Damicela Iglesias Torralba v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-1103
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 5, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-1103 Lower Tribunal Nos. F19-15745, F19-23949, F20-12435, F21-13392, F23-16943 ________________

Damicela Iglesias Torralba, Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Shearon Cruz, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Thornton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Haccord J. Curry, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Black v. State, 59 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)

(“[W]e review the trial court's findings that are based on hearing each

[officer]’s live testimony under the ordinary ‘competent and substantial

evidence’ standard. However, to the extent that the trial court’s findings are

based on viewing the [bodycam footage], which this court of course has also

viewed, we utilize a much less deferential standard.”); Hall v. State, 414 So.

3d 345, 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“We have reviewed the video evidence,

and we conclude that [a]ppellant’s actions resolved any arguable ambiguity

in h[er] spoken words and established consent . . . .”); State v. Baez, 894 So.

2d 115, 117 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]he totality of the circumstances controls in cases

involving the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Gamez, 34 So. 3d 245, 247–49

(Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Consent to search may be in the form of conduct,

gestures, or words. . . . [T]here was no evidence that [appellant] suffered

from a vulnerable, subjective state, caused by a mental condition, age,

intelligence, or education. We also note that there was no evidence of a

coercive circumstance or any coercive conduct by [the officers], such as a

show of force, threatening conduct, a prolonged detention, or deception.”

(internal citations omitted)); State v. Ojeda, 147 So. 3d 53, 58 (Fla. 3d DCA

2014) (“[Appellant] volunteered to ‘cooperate with whatever [she was]

asked.’ [Officer Rivera] then asked h[er] to sign the consent form.

2 [Appellant] did so upon the first request.”); Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So.

2d 592, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“A suspect is more likely to be overawed

by one officer speaking in an insistent, demanding tone than is a suspect

who is addressed in a low-key manner in an encounter with several

officers. . . . Even though the presence of such a number of officers might

heighten the potential for coercion, given the other circumstances present

here, we conclude that the number of officers present did not have a coercive

impact on [appellant].”); Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1193 (Fla. 2006)

(“[T]his otherwise consensual encounter did not mature into a seizure simply

because the police retained [appellant]’s identification which [s]he had

consensually and voluntarily produced . . . .”).