Dalrada Precision Corp. v. Cox

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedFebruary 24, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-01122
StatusUnknown

This text of Dalrada Precision Corp. v. Cox (Dalrada Precision Corp. v. Cox) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dalrada Precision Corp. v. Cox, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DALRADA PRECISION CORP., a Case No.: 24-cv-1122-AJB-DEB California corporation, wholly owned 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ subsidiary of DALRADA FINANCIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 13 CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation [Real Party in Interest], 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 STUART COX, 17 Defendant.

18 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Dalrada Precision Corp. and Dalrada Finincial Corp.’s 19 motion to strike Defendant Stuart Cox’s answer. (Doc. No. 19.) Defendant, proceeding pro 20 se, filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. No. 24.) Plaintiffs did not file a reply. For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion. 22 Plaintiffs bring this Complaint against Defendant for allegedly fraudulent acts and 23 misrepresentations perpetrated by Defendant, thereby inducing Plaintiffs into entering into 24 a contract for the purchase of a company owned by Defendant. (See generally Complaint 25 (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1.) 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 states that a party must “admit or deny the 27 allegations against it by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B). Rule 8 further states 28 1 “[a] party that intends in good faith to deny all the allegations of a pleading—including the 2 jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general denial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(3). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that the “court may strike from a 4 pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 5 matter.” “[T]he function of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid the waste of time and money 6 spent on litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues before trial . . . .” 7 Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sidney-Vinstein v. 8 A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983)), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 9 (1994). Grounds for a motion to strike must be readily apparent from the face of the 10 pleadings or from materials that may be judicially noticed. Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Cas. 11 & Sur. Co., 183 F.R.D. 550, 554 (D. Haw. 1998). A matter will not be stricken from a 12 pleading unless it is clear that it can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the 13 litigation. Id.; see also Empire Tractor Corp. v. Time, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 121, 122 (E.D. Pa. 14 1950) (“[A]nd if there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter [sought 15 to be stricken] may [at some time] raise an issue, the motion should be denied.” (citations 16 omitted)). Motions to strike are also disfavored in the absence of prejudice. Horowitz v. 17 Sulla, No. 13-00500 HG-BMK, 2014 WL 1048798, at *10 (D. Haw. Mar. 14, 2014) (citing 18 Wailua Assocs., 183 F.R.D. at 553). 19 Plaintiffs assert Defendant’s answer should be stricken in its entirety because 20 Defendant’s answer fails to identify specific defenses, and because there are numerous 21 procedural deficiencies that make it difficult for Plaintiffs to ascertain Defendant’s 22 defenses and claims. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 5.) Plaintiffs contend Defendant’s answer as a 23 whole prejudices Plaintiffs by complicating the litigation and creating confusion. (Id.) 24 Defendant, appearing pro se, filed a “Submission of Defense Reply and Request for 25 Dismissal” in an e-mail format, styling his answer as a general denial of Plaintiffs’ 26 allegations and does not use the traditional admit/deny style sanctioned by attorneys. (See 27 generally Answer, Doc. No. 18.) Though proceeding pro se, Defendant is nevertheless 28 required to comply with the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 Plaintiffs first contend Defendant’s answer fails to satisfy Rule 8 because the 2 defenses are not stated “in short and plain terms,” and impermissibly includes a request for 3 dismissal and counterclaims that are improperly pled. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 10–11.) Plaintiffs 4 assert the answer’s failure to comply with the Court’s procedural and pleading format 5 requirements leaves Plaintiffs with no clarity as to how to respond. (Id. at 11.) However, 6 the first 12 pages of Defendant’s answer, using headings and subheadings, addresses 7 Defendant’s “arguments against allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and defamation, 8 which I categorically deny.” (Answer at 3.) Under the heading “Summary of My Position,” 9 Defendant asserts he categorically denies Plaintiffs’ allegations, that all contracts were 10 executed outside of the United States and are under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom 11 and Scottish law, and that Plaintiffs’ asserted damages have already been addressed in 12 binding arbitration. (Id.) Moreover, Defendant addresses the choice of law and venue 13 provisions as stated in the contract between the parties, the statute of limitations, and asserts 14 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (Id. at 4–5.) The answer thus serves 15 its core function of notifying Plaintiffs of the theories of defense upon which Defendant 16 intends to rely. None of those theories are legally defective. 17 Next, Plaintiffs assert Defendant’s answer is redundant and immaterial because it 18 raises issues unrelated to the Complaint. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 12.) Moreover, Plaintiffs 19 contend the answer impermissibly asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and 20 seeks damages. (Id.) However, Plaintiffs fail to pinpoint any statements made within the 21 42-page answer which they find redundant or immaterial, and only state in a conclusory 22 manner that “[t]he statements made in Defendant’s Answer . . . are included solely to harass 23 or prejudice Plaintiffs.” (Id.) Defendant’s allegations, while not a model of clarity, could 24 be construed as a defense to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Any arguments made in the answer in 25 support of a motion to dismiss the Complaint will be duly considered upon a properly filed 26 motion to dismiss by Defendant. 27 Finally, Plaintiffs assert Defendant’s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction is 28 without merit. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 13.) However, this is an improper merits argument within 1 |}a Rule 12(f) context, and Plaintiffs fail to assert how this argument meets Rule 12(f)’s 2 || requirements. 3 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is DENIED. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: February 24, 2025

8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Related

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
510 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty
984 F.2d 1524 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
Empire Tractor Corp. v. Time, Inc.
10 F.R.D. 121 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1950)
Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co.
697 F.2d 880 (Ninth Circuit, 1983)
Wailua Associates v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
183 F.R.D. 550 (D. Hawaii, 1998)

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Dalrada Precision Corp. v. Cox, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dalrada-precision-corp-v-cox-casd-2025.