Dallinger v. Rapello

14 F. 32, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2707
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 18, 1882
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 14 F. 32 (Dallinger v. Rapello) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dallinger v. Rapello, 14 F. 32, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2707 (circtdma 1882).

Opinion

Gray, Justice.

The declaration does not allege that the testator left, or that his exec itor holds, any personal property situated within the commonwealth of Massachusetts, or taxable therein, or that the [33]*33executor, or any legatee, distributee, or creditor is an inhabitant thereof. The allegation that the taxes were “duly assessed” shows only that they were assessed in proper form. And the final allegation, that the defendant owes the plaintiff the amount of the taxes, is a mere conclusion of law, which is not admitted by the demurrer. The taxes sued for are not of the nature of legacy or succession taxes, as in the cases of Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, and of U. S. v. Hunnewell, decided by this court at the present term.1 But they are annual taxes, assessed under the general tax acts of Massachusetts. The case, therefore, directly presents the question whether personal property of a deceased inhabitant of Massachusetts is taxable, under those acts, after the appointment of an executor, and before distribution, when the property is not within the commonwealth, and neither the executor, nor any person having an interest in or right to receive the property, has a domicile or residence here. This question does not appear to have been decided by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. But the rules established by the eonstitu - "tion and the statutes of the commonwealth, as expounded by that court, afford satisfactory guides for its determination.

The power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature is “to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident and estates lying within, the said commonwealth. Const. Mass. c. 1, § 1, art. 4. And no case has been brought to our notice in which personal property, not itself within the state, and the present owners of which do not reside within the state, has been held to be taxable here. The right to tax is created and limited by the constitution, and by the acts passed by the legislature pursuant to the authority thereby conferred ; and such acts are not to be extended by doubtful interpretation, but are to be restricted to cases coming clearly within their language and their intent. Sewall v. Jones, 9 Pick. 412, 414; Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243, 248. When the owner of the legal title in personal property resides out of the state, express and unequivocal words are needed to subject the property, even if itself situated oí used here, to the provisions of the general tax acts. Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. 514; Dorr v. Boston, 6 Gray, 131; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 292.

By Gen. St. c. 11, § 12, it is enacted that “all personal estate, within or without the state, shall be assessed to the owner in the city or town where he is an inhabitant on the first day of May, except as [34]*34follows.”' The first and third clauses of this section, providing for the taxation of stock in trade in the place in which it is employed, and of horses and cattle in the place in which they are kept, other than where the owners reside, carefully adds the words “whether such owners reside within or without this state.” The second clause of the same section, which contains no such words, but which directs “all machinery employed in any branch of manufactures, and belonging to a person or corporation, ” to be assessed where it is situated or employed, and the value of such machinery owned by corporations to be deducted from the value of the shares, before assessing a tax on these to the stockholders, has been adjudged to have no application to a corporation established in another state. Blackstone Manuf’g Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray, 488; Dwight v. Boston, 12 Allen, 316. In the case of personal property of persons under guardianship, provision is made by the fourth clause for taxing it at the home of the ward, and if that is without the state, then to the guardian at his own home,— clearly implying that when both reside abroad the property is not taxable in this state, even if situated here. So, by the fifth clause, personal property held in trust by an executor, administrator, or trustee, the income of which is payable to another person, can only be taxed at the residence of the trustee or at the residence of the cestui que trust; if both reside within the state, to the trustee at the residence of the cestui que trust; if only one of them resides within the state, to that one in the place where he resides. See, also, Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen, 277.

The seventh clause of Gen. St. c. 11, § 12, provides as follows:

“ The personal estate of deceased persons shall be assessed in the place where the deceased last dwelt. After the appointment of an executor or administrator, it shall he assessed to such executor or administrator until he gives notice to the assessors that the estate has been distributed and paid over to the parties interested therein. Before such appointment, it shall be assessed in general terms to the estate of the deceased.”

And by the further provisions of this clause, and of section 20 of chapter 12, (under which this action is brought,) the executor or administrator is liable, in an action of contract, as well for the taxes so assessed before his appointment, as for those assessed upon him afterwards. By the statute of 1878, c. 189, § 2, personal property held by an executor or administrator is taxable according to the provisions of Gen. St. c. 11, § 12, cl. 7, for the space of three years after his appointment, unless it has been distributed, and notice of its distribution has been given to the assessors, “stating the names, resi-[35]*35deuce, and the amount paid to the several parties interested in the estate who are residents of the commonwealth;” and after the three years the property, whether it has been distributed or not, is to be assessed according to the provisions of Gen. St. c. 11, § 12, cl. 5.

It is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that until the property is distributed, or until three years after the appointment of the executor have elapsed, the property is to be treated as situated in the place in which its late owner resided, and in which the executor is required by law to account for it. But upon deliberate consideration of the seventh clause of chapter 11, § 12, of the General Statutes, in connection with the other provisions of the same chapter, we are unable to find any evidence that the legislature, in framing this clause, contemplated a case in which the property is itself out of the state, and is held by an executor or administrator residing out of the state. The provision, first introduced in those statutes, permitting the tax, before the appointment of an executor or administrator, to be assessed generally to the estate of the deceased where he last dwelt, appears to have been intended to prevent the personal property from escaping taxation altogether before such appointment, and not to extend the liability of the executor or administrator for taxes assessed after his appointment. See Cook v. Leland, 5 Pick. 236; Wood v. Torrey, 97 Mass. 321.

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Bluebook (online)
14 F. 32, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2707, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dallinger-v-rapello-circtdma-1882.