Daly Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of County Commissioners

81 P. 950, 33 Mont. 101, 1905 Mont. LEXIS 90
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 29, 1905
DocketNo. 2,144
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 81 P. 950 (Daly Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of County Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daly Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 81 P. 950, 33 Mont. 101, 1905 Mont. LEXIS 90 (Mo. 1905).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE' HOLLOWAY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This controversy was submitted to the trial court under the provisions of sections 2050, 2051 and 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The agreed statement sets forth at length the facts that the Daly Bank and Trust Company is a corporation organized under the provisions of Chapter I, Title III, Division I, Part IV, of the Civil Code of Montana, and was transacting a banking and trust business on the first Monday of March, 1903. Then follows a statement of the amount of its capital stock and undivided profits, the names of the stockholders, and the amount of capital stock owned by_ each, and a [103]*103statement of the bank made on the first Monday of Mareh, 1903, showing its resources and liabilities in detail. It .is then set forth that the bank made a return to the assessor as required by the provisions of sections 3691-3694 of the Political Code of Montana; that from this statement it appeared that the amount invested in real estate by the bank was $45,000, and the amount invested in banking furniture and fixtures $4,500; that the surplus and undivided profits amounted to $36,500; that the real estate and personal property was returned as assessable to the bank, and the capital stock, less the amount invested in real estate and personal property, returned as taxable to the several stockholders in proportion to the number of shares owned by each; that this assessment was accepted by the assessor, and spread upon the assessment-roll, passed upon and approved by the board of equalization, the tax extended, the tax-roll turned over to the county treasurer, who demanded and received from the bank and from the stockholders, through the agency of the bank, the taxes assessed upon the property so returned; that thereafter, on December 17, 1903, without giving the bank any notice whatever, the assessor of Silver Bow county, acting under the direction of the board of county commissioners, assessed to this bank solvent credits over and above the original assessment of $1,160,105; that by direction of the board of county commissioners this assessment was returned to the county treasurer, and by him extended on the assessment-roll, and the tax, amounting to $19,257.73, demanded from the bank. This gave rise to this controversy, whieh was submitted to the district court upon the agreement that, if the court should find that the assessment of $1,160,105 was improperly made, then the tax thereon should be canceled and held void; but in case the court should find that it was properly made, then judgment should be entered against the bank for that amount of the tax. The court found the assessment to be void, and entered judgment canceling the same. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

All parties to the controversy had apparently proceeded upon [104]*104the theory that the property of a state bank or trust company can only be taxed, in the manner provided by section 611 of the Civil Code. But after the tax had been paid upon the bank’s assessment as returned by it, it appears that the board of commissioners entertained some doubt as to whether or not the solvent credits of a state bank or trust company are not also taxable, without any deduction being allowed or permitted for the debts of such bank or trust company, and it was apparently for the purpose of securing an adjudication upon this matter that the assessor was directed to assess to the bank its solvent credits and to direct the treasurer to collect the tax upon the same. While the circumstances attending the making of this supplemental assessment precluded the parties from presenting succinctly the matters actually in controversy, still, by brushing aside all purely technical objections, including the questions as to whether the assessor could -make the assessment at the time or in the manner in which he did, whether such assessment could be made without notice to the bank, and whether or not the bank sought to have deducted from its solvent credits its bona fide debts or had an opportunity to do so, we are able then to determine that the parties to the agreed statement of facts sought to have settled the question: What property of a state bank or trust company is subject to taxation and in what manner ?

The position of respondent is that its property is only assessable in the manner provided by section 611 of the Civil Code; while that of the appellants apparently is that solvent credits of a state bank or trust company are also taxable, and that, too, without any deduction being allowed therefrom for bona fide debts. We are unable to agree with either of the parties.

1. Section 611 of the Civil Code provides: “Sec. 611. The property of the corporation organized under this act shall be assessed for taxes in the same manner as the property of national banks, and no other.” This section is clearly unconstitutional. In the absence of congressional action, this state could not tax any property of a national bank, and its property can only be [105]*105taxed to the extent that the general government has granted to the state permission to do so. Section 5219 of the United States Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 3502) limits that right to taxing to the bank its real estate, and to the stockholders the sharps of capital stock owned by them. This excludes from taxation by the state all personal property owned by a national bank. (First Nat. Bank v. Province, 20 Mont. 374, 51 Pac. 821.) And under section 611, above, all the personal property of a state bank or trust company would likewise be exempt from taxation if a state bank or trust company can only be taxed in the manner in which a national bank is taxed. But this exemption, as applied to the personal property of a state bank or trust company, is in direct contravention of sections 1 and 7 of Article XII of the Constitution of Montana, which provide:

“Section 1. The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance of the state shall be provided by the legislative assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, except that specially provided for in this article. ’!

* ‘ Section 7. The power to tax corporations or corporate property shall never be relinquished or suspended, and all corporations in this state, or doing business therein, shall be subject to taxation fqr state, county, school, municipal and other purposes, on real and personal property owned or used by them and not by this Constitution exempted from taxation.” (See, also, Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis and Clark County, 28 Mont. 484, 98 Am. St. Rep. 572, 72 Pac. 982.)

What property of a state bank or trust company, then, is subject to taxation? Section 1 of Article XII, above, provides that the legislative assembly shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, except that particularly exempted; and section 7 of Article XII, above prescribes that every corporation shall be subject to taxation on real and personal property owned or used by it, and not exempt [106]*106from taxation; while section 3670 of the Political Code provides that “all property in this state is subject to taxation; except as provided in the next section.” The next section referred to merely contains exemptions mentioned in section 2 of Article XII of the- Constitution. These are general provisions, and are limited by section 17 of Article XII, which provides: “See. 17.

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Bluebook (online)
81 P. 950, 33 Mont. 101, 1905 Mont. LEXIS 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daly-bank-trust-co-v-board-of-county-commissioners-mont-1905.