Dalton John Meaux v. Elizabeth Miller Hensgens Miller

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 10, 2008
DocketCA-0008-0712
StatusUnknown

This text of Dalton John Meaux v. Elizabeth Miller Hensgens Miller (Dalton John Meaux v. Elizabeth Miller Hensgens Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dalton John Meaux v. Elizabeth Miller Hensgens Miller, (La. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-712 DALTON JOHN MEAUX

VERSUS

ELIZABETH MILLER HENSGENS MILLER, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 87119-C HONORABLE BYRON HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

MARC T. AMY JUDGE

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy and James T. Genovese, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

George R. Wentz, Jr. Baldwin, Haspel, Burke & Mayer, L.L.C. 1100 Poydras Street 20th and 22nd Floors New Orleans, LA 70163-2000 (504) 569-2900 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Noble Royalties, Inc. The Noble Grantees

Michael R. Mangham Mangham & Associates, L.L.C. 406 Audubon Boulevard, Suite A Lafayette, LA 70503 (337) 233-6200 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Elizabeth Miller Hensgens Miller Charles Nicholas Hensgens, III Craig Robert Hensgens Mary Elizabeth Hensgens Hetzel Catherine Elaine Hensgens Cramer Brian Keith Hensgens Karl Jude Hensgens F. John Reeks, Jr. Lemle & Kelleher, L.L.P. 401 Edwards Street 10th Floor, Louisiana Tower Shreveport, LA 71101 (318) 227-1131 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Eagle Rock Production, L.P.

Matthew D. Lane, Jr. Gordon, Arata, McCollam, Duplantis & Eagan, L.L.P. Post Office Box 81829 Lafayette, LA 70598-1829 (337) 237-0132 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Dalton John Meaux AMY, Judge.

The plaintiff filed a possessory action, asserting that he acquired disputed

property by acquisitive prescription in the 1940s. He named the parties to mineral

leases allegedly affecting the tract as defendants. One group of defendants filed an

exception of prescription, asserting an ownership interest in a unit well located in a

drilling and production unit which includes the disputed tract. These defendants

contended that production began from the well in February 2006, disturbing the

plaintiff’s possession. They further contended that the plaintiff did not file the

possessory action until after the matter had prescribed. The trial court granted the

exception of prescription. The plaintiff appeals. For the following reasons, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Dalton John Meaux, alleges that his family has been farming the

property at issue since 1912 and acquired the entirety of the disputed tract, both

surface and minerals, by acquisitive prescription by the 1940s. He filed the present

possessory action in June 2007 and named as defendants, the parties to leases and

other instruments affecting the tract. He argued that the recorded instruments

disturbed his peaceful possession of the tract.

Noble Royalties, Inc. and a group of other defendants, the Noble Grantees,

filed an exception of prescription, asserting that they held an ownership interest in a

unit well, which is part of the drilling and production unit of which the disputed tract

is a part. The well, however, is not located on the disputed tract. Noble argued that

production began from the well in February 2006, disturbing the plaintiff’s

possession. As the plaintiff did not file the possessory action until June 2007, more than a year after the production from the well, Noble asserted that the matter was

prescribed. The trial court granted the exception of prescription.

Mr. Meaux appeals, assigning the following as error:

1. The Trial Court committed manifest error in granting Noble’s Peremptory Exception of Prescription.

2. The Trial Court’s finding that Meaux was an adverse possessor of the Disputed Tract was manifestly erroneous.

3. The Trial Court’s reliance on facts alleged by Noble but not proven at trial by competent legal evidence was manifestly erroneous.

4. The Trial Court’s finding that production of oil from Commissioner’s Unit MT RA SUE commenced on February 23, 2006 was manifestly erroneous.

5. The Trial Court’s conclusion that production of oil from Commissioner’s Unit MT RA SUE was a disturbance in fact of Meaux’s possession of the Disputed Tract was manifestly erroneous.

Discussion

This case is resolved by reference to the plaintiff’s first assignment of error,

which questions the adequacy of the evidence submitted by Noble in support of its

exception of prescription.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3655 describes a possessory action,

as “one brought by the possessor of immovable property or of a real right therein to

be maintained in his possession of the property or enjoyment of the right when he has

been disturbed, or to be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has

been evicted.” In order to prevail on a possessory action, a possessor must establish

that:

(1) He had possession of the immovable property or real right therein at the time the disturbance occurred;

2 (2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession quietly and without interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force or fraud;

(3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article 3659; and

(4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 3658 (emphasis added). As this case involves the possession of

mineral rights, Mineral Code Article 156 is also relevant. It provides:

Possession of mineral rights under Article 1541 or 1552 is lost by adverse use or exercise of them according to their nature. Loss of possession occurs although the production and or operations constituting the adverse use or exercise are not on the land being possessed. It is sufficient that the production or operations constituting the adverse use or exercise are not on the land being possessed. It is sufficient that the production or operations constitute a use of the mineral rights according to the title of the owner thereof. In the case of a mineral lease, the use or exercise must be such that it would interrupt the liberative prescription of nonuse if the lessee had been the owner of a mineral servitude.

La.R.S. 31:156. Noble alleges that production from the well in which it holds an

interest constituted an adverse use or disturbance under the terms of La.R.S. 31:156

and that, since the possessory action was not brought until more than one year after

that disturbance, the action is prescribed under La.Code Civ.P. art. 3658. Each party

1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:154 provides:

§ 154. Possession under title as including mineral rights

One who establishes corporeal possession of land as owner under an act translative of title is in possession of the rights in minerals inherent in perfect ownership of land except to the extent mineral rights are reserved in the act or the act is expressly made subject to outstanding mineral rights. This Article does not apply to a mineral lessee of the possessor or any of his ancestors. 2 Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:155 provides:

§ 155. Possession without title as including mineral rights

A possessor of land as owner without title possesses the mineral rights inherent in perfect ownership of land.

3 points to jurisprudence in support its interpretation of the articles as they relate to the

articles. See, e.g., Dixon v. Am. Lib. Oil Co., 77 So.2d 533 (La.1955); Graham v.

McRae Exploration, Inc., 493 So.2d 705 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1986).

Essential to Noble’s burden of proving its exception, however, is its assertion

that the prescriptive period commenced with production from the subject well in

February 2006. Noble attempted to demonstrate this production date by way of

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Related

Cichirillo v. Avondale Industries, Inc.
917 So. 2d 424 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2005)
Graham v. McRae Exploration, Inc.
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Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc.
983 So. 2d 84 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2008)
Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Company
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