Dameron v. . Gold

17 N.C. 17
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided June 5, 1831·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Hctfot, J udgp,

after stating the case as above, proceeded as follows : Tiffs court finds ho reason to be dissatisfied with the mode of conducting the trial, or the opinions held by the judge of the Superior Court. They seem to be correct, and conformable to the settled law. But supposing the verdict to stand, whether all of the plaintiffs, or which of them are entitled to a decree, or whether any decree can he made against any of the defendants, except Mary Gold, arc questions of more consequence, and remain to he disposed of.

The children of Gold have no right or direct interest In this property, as the estate of Dameron. It is a ques- *- A , A tion, whether the distributive share of their mother vested in. their father upon the intermarriage, or survived to *■ ° 7 *20 her, upon his death, before an account of Dameron’s estate. bail been taken, and distribution made. The court does not mean to determine that question ; and indeed could not do it, since Gold’s administrator is not before ^hc c0Ul’^ If) however, it did survive to the mother, those pi aintiffs have ho interest whatever in the fund, ^ vested in the father, it came to his administrator j who alone can call for the estate; for there may be debts, When an administrator de bonis non shall be appointed, and gets the property, there will be a trust for the children and widow, after creditors are satisfied. Under either aspect, the children of Gold cannot maintain this suit. And the bill must, therefore, as to them, be dismissed with costs, except as to the defendant, Marij.

Becanse ifthe share of the wife cond^ husband," his administrator it^and if it sw- vives to her, the no'rig-ht to itC A court of ’■qaity kas^ a tion on the bill ¿/(«■I a rainst the truste£amSt ttó , l^u.t where sl third person claims a leg».! title adversely to the trustee, a <nra?against the trustee and son^drawln/the question of title equiiy,lgcamiotn he maintained,

The children of liameron can sustain this bill, as against the administratrix of their father, for an account and distribution. And as to the negroes in question, :ire certainly, as between' these parties, to be considered as those of Üumeron. To that purpose, the ver-* diet was not necessary. Mrs. Gold had confessed the right of the plaintiffs before. Indeed, I must suppose, from the proofs, and the whole course of the proceedings, that she never contested it,- and was made a defendant, not to try the right against herself, so much as to bring a case into - court, in which the right might be tried against the other defendants.

But whether the right, as against those other defend- * o ants, can be tried in this manner, is a very different and material question, and comes now to be considered, x k rom their answer, which is supported by direct and di vers I)ro°Ist B is clear, that before, and at the bringing of this suit, the defendant, Mary, claimed the negroes *or ^iei‘se^ aní^her children, as the gift of her father to her husband Dameron, and was in the exclusive posses-sio'n under .that claim. Indeed, the bill itself charges., that the other defendants were then suing Mary Gold, to compel a division and delivery of them, and the answer of those defendants admits the fact. The caséis, then, that of a trustee in possession, claiming to hold according to the trust j and a third pai'ty, out of possession *21 claiming by a different and distinct title, and denying the right, at law, of the trustee. In such a case, the ' eesíui que'trust, has filed a bill against the trustee and the adverse claimants, to have the conflicting legal titles litigated and determined here. Can such a bill be supported ?

It cannot be sustained as a bill of inter-pleader, because the/plaintiffs are not in possession. And it aeemSy that the trustee cannot to protect himself draw the u-s/ui que trust and a stranger into litigation. Nor can one in possession, under a legal title, sue one out of possession, to have a pretended title oí the latter declared void, unless upon 'some peculiar ground of equity juródiptiftip

It may be here remarked, that this question is not at all connected with, nor does. any consequence from the former orders, tend to determine it. The issue was directed, because there seemed to be great doubt upon the question of fact, which might be found against the plaintiffs. If so found, it would bo decisive against them. It is true, the court did not then consider the effect of a finding the other way, as has happened. But that finding leaves the equity and question of jurisdiction’open for a decision, upon their proper principles. Supposing then the gift to be established, as far as a verdict on an Issue out of chancery establishes anything, the inquiry recurs, can this bill bo sustained ?

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Dameron v. . Gold, 17 N.C. 17 (N.C. 1831).

17 N.C. 17 (Dameron v. . Gold) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

State Ex Rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe
122 S.W.2d 909 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1938)