Dallas Sports Club v. DSE Hockey Arena

Texas Business Court

Dallas Sports Club v. DSE Hockey Arena

DecidedMay 11, 2026

Docket25.BC01B-0049

StatusPublished

This text of Dallas Sports Club v. DSE Hockey Arena (Dallas Sports Club v. DSE Hockey Arena) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Business Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dallas Sports Club v. DSE Hockey Arena, (Tex. Super. Ct. 2026).

Pincite

Opinion

FILED IN BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK ENTERED 5/11/2026

2026 Tex. Bus. 24

The Business Court of Texas, 1st Division

DALLAS SPORTS GROUP, LLC § AND RADICAL ARENA, LTD., § Plaintiffs § v. § Cause No. 25-BC01B-0049 § DSE HOCKEY CLUB, L.P. and § DALLAS SPORTS & § ENTERTAINMENT, L.P., § Defendants ═══════════════════════════════════════ MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES ═══════════════════════════════════════

[¶ 1] Before the court are the parties’ Civil Practice and Remedies Code

§ 37.009 attorneys’ fees requests. For the following reasons, the court orders

that each side shall bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs in this case.

[¶ 2] Dallas Sports Group, LLC and Radical Arena, Ltd. (the

Mavericks), invoked the court’s declaratory judgment jurisdiction to

determine whether they effectively redeemed DSE Hockey Club, L.P.’s (Hockey Club) interests in a general partnership and that partnership’s general

partner. The Mavericks also requested emergency and permanent injunctive

relief. Later, they amended their petition to add Hockey Club’s parent

company, Dallas Sports & Entertainment, L.P. (DSELP), as a defendant.

(Hockey Club amended its answer and counterclaim to add affirmative

defenses for, and a counterclaim by, DSELP.) The “Stars” refers to Hockey

Club and DSELP unless indicated otherwise.

[¶ 3] The parties’ substantive dispute focused on (i) the Mavericks’

claim that they effectively redeemed the Stars’ ownership interest in the

entities operating the City of Dallas’s American Airlines Center where both

teams play their home games and (ii) the Stars’ counterclaims.

[¶ 4] On April 2, 2026, the court ruled on seven dispositive motions.

See Dallas Sports Group, LLC v. DSE Hockey Club, L.P., 2026 Tex. Bus. 15,

___ S.W.3d ____ (1st Div.). A month later, it decided the last three

dispositive motions. As a result, the Mavericks won on all substantive issues

and are thus entitled to their requested declaratory and injunctive relief and a

denial of the Stars’ counterclaims.

[¶ 5] The next day the court conferred with counsel regarding the

attorneys’ fees issue. The court began by asking the parties to discuss what

-2- they wanted to do with the attorneys’ fees issue and invited “everybody to

pursue whatever claims and rights and whatever they want.”1

[¶ 6] The court then referenced Civil Practice and Remedies Code

§ 37.009,2 which provides that in a declaratory judgment case “the court may

award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and

just.”3

[¶ 7] Pursuant to this statute’s terms, the award of fees and costs is not

mandatory, and the court may award fees and costs “to either party in all

cases.” MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660,

669 (Tex. 2009). That is, “[a] prevailing party in a declaratory judgment

action is not entitled to attorney’s fees simply as a matter of law; entitlement

depends on what is equitable and just, and the trial court’s power is, in that

respect, discretionary.” Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy Nine Mun.

Dist., 198 S.W.3d 300, 320 (Tex. App.—6th Dist. 2006, pet. denied).

[¶ 8] Next, the court stated that under § 37.009, the factfinder decides

the amount of a party’s reasonable and reasonable attorneys’ fees, but the

1 May 5, 2026, Rough Transcript (Tr.) at 2. 2 Tr. at 2. 3 The court did not exclude other possible attorneys’ fees grounds.

-3- court has “broad authority to take the fact-findings and decide what to do with

them.”4

[¶ 9] The court added:

So[,] without ruling but giving you an inclination as to kind of what I think my starting point is to let you guys decide what we want to do with next week, my inclination is to start with each side pays their own fees. And[,] so[,] given that information, do you all want a trial next week? If we have a trial next week, do you want to [go] to the Court? Do you want a jury trial? Let me know.

[¶ 10] Thereafter, the Mavericks’ counsel responded that a jury trial on

attorneys’ fees might not be the best use of the jury’s and parties’ time.5 So,

to obviate the need for a jury trial, he said that the night before he offered “to

stipulate as to reasonableness, necessity, and amount of their fees and ours.”6

[¶ 11] Next, he suggested two solutions, the latter being each side pays

their own fees.7 The court responded, “[w]ell, I’m wide open to being

persuaded to do something else.”8 The Mavericks’ counsel acknowledged that

opportunity and said he would discuss the matter with his clients.9

4 Tr. at 3. 5 Tr. at 3. 6 Tr. at 3-4. 7 Tr. at 4. 8 Tr. at 4. 9 Tr. at 4.

-4- [¶ 12] The Stars’ counsel echoed the Mavericks’ statements and said

he would discuss the issue during the mediation scheduled for the next day.10

He added that the parties and court should adopt a structure that promotes

expediency if the court were to decide the attorneys’ fees issue.11

[¶ 13] The court and parties then discussed the logistics should there

be a jury trial on attorneys’ fees.12

[¶ 14] Thereafter, the court acknowledged that the parties obviously

had been thinking about what to do with the attorneys’ fees issues.13 It then

added that, without saying that it was exactly what it would do, it seemed that

a logical starting point would be to have everybody pay their own fees but that

the court was “open to being persuaded either way.”14

[¶ 15] The next day, the parties delivered a written stipulation that:

1. Plaintiffs and Defendants have incurred attorneys’ fees with respect to their claims for Declaratory Judgment under section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code;

2. The Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,600,000 are reasonable and necessary.

10 Tr. at 4. 11 Tr. at 4-5. 12 Tr. at 6-7. 13 Tr. at 7. 14 Tr. at 7.

-5- 3. The Defendants’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,600,000 are reasonable and necessary.

4. By these stipulations, neither party concedes the propriety of any fee recovery by the opposing party and request the Court award fees as it determines are equitable and just.

5. The parties request that the Court take notice of these stipulations of fact.15

[¶ 16] In subsequent emails the parties confirmed that they waived

further presentations regarding attorneys’ fees and asked the court to rule on

the issue.

[¶ 17] The court considered the record, the parties’ stipulation, and

their waiver of their opportunity to persuade the court regarding an attorneys’

fees request. Based on the above, the court finds and concludes pursuant to

Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 37.009 that each side paying its own fees

and costs is equitable and just in this case.

It is so ORDERED.

BILL WHITEHILL Judge of the Texas Business Court, First Division

SIGNED: May 11, 2026

15 May 7, 2026, Stipulation of Facts.

-6- Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed.

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