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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DAMASCUS LORD SEYMOUR MENEFEE, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05616-JNW-DWC 11 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 v. Noting Date: November 21, 2025 13 CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF, 14 Respondent. 15
The District Court has referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 16 Christel. Petitioner Damascus Menefee, a pre-trial detainee currently housed at Washington 17 County Jail (“WCJ”) in Oregon, filed a federal habeas Petition (Dkt. 6) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 18 when he was detained at Clark County Jail (“CCJ”) in Washington. The Court has reviewed the 19 Petition and Petitioner’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (“Response”) (Dkt. 13) 20 and concludes the Petition is moot, unexhausted, and it is inappropriate for the Court to intervene 21 in this case. Therefore, the Court recommends the Petition be dismissed with prejudice and a 22 certificate of appealability not be issued. 23 24 1 I. Background 2 In the Petition and the Response, Petitioner contends that he is being unlawfully detained 3 and was unlawfully extradited to WCJ because his waiver of extradition was invalid, 4 unintentional, and/or given under duress. Dkt. 6 at 6–7; Dkt. 13 at 8. Despite being somewhat
5 unclear, it appears that Petitioner states that jail officials at CCJ illegally allowed his extradition 6 to WCJ. Dkt. 13 at 8. Since filing the Petition, Petitioner has been extradited to Oregon and is 7 facing several criminal charges there. See Id. at 11–15; Dkt. 15. Based on the Petition and the 8 Response, Petitioner does appear to have presented this claim before a trial court in Washington 9 but has not presented it before any other forum in the Washington courts. Dkt. 6 at 2–5; see 10 generally Dkt. 13. 11 II. Discussion 12 After screening the Petition and considering the Response, the Court finds that the 13 Petition is moot, Petitioner has not shown he exhausted available state remedies, and it would be 14 inappropriate for the federal court to intervene in this case. Therefore, the Court recommends
15 dismissal of this § 2241 Petition with prejudice. 16 A. Mootness 17 When Petitioner was detained at CCJ, he filed the Petition and challenged his proposed 18 extradition to Oregon and requested his release because there were no pending criminal charges 19 against him in Washington. See generally Dkt. 6. Since filing the Petition, Petitioner was 20 extradited from CCJ and sent to WCJ in Oregon. Dkt. 15. 21 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a petition for writ of habeas corpus may be brought in 22 federal court by one who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 23 United States.” For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be an actual case
24 1 or controversy at the time the case is decided. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). 2 When an alleged wrongful conduct has ceased and there is no reasonable expectation that it will 3 be repeated, an action to enjoin that wrong is moot. See id. at 402–03. If a party seeking relief 4 cannot obtain the requested relief, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of
5 jurisdiction. Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999). Regarding extradition 6 proceedings: 7 A fugitive can challenge extradition by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, but the purpose of the writ is very limited because it only affects his detention in the 8 asylum state. It does not affect the underlying charges against him. Once the fugitive is returned to the demanding state, the right to challenge extradition 9 becomes moot: the fugitive is no longer being detained by the asylum state, and so, the legality of his or her detention there is no longer at issue. 10 Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1298 (6th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up); Johnson v. Buie, 312 11 F.Supp 1349, 1351 (W.D. Miss. April 9, 1970) (“The theory behind permitting the fugitive to 12 petition for habeas corpus in the asylum state is that it is a method of challenging the legality of 13 his detention there.”). 14 Here, the Petition challenging his extradition to Oregon is moot because Petitioner is no 15 longer in Washington. Petitioner is no longer in Respondent’s custody, so he can no longer 16 obtain the relief he requests in the Petition, making the Petition moot. Thus, the Court 17 recommends the Petition be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. See Ruvalcaba¸167 18 F.3d at 521. 19 Alternatively, as discussed in the next two sections, the Petition should be dismissed 20 because Petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies and federal intervention would be 21 inappropriate under the Younger abstention doctrine. 22 23 24 1 B. Exhaustion 2 “[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a 3 federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 4 (1971). Petitioner’s claims will be considered exhausted only after “the state courts [have been
5 afforded] a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference 6 from the federal judiciary.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). “[S]tate prisoners must 7 give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 8 complete round of the State’s established appellate review.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 9 838, 845 (1999). 10 Although there is no exhaustion requirement mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), the 11 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held exhaustion is necessary as a matter of comity unless 12 special circumstances warrant federal intervention before a state criminal trial. Carden v. 13 Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83–84 (9th Cir. 1980); see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 14 Petitioner fails to show he exhausted state court remedies by presenting federal constitutional or
15 statutory claims to the Washington courts for a full review of the extradition process against him. 16 In neither the Petition nor the Response does Petitioner state that he exhausted his claims. Dkt. 6; 17 Dkt. 13. And Petitioner has not shown special circumstances warranting federal intervention in 18 this case. Therefore, the Court finds the Petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state 19 court remedies. 20 C. Younger Abstention 21 Petitioner’s case is also not appropriate in federal court under the Younger abstention 22 doctrine. Under Younger, abstention from interference with pending state judicial proceedings is 23 appropriate if (1) the proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state
24 1 interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal 2 questions. Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir.
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DAMASCUS LORD SEYMOUR MENEFEE, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05616-JNW-DWC 11 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 v. Noting Date: November 21, 2025 13 CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF, 14 Respondent. 15
The District Court has referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 16 Christel. Petitioner Damascus Menefee, a pre-trial detainee currently housed at Washington 17 County Jail (“WCJ”) in Oregon, filed a federal habeas Petition (Dkt. 6) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 18 when he was detained at Clark County Jail (“CCJ”) in Washington. The Court has reviewed the 19 Petition and Petitioner’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (“Response”) (Dkt. 13) 20 and concludes the Petition is moot, unexhausted, and it is inappropriate for the Court to intervene 21 in this case. Therefore, the Court recommends the Petition be dismissed with prejudice and a 22 certificate of appealability not be issued. 23 24 1 I. Background 2 In the Petition and the Response, Petitioner contends that he is being unlawfully detained 3 and was unlawfully extradited to WCJ because his waiver of extradition was invalid, 4 unintentional, and/or given under duress. Dkt. 6 at 6–7; Dkt. 13 at 8. Despite being somewhat
5 unclear, it appears that Petitioner states that jail officials at CCJ illegally allowed his extradition 6 to WCJ. Dkt. 13 at 8. Since filing the Petition, Petitioner has been extradited to Oregon and is 7 facing several criminal charges there. See Id. at 11–15; Dkt. 15. Based on the Petition and the 8 Response, Petitioner does appear to have presented this claim before a trial court in Washington 9 but has not presented it before any other forum in the Washington courts. Dkt. 6 at 2–5; see 10 generally Dkt. 13. 11 II. Discussion 12 After screening the Petition and considering the Response, the Court finds that the 13 Petition is moot, Petitioner has not shown he exhausted available state remedies, and it would be 14 inappropriate for the federal court to intervene in this case. Therefore, the Court recommends
15 dismissal of this § 2241 Petition with prejudice. 16 A. Mootness 17 When Petitioner was detained at CCJ, he filed the Petition and challenged his proposed 18 extradition to Oregon and requested his release because there were no pending criminal charges 19 against him in Washington. See generally Dkt. 6. Since filing the Petition, Petitioner was 20 extradited from CCJ and sent to WCJ in Oregon. Dkt. 15. 21 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a petition for writ of habeas corpus may be brought in 22 federal court by one who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 23 United States.” For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be an actual case
24 1 or controversy at the time the case is decided. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). 2 When an alleged wrongful conduct has ceased and there is no reasonable expectation that it will 3 be repeated, an action to enjoin that wrong is moot. See id. at 402–03. If a party seeking relief 4 cannot obtain the requested relief, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of
5 jurisdiction. Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999). Regarding extradition 6 proceedings: 7 A fugitive can challenge extradition by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, but the purpose of the writ is very limited because it only affects his detention in the 8 asylum state. It does not affect the underlying charges against him. Once the fugitive is returned to the demanding state, the right to challenge extradition 9 becomes moot: the fugitive is no longer being detained by the asylum state, and so, the legality of his or her detention there is no longer at issue. 10 Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1298 (6th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up); Johnson v. Buie, 312 11 F.Supp 1349, 1351 (W.D. Miss. April 9, 1970) (“The theory behind permitting the fugitive to 12 petition for habeas corpus in the asylum state is that it is a method of challenging the legality of 13 his detention there.”). 14 Here, the Petition challenging his extradition to Oregon is moot because Petitioner is no 15 longer in Washington. Petitioner is no longer in Respondent’s custody, so he can no longer 16 obtain the relief he requests in the Petition, making the Petition moot. Thus, the Court 17 recommends the Petition be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. See Ruvalcaba¸167 18 F.3d at 521. 19 Alternatively, as discussed in the next two sections, the Petition should be dismissed 20 because Petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies and federal intervention would be 21 inappropriate under the Younger abstention doctrine. 22 23 24 1 B. Exhaustion 2 “[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a 3 federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 4 (1971). Petitioner’s claims will be considered exhausted only after “the state courts [have been
5 afforded] a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference 6 from the federal judiciary.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). “[S]tate prisoners must 7 give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 8 complete round of the State’s established appellate review.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 9 838, 845 (1999). 10 Although there is no exhaustion requirement mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), the 11 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held exhaustion is necessary as a matter of comity unless 12 special circumstances warrant federal intervention before a state criminal trial. Carden v. 13 Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83–84 (9th Cir. 1980); see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 14 Petitioner fails to show he exhausted state court remedies by presenting federal constitutional or
15 statutory claims to the Washington courts for a full review of the extradition process against him. 16 In neither the Petition nor the Response does Petitioner state that he exhausted his claims. Dkt. 6; 17 Dkt. 13. And Petitioner has not shown special circumstances warranting federal intervention in 18 this case. Therefore, the Court finds the Petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state 19 court remedies. 20 C. Younger Abstention 21 Petitioner’s case is also not appropriate in federal court under the Younger abstention 22 doctrine. Under Younger, abstention from interference with pending state judicial proceedings is 23 appropriate if (1) the proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state
24 1 interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal 2 questions. Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994); Middlesex 3 Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). First, though 4 Petitioner alleges that he does not have criminal charges against him in Washington, he concedes
5 he is a pre-trial detainee with ongoing state criminal proceedings in Oregon. See Dkt. 13 at 10– 6 15. Second, as these proceedings involve criminal prosecutions, they implicate important state 7 interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49, (1986); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Third, 8 Petitioner has failed to allege facts showing he has been denied an adequate opportunity to 9 address the alleged constitutional violations in the state court proceedings. Last, granting the 10 Petition would effectively enjoin the ongoing state judicial proceedings against Petitioner 11 because invalidating his extradition to Oregon to face criminal charges there would upend the 12 prosecution against Petitioner for his alleged crimes. Accordingly, Younger abstention applies to 13 this case. 14 In extraordinary cases, a federal court can intervene in a pending state matter
15 notwithstanding the Younger abstention rule. Federal injunctive relief against pending state 16 prosecutions is appropriate “[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by 17 state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other 18 extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown[.]” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 19 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); Carden, 626 F.2d at 84 (Younger abstention appropriate despite the 20 prosecution’s allegedly “unfair” charging practices and “deliberate delay” of the proceedings). 21 Petitioner has failed to show injunctive relief is appropriate in this case. 22 23
24 1 D. Conclusion 2 The Petition is moot, Petitioner has failed to show he exhausted his state remedies, and 3 federal intervention would be inappropriate under the Younger abstention doctrine. Therefore, 4 the Court recommends the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
5 III. Certificate of Appealability 6 A state detainee who is proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a Certificate of 7 Appealability (“COA”) under § 2253(c)(1)(A) in order to challenge process issued by a state 8 court. Wislon v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2009). A COA may be issued only where a 9 petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2253(c)(3). A petitioner satisfies this standard “by demonstrating that jurists of reason could 11 disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could 12 conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller- 13 El. v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Under this standard, Petitioner is not entitled to a 14 COA. If Petitioner believes the Court should issue a COA, he should set forth his reasons in his
15 objections to this Report and Recommendation. 16 IV. Conclusion 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends the Petition (Dkt. 6) be dismissed with 18 prejudice. The Court also recommends a COA not be issued. 19 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall have 20 fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of de novo 22 review by the district judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Accommodating the time limit 23
24 1 imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on November 21, 2 2025, as noted in the caption. 3 Dated this 30th day of October, 2025. 4 A 5 David W. Christel Chief United States Magistrate Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24