Damion Burns v. Eric Bryant, et al.

District Court, M.D. Georgia·Decided May 13, 2026·No. 1:24-cv-00154·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBANY DIVISION

DAMION BURNS, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : Case No. 1:24-cv-154-LAG-ALS : ERIC BRYANT, et al., : : Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff brought this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 10, 2024. (Doc. 1). Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 29). For the reasons which follow, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that Plaintiff’s Recast Complaint be dismissed. Background Plaintiff alleges in relevant part that he was detained in Sumter County Law Enforcement Center (“Sumter”) in Americus, Georgia, from July 4, 2024 to October 10, 2024. (Doc. 8, at 5). Plaintiff contends that the dorm in which he was held was “unfit to live in[,]” due to mold, the lack of cleaning supplies, and insect infestation. Id. Plaintiff asserts that he developed a “staph infection and strep infections” on his genitals due to the unsanitary conditions. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff seeks damages. Id. at 8. On preliminary review of the Recast Complaint, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to safety against Defendants Sheriff Bryant, Lieutenant Wakefield, and Captain Mason to proceed for further factual development. (Doc. 14). Discussion Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing in relevant part that Plaintiff’s Recast Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Alternatively, they also argue that the Eleventh Amendment

bars Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, and that because Plaintiff did not suffer more than de minimis harm, he cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages. (Doc. 29-1). Despite being notified (Doc. 30) of his right and obligation to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff did not file a response. This matter is ripe for review. The Court agrees that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and it recommends that Defendants’ Motion be granted on that basis. As a result, the Court declines to address Defendants’ alternative arguments. Exhaustion Standards “Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement and not generally an adjudication on the merits, an exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the

proper subject for a summary judgment; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such is the case here, as Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, the Court will treat the Motion as a Motion to Dismiss. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). When a grievance procedure is provided for prisoners, “an inmate alleging harm suffered from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.” Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires compliance with an agency’s procedural rules.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must properly take each step within the administrative process. If their initial grievance is denied, prisoners must then file a timely appeal.” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “The critical function of the grievance process is that it provides the institution with notice of a problem such that they have an opportunity to address the problem internally.” Toenniges v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 600 F. App’x 645, 649 (11th Cir. 2015).

“[D]eciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a two-step process.” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). “First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true.” Id. If, taking the plaintiff’s facts as being true, the defendant is entitled to dismissal for failure to exhaust, then the complaint should be dismissed. Id. “If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step . . . the court then proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” Id. The defendant bears the burden of proof during this second step. Id. In resolving the factual dispute, a court is authorized to make credibility determinations. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1377-78 (finding district court did not clearly err in determining plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied access to grievance forms was not credible); see also Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072, 1082-83 (11th Cir. 2018) (upholding district court’s weighing of the evidence and

credibility determination to find that one of the inmate’s grievances was not filed). Further, since dismissal for failure to exhaust is not an adjudication on the merits, the court can resolve factual disputes using evidence from outside the pleadings. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376-77. TURNER Step One Defendants do not address whether Plaintiff’s Recast Complaint is subject to dismissal under Turner Step One. However, having considered Plaintiff’s allegations regarding exhaustion in his Recast Complaint (Doc. 8, at 3-4), and finding that he sufficiently alleges exhaustion of his remedies, the Court will proceed to the second Turner step and make specific findings based upon the evidence as submitted by the parties and resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.

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Damion Burns v. Eric Bryant, et al., (M.D. Ga. 2026).

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Related

Brown v. Sikes
212 F.3d 1205 (Eleventh Circuit, 2000)
Bryant v. Rich
530 F.3d 1368 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Turner v. Burnside
541 F.3d 1077 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. Deshawn Travis Glover
686 F.3d 1203 (Eleventh Circuit, 2012)
Toenniges v. Georgia Department of Corrections
600 F. App'x 645 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Shawn Wayne Whatley v. Ware SP Warden
898 F.3d 1072 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)