Dalton v. Clanton

559 A.2d 1197, 1989 Del. LEXIS 138
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware
DecidedApril 6, 1989
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 559 A.2d 1197 (Dalton v. Clanton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dalton v. Clanton, 559 A.2d 1197, 1989 Del. LEXIS 138 (Del. 1989).

Opinion

HOLLAND, Justice:

This is an appeal from a decision by the Family Court. The issues presented in this appeal relate back to a decision of the Superior Court, which had reversed an earlier decision by the Family Court. 1 When the Superior Court reversed the initial decision of the Family Court, it held that Joseph F. Dalton (“Father”) was obligated to provide support for two of his sons. One of these sons, Joseph, Jr., was an adult. The other son, Jason, was a minor. 2

The statutory criteria which must be considered by the Family Court before entering, a support order are set forth in 13 *1199 Del.C. § 514. However, in an effort to discharge its statutory obligations on a uniform basis, the Family Court has adopted a procedure in support cases, known as the “Melson Formula.” In fact, the Family Court recognizes a rebuttable presumption that the Melson Formula should be applied in making all child support determinations.

In this case, the Family Court deviated from the Melson Formula in entering its original support order, concerning the minor son, Jason. As a result of that deviation, the Family Court’s order was reversed. When the Superior Court remanded this case to the Family Court, it directed the Family Court to use the Melson Formula in determining the amount of support the Father was obligated to pay for Jason.

In this appeal, the Father acknowledges that 13 Del.C. § 501 imposes a duty upon him to contribute to the support of his minor son, Jason. The Father also acknowledges that the factors which the Family Court must consider before entering a support order for a minor child are set forth in 13 Del. C. § 514. However, the Father argues that the Melson Formula is inconsistent with 13 Del.C. § 514.

The Father argues, in particular, that in establishing the Melson Formula, the Family Court has adopted a mechanical calculation for setting an amount for child support that does not consider all of the statutory factors. The Father also argues that by recognizing a rebuttable presumption that the Melson Formula shall be applied to make child support determinations, the Family Court has shifted the focus in child support litigation away from the statutory factors and onto the court-created formula. The Mother argues to the contrary with respect to each of these challenges to the Melson Formula by the Father.

We find that the Family Court’s adoption of the Melson Formula, as a rebuttable presumption, and as the proper method of determining all child support cases, is consistent with its statutory obligation to “[m]ake and publish Court rules governing policies, processes, practices, and procedures, which shall be uniform throughout the State.” 10 Del.C. § 907(5). We also find that, as a rebuttable presumption, the Melson Formula is consistent with all of the factors set forth in 13 Del.C. § 514. However, in this ease, we find that neither the Family Court’s initial determination of the amount of support to be paid by the Father for Jason, nor the Superior Court’s subsequent reversal of that order, addressed the operation of the Melson Formula as a rebuttable presumption. Therefore, we remand the petition for support, as to Jason, to the Family Court.

The Superior Court’s decision that the Father had a duty to support his adult son was predicated upon its conclusion that Joseph, Jr. was unable to support himself. 13 Del.C. § 503. The Father argues that the facts in the record do not support the Superior Court’s decision that his adult son, Joseph, Jr., is a “poor person unable to support himself.” 13 Del.C. § 503. We agree. We find that the record supports the Family Court’s determination that Joseph, Jr. is not a “poor person unable to support himself” and that the Father has no statutory obligation to support him.

Basic Facts

The Father and Linda Clanton (“Mother”), were married in 1963. Three children were born from that marriage: Joseph, Jr., born February 5, 1964; Jeffrey, born July 14, 1968; and Jason, born July 13, 1970. The family resided in Pennsylvania. The Father and Mother separated in 1972 and were eventually divorced in 1974. The Father moved to Delaware, where he remarried. The Father also established a business in Delaware. The Mother remained in Pennsylvania. She married John Clanton in 1974 and two sons were born from that marriage.

Procedural History

The Mother’s support petitions in the Family Court of the State of Delaware alleged that both Jason and Joseph, Jr. *1200 lived with her in Pennsylvania. 3 The Family Conrt referred the Mother’s petitions for support to a Master. 10 Del.C. § 913(b). The Master was requested to make factual findings and recommendations. Id.

The Family Court Master found, as a fact, that Joseph, Jr. was able to support himself. The Master recommended that the Family Court find that the Father had no duty to support Joseph, Jr., since he was an adult. 13 Del.C. §§ 501, 503. The Master found, as a fact, that Jason was a minor entitled to be supported by his Father. 13 Del.C. § 501. The Master recommended that the Family Court order the Father to pay monthly support for Jason in the amount of $765.24. This latter recommendation by the Master was based exclusively upon a calculation according to the Melson Formula.

The Father petitioned to have a Judge of the Family Court review the Master’s findings, and recommendations de novo. 10 Del.C. § 913(c). 4 A Family Court Judge found, after a de novo review, that Joseph, Jr. was not a “poor person” within the meaning of 13 Del.C. § 503. Accordingly, the Family Court Judge held that the Father had no duty under Section 503 to support him. The Family Court Judge also reviewed de novo the Master’s findings and recommendations, which were based upon the Melson Formula, quantifying the support obligation of the Father for Jason. The Family Court Judge stated that the Melson Formula served as a guide, not as a compulsion, in making support determinations.

The Family Court Judge noted that the statutory criteria were controlling. The Family Court Judge ruled that “13 Del.C. § 514 did not contemplate such bonanza” as would result in the Mother’s favor, if the calculation resulting from an application of the Melson Formula was determined to be the Father’s support obligation for Jason. The Family Court declined to enter a support order based upon a literal application of the Melson Formula. The Family Court ordered the Father to pay $450.00 per month for the support of Jason. 5

The Mother filed an appeal in the Superi- or Court, pursuant to the then existing 10 Del.C. § 960(a) (1975). The decisions of the Family Court, holding that Joseph, Jr.

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Bluebook (online)
559 A.2d 1197, 1989 Del. LEXIS 138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dalton-v-clanton-del-1989.