Dalton Cooper, Inc. v. United States

32 Cust. Ct. 262, 1954 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1714
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedApril 22, 1954
DocketC. D. 1611
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 32 Cust. Ct. 262 (Dalton Cooper, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dalton Cooper, Inc. v. United States, 32 Cust. Ct. 262, 1954 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1714 (cusc 1954).

Opinion

Ekwall, Judge:

In this case, the importer seeks recovery of customs duties assessed and collected upon an importation of settled lime juice from Dominica, British West Indies, and entered at the port of New York.

Assessment was made under the provision for fruit juices, not specially provided for, at 20 cents per gallon under paragraph 806(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T. D. 51802 and T. D. 51939.

Plaintiffs claim it. is dutiable under the provision for lime juice “unfit for beverage purposes” in paragraph 48 of the same act, as modified by T, D. 51802.

The pertinent provisions of the tariff act, as modified, supra, are as follows:

[Pab. 806.] (a) Cherry juice, prune juice, or prune wine, and all other fruit juices and fruit sirups, not specially provided for:
Containing less than one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol * * * 200 per gal.
[263]*263[Par. 806.] (b) Concentrated juice of citrus fruits, fit for beverage purposes, and sirups containing any of the foregoing, all the foregoing, whether in liquid, powdered, or solid form:
Lime juice, 200 per gal. on the quantity of unconcentrated natural fruit juice contained therein as shown by chemical analysis.
[Par. 48.] Juice of lemons, limes, oranges, or other citrous fruits, unfit for beverage purposes, 1J40 per lb.

Over objection of counsel for the Government, the records, exclusive of the invoices, in the cases of Walker Services v. United States, 28 Cust. Ct. 109, C. D. 1395; Von Laer v. United States, 8 Cust. Ct. 517, Abstract 47184; and Walker Services v. United States, 21 Cust. Ct. 218, Abstract 52607, were incorporated in the present case.

In the incorporated cases, the court held the settled lime juice there involved to be “unfit for beverage purposes.” It consisted of raw lime juice, which the evidence disclosed was filtered after importation in order to make it more attractive for sales purposes. It was then sold for beverage purposes. The court found that in the condition as imported it was unfit for beverage purposes.

Plaintiffs introduced the testimony of two witnesses in the instant case, the assistant chief chemist in the United States Customs Laboratory at New York and Jeanne Garr, the president of the importing corporation, one of the plaintiffs herein. There was also produced by the plaintiffs, and admitted in evidence as exhibit 1, the report of analysis of a sample of the instant merchandise. No sample of the commodity involved is before the court.

On behalf of the Government, two witnesses were introduced, Mr. Arthur Schwartz, the general manager of the American Lime Corp., and Examiner Joseph Seikel, the United States examiner of the instant lime juice.

Plaintiffs’ witnesses were not interrogated as to whether the instant lime juice and that involved in the incorporated cases, as represented by the samples therein, were comparable.

Plaintiffs rely, apparently, upon the testimony of the Government chemist as to the comparability of the analyses involved in the incorporated cases with that in the instant case. The statement is made in plaintiffs’ brief that “The juice is comparatively the same as that analyzed and reported in the” incorporated cases. We do not so understand the testimony, which we set forth as follows:

Q. Are the chemical reports, taking into account this variation, comparatively or substantially the same? — A. I would say they are comparatively the same for the things that they show.
Q. I now show you Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 in this case, which is the chemical analysis of the present importation before the court, and ask you to examine the three. — A. I have.
Q. Again taking into account the variations which occur in a natural product, are these three reports, the chemical analyses, comparatively or substantially [264]*264the same? — A. I would say that in the total solids they are comparatively the same. One of the reports shows ash, as does the laboratory report in the New York laboratory, Exhibit 1, and that is comparatively the same.
Judge Ekwall: What is comparatively the same?
The Witness: The ash. Only one of the other laboratory reports has an ash. The citric acid is shown on all three reports and I would say that the variance there is what you might normally expect from a lime juice.

However, this witness admitted that the laboratory reports and analyses in the earlier cases had not been made by him nor under his supervision and that he never saw any of the samples that were examined. He also stated that, as to the total solids shown on the analyses in the incorporated cases, he could only tell, in part, what those total solids consisted of and that the difference in solids, shown by the analyses, represents solids which are not identified or accounted for. He further testified that if a denaturing volatile liquid were present in the commodity analyzed in the incorporated cases it would not show up in the percentage of solids in the report. This witness was asked if, based upon the percentages shown in the analyses of the incorporated cases, he could tell how much lime pulp, as distinguished from possible dirt or sediment, was contained in the sample analyzed, to which he replied that he could give a maximum figure for pulp present, but not as distinguished from dirt. He stated, “There may be no pulp in these two or there may be pulp or there may be pulp and dirt. I have no knowledge of what was actually in them.” When asked what he meant by a maximum figure, the witness replied:

A. There couldn’t be more than a certain percentage of pulp in either Exhibit 2 or 3 for Identification because the pulp would show in the total solids. We know of the total solids that the 8.43 percent in Exhibit 3 for Identification is not pulp it’s citric acid and ash. Therefore the pulp could be a maximum of the difference between 8.43 and 8.6, which is 17/100 of a percent. By the same reasoning, on Exhibit 2 you come up with a maximum of about 44/100 of a percent pulp present, if there is nothing else but pulp in there.
Q. What do you mean by “pulp”? — A. Pulp would be the little cells that surround the little sort of globules of juice that you get in an orange. That’s what I would consider pulp.
Q. You mean the natural fruit cells in the fresh lime, is that correct? — A. That’s right; that’s what I would consider to be pulp.

From tbe above, it is plain tbat, from tbe analyses, tbe witness considered tbe reports were comparatively tbe same as to tbe total solids, and tbat one of them showed asb wbicb is comparatively tbe same as in exbibit 1, tbe report of tbe analysis of tbe sample in tbe instant case. Also, tbat be could tell only in part wbat tbe total solids shown on tbe analyses consisted of and tbat tbe difference in solids represents solids wbicb are not identified or accounted for. We do not consider this sufficient upon wbicb to base a finding tbat tbe merchandise in tbe incorporated cases and tbat before tbe court are [265]*265similar.

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Related

Dalton Cooper, Inc. v. United States
41 Cust. Ct. 271 (U.S. Customs Court, 1958)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 Cust. Ct. 262, 1954 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1714, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dalton-cooper-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1954.