Damorian Dante Hall v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00171-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00171-CR No. 02-25-00172-CR ___________________________

DAMORIAN DANTE HALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 1474436D, 1493382D

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Damorian Dante Hall appeals the trial court’s judgments adjudicating

his guilt after revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision. We affirm

the trial court’s judgment as modified.

I. Procedural Background

In 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hall pled guilty (in trial court cause

number 1474436D) to aggravated robbery and (in cause number 1493382D) to

indecency with a child by exposure. The trial court placed him on seven years’

deferred adjudication with a $700 fine in each case.

Within months, the State petitioned to proceed to adjudication in both cases,

alleging that Hall had violated multiple terms and conditions of his community

supervision.1 At the hearing on the State’s amended petitions, Hall pled “true” to all

the paragraphs but one—which the State then abandoned—in each of the amended

petitions.

The trial court accepted Hall’s pleas of true and sentenced him to ten years’

imprisonment in the indecency case and fifteen years’ imprisonment in the robbery

case. The trial court did not orally pronounce a fine at that time; however, its

judgment in the indecency case includes a $700 fine, and its judgment in the robbery

case includes a $659 fine. Each judgment also includes a “Special Finding” that Hall

1 The State later amended its petition in each case. The specific allegations in the petitions are not at issue in this appeal.

2 owes reparations in the amount of $415 (in the indecency case) and $4,718 (in the

robbery case). Further, the judgment in the robbery case reflects that Hall is ordered

to pay $2,560 in “Reimbursement Fees.” Hall timely filed a notice of appeal in each

case, and the trial court appointed him appellate counsel.

II. Anders Brief and Motion to Withdraw

With a supporting brief, Hall’s court-appointed appellate attorney has moved to

withdraw as counsel. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396,

1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders, which

requires presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why

there are no arguable grounds for reversal. Id., 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Hall’s counsel

provided him with a copy of the Anders brief and his motion to withdraw, notified

him by letter of his right to file a pro se response and to file a petition for

discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals, and provided him with a form

motion for pro se access to the appellate record. Hall did not file the form motion or

a pro se response in this court.

Although he argues in his Anders brief that “this appeal is non-meritorious,”

Hall’s counsel directs our attention to “issues pertaining to the trial court’s assessment

of outstanding fines, fees, [and] reparations.” He contends that the fines and

reparation orders should be deleted from the judgments and that the trial court

abused its discretion by ordering Hall to pay reimbursement for attorney’s fees

because the trial court did not find that there had been a material change in Hall’s

3 financial circumstances.2 The State did not file a brief but instead filed a letter stating

that it agrees with Hall’s counsel that Hall has no meritorious grounds upon which to

advance an appeal in this case and that it “further agrees with [Hall]’s counsel

regarding the fines and reimbursement fees.” 3 With one exception, so do we.

III. Our Analysis

We have independently examined the record, as is our duty upon the filing of

an Anders brief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);

Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); see also

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). After carefully reviewing

the record, we have determined that—other than some correctable errors in the

judgments and bills of costs pertaining to fines and other improper assessments—the

appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Our independent review of the record

reveals nothing further that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State,

178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684,

685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

2 The court appreciates counsel’s diligence and earnest evaluation of the record for any discernable error. In the future, court-appointed counsel practicing before this court are welcome to file a merits brief if the only issue on appeal is clerical error requiring modification, but not reversal, of the trial court’s judgment. 3 The State’s letter does not expressly address the reparations. For the reasons below, we will modify the judgments to delete the fines in both cases and the reimbursement fees and the reparations in the robbery case, but we will not delete the $415 in reparations in the indecency case.

4 A. The Fines

When an accused receives deferred adjudication community supervision, no

sentence is imposed. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Then, when guilt is adjudicated, the judgment adjudicating guilt sets aside the order

deferring adjudication, including any previously imposed fine. Id. When a variation

exists between the oral pronouncement of sentence at adjudication and the written

memorialization of the sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. Id.

Because the trial court did not orally pronounce any fine at the time it revoked

Hall’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of the underlying offense, and

sentenced him, the judgments must be modified to delete the fines. See id.; see also

Demerson v. State, No. 02-18-00003-CR, 2018 WL 3580893, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth July 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

B. The “Reimbursement Fees” in the Robbery Case

We may modify a trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors that contradict

the record. Alexander v. State, 496 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see Bray v.

State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that an

appellate court has the authority to modify a judgment in an Anders appeal). Because

“[o]nly statutorily authorized court costs may be assessed against a criminal

defendant,” Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), we may

modify the bill of costs to reflect the appropriate statutory costs and to delete

improper charges. See id. at 396.

5 Here, the bill of costs in the robbery case clarifies that the $2,560 in

“Reimbursement Fees” listed in the judgment is for attorney’s fees under Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 26.05. Article 26.05(g) “requires a present determination

of financial resources,” and the defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay are

explicit, critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering

reimbursement of costs and fees. Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251–

52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Although the record indicates that Hall initially had retained counsel after first

being charged with aggravated robbery back in 2016, that counsel withdrew in 2018.

Hall was then appointed counsel, who was his attorney at the time of his guilty plea.

He also had court-appointed counsel in the revocation proceeding. Nothing in the

record shows that Hall had the ability to pay attorney’s fees when he originally pled

guilty or when his community supervision was revoked.4 Accordingly, we delete the

$2,560 in “Reimbursement Fees” from the judgment and the corresponding

attorney’s-fee charge from the bill of costs in the robbery case. See Ruyle v. State,

No. 02-24-00199-CR, 2025 WL 938131, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2025,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

We also strike as premature the $25 time-payment fee listed in the bill of costs

and incorporated into the order to withdraw funds from Hall’s inmate trust account.

We note that all the orders appointing Hall counsel, including appellate 4

counsel, reflect his “Indigency Status” as “Full.”

6 Due to Hall’s offense date, we apply the former version of the time-payment-fee

statute. 5 The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[t]he pendency of an appeal

stops the clock for purposes of the time[-]payment fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d

129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Thus, imposition of the time-payment fee against

Hall is premature because Hall’s timely appeal tolled the time for him to pay the court

costs re-imposed in the judgment. See Garza v. State, No. 02-20-00155-CR,

2022 WL 488933, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem op.,

not designated for publication). The assessment of the time-payment fee against Hall

should accordingly be deleted without prejudice to future assessment if, more than

thirty days after mandate issues, Hall has failed to fully pay any other court cost

imposed. See Dulin, 620 S.W.3d at 133; Garza, 2022 WL 488933, at *4.

5 Former Local Government Code Section 133.103 provided that

a person convicted of an offense shall pay . . . a fee of $25 if the person: (1) has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor; and (2) pays any part of a fine, court costs, or restitution on or after the 31st day after the date on which a judgment is entered assessing the fine, court costs, or restitution.

Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 209, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 979, 996–97, redesignated as Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.030. The redesignated section became effective on January 1, 2020, and applies only to convictions with offense dates on or after that date. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, §§ 2.54, 4.40(33), 5.01, 5.04, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4010, 4035. Because Hall’s offenses were committed in 2016 and 2018, the former statute applies.

7 C. The Reparations

We have previously held that when reparations are comparable to fees—and

are therefore not punishment and not part of a defendant’s sentence—they do not

have to be included in the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence to be properly

included in the written judgment. See Brown v. State, No. 02-08-00063-CR,

2009 WL 1905231, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 2, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). To include such fees, however, the State

must supply evidence that the defendant actually owes them. Lewis v. State,

423 S.W.3d 451, 460–61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d); see also Romo v.

State, No. 02-23-00197-CR, 2024 WL 1100790, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Mar. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, we have

struck reparations when we were unable to determine the authority for their

imposition. See Lewis, 423 S.W.3d at 461; see also Harris v. State, No. 02-25-00173-CR,

2026 WL 1041694, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 16, 2026, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases, including Lewis and Romo).

Here, the trial court’s judgment in the robbery case includes a “Special

Finding” ordering Hall to pay $4,718 in reparations. However, the trial court did not

orally pronounce these reparations at sentencing, and there is nothing in the record

itemizing them or explaining their purpose. Outside of the judgment itself, the only

record reference to “reparations” is found in a docket entry dated May 27, 2025—the

day of the revocation hearing. In pertinent part, this entry states, consistent with the

8 judgment, “REPARATIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,718.00 PAYABLE.”

Further, although it does not use the word “reparations,” the order to withdraw funds

dated June 3, 2025, states that Hall “currently has incurred court fees and costs in the

District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, as above entitled and represented in the

certified Judgment and Bill of Costs attached hereto in the amount of $8,251.00.”

This number equals the sum total of the $4,718 in reparations; the $2,560 in attorney’s

fees; the $659 fine; and the $314 in court costs reflected in the judgment. However,

the record contains no other evidence showing that Hall actually owes any reparations

and no support for the $4,718 amount.

On this record, there is nothing that would allow us to determine what portion

of the $4,718, if any, is for fines—which must be orally pronounced at sentencing—

and what portion is merely for fees and costs. Compare Bradley v. State,

No. 02-17-00009-CR, 2017 WL 5895350, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 30,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment

adjudicating guilt to delete fine where trial court did not include fine in its oral

pronouncement of sentence at probationer’s revocation hearing), with Brown,

2009 WL 1905231, at *2 (holding that reparations need not be orally pronounced

when they are comparable to fees).

Unlike the record in the robbery case, however, the record in the indecency

case contains some support for the $415 in reparations that Hall was ordered to pay.

A “Revocation Restitution / Reparation Balance Sheet” filed May 27, 2025, breaks

9 down the $415 in reparations as $10 “Due to CSCD - CRIME STOPPERS” and

$405 “Due to CSCD - SEX OFFENDER SPECIAL FEE.” The record also reflects

that Hall was ordered to pay “CRIME STOPPERS . . . the amount of $20.00” in

2018 and “a sex offender fee of $5.00 each month” as conditions of his deferred

adjudication community supervision. We have previously held that such a “Balance

Sheet” supports a reparations award where the record also reflects that the fees

itemized in the Balance Sheet were fees that the appellant was ordered to pay as a

condition of his probation. See Hongpathoum v. State, 578 S.W.3d 213, 217 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2019, no pet.);6 see also Garza, 2022 WL 488933, at *2–3 & n.2; Levine v.

State, No. 02-19-00414-CR, 2020 WL 5414974, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept.

10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (clarifying that although

“evidentiary-sufficiency principles do not apply to reparations,” the reparations

“must . . . have some sort of record support”). We similarly hold that the record in the

indecency case supports the $415 that Hall was ordered to pay in reparations.

IV. Disposition and Conclusion

In appellate cause number 02-25-00171-CR (the robbery case), we modify the

judgment to delete the $659 fine, the $2,560 in “Reimbursement Fees,” and the

$4,718 in reparations. We also modify the robbery case’s bill of costs to strike the

6 As we wrote in Hongpathoum, “[c]ommunity supervision” and “probation” are synonymous and generally used interchangeably. 578 S.W.3d at 214 n.1 (quoting Maslyk v. State, No. 02-16-00295-CR, 2017 WL 2289098, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)).

10 $2,560 reimbursement and $25 time-payment line items and to reflect that Hall owes

nothing in reimbursement fees. We will strike the time-payment fee without prejudice,

however, because it may be assessed if Hall fails to completely pay his other court

costs more than thirty days after the issuance of the appellate mandate in this case.

See Dulin, 620 S.W.3d at 133. We modify the order to withdraw funds from Hall’s

inmate trust account to reduce the amount of court fees and costs that Hall owes to

$289.

In appellate cause number 02-25-00172-CR (the indecency case), we modify the

judgment to delete the $700 fine. We also modify the order to withdraw funds from

Hall’s inmate trust account to reduce the amount of court fees and costs that Hall

owes to $1,054. 7

Except for these necessary modifications, we agree with Hall’s appointed

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d

at 827–28. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw; modify the judgments, the orders

to withdraw, and—in the robbery case only—the bill of costs to reflect the above

deletions; and affirm the judgments as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bray,

179 S.W.3d at 729.

This amount equals the sum total of the $639 in court costs and $415 in 7

reparations.

11 /s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice

Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 25, 2026