Dallas Blake Johnson v. Warden, USP Victorville

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-03064
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION

12 DALLAS BLAKE JOHNSON, No. 5:25-cv-3064-AH-BFM 13 Petitioner, v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 WHY HABEAS PETITION WARDEN, USP VICTORVILLE, SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 15 Respondent. 16 17

18 This Order concerns a federal habeas petition. Petitioner Dallas Blake 19 Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 20 (ECF 1 (“Petition”).) Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 21 in the United States District Court—rules that apply to the Petition in this 22 Court—the Court must review the Petition before ordering a response. See Rule 23 1(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (a district court may “apply any or all 24 of these rules” to any habeas petition); see also Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 25 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court’s dismissal of a Section 2241 26 petition under Habeas Rules 1(b) and 4). If it “plainly appears” from that initial 27 28 1 review that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Court must dismiss the 2 Petition. 3 Here, Petitioner claims that the Bureau of Prisons has violated his 4 statutory right under the First Step Act to be placed within 500 miles of his 5 home address. (Petition at 1.) It appears, however, that the Petition must be 6 denied for three reasons. 7 First, this Court lacks authority to review a BOP’s individualized housing 8 decision under this provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“Notwithstanding any 9 other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this 10 subsection is not reviewable by any court.”); Brown v. Ives, 543 F. App’x 636, 11 637 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Insofar as [petitioner] is challenging the BOP’s 12 individualized determination concerning his placement, the district court 13 properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition.”). It appears that 14 the Petition is subject to dismissal under that provision, because it appears that 15 the claim in the Petition challenges the BOP’s individualized housing decision 16 in his case. 17 Second, the First Step Act requires that the BOP place individuals within 18 500 driving miles of their home address, subject to a host of considerations, 19 including bed availability, security designation, programmatic needs, mental 20 and medical health needs, recommendations of the sentencing court, and 21 security concerns. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Petitioner has alleged that he has been 22 placed more than 500 miles from his home address but has not alleged that the 23 BOP violated the statute, which requires consideration of more than simply the 24 distance from the prison to one’s home address. 25 Finally, Petitioner does not indicate that he has exhausted this claim 26 administratively using the BOP grievance system. Exhaustion in a § 2241 27 petition is not mandatory or jurisdictional; it can be excused under certain 28 1 || circumstances. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Those 2 || circumstances include where exhaustion would be futile because the agency 3 || would be bound by official policy to deny the claim, or where irreparable injury 4 || may occur without immediate judicial relief. Id.; see also Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 5 || F.8d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the circumstances in which 6 || exhaustion can be waived include “where administrative remedies are 7 || inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a 8 || futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings 9 || would be void”). But Petitioner has not offered any reason to think that any of 10 |} those exceptions apply here, or that he has any other good reason for not 11 |} exhausting his claim. And in cases involving difficult factual questions—like the 12 || basis for a designation decision—exhaustion is all the more important. See 13 || Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the exhaustion 14 || requirement facilitates judicial review through development of a factual record). 15 Petitioner is therefore ordered to show cause (meaning explain in 16 || writing) why the Court should not recommend dismissal of the Petition. No 17 || later than January 9, 2026, Petitioner shall respond, in writing, to this Order. 18 || In his response, Petitioner must set forth his arguments, if any, as to why his 19 || Petition should not be dismissed for the reasons stated in this Order. 20 Petitioner’s failure to file a timely response as ordered may result 21 || in the Court recommending to the District Judge that this case be 22 || dismissed for failure to prosecute and to follow court orders. 23 24 || DATED: December 9, 2025 TMinf 26 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28