Dalessio v. BT EQUIPMENT COMPANY

336 A.2d 563, 114 R.I. 524, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1449
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedApril 25, 1975
Docket73-249-Appeal
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 336 A.2d 563 (Dalessio v. BT EQUIPMENT COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dalessio v. BT EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 336 A.2d 563, 114 R.I. 524, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1449 (R.I. 1975).

Opinion

Doris, J.

This is a civil action by Joseph Dalessio, plaintiff, against B. T. Equipment Company, Campanella Corporation, and Holiday Inns, Inc. to recover damages for injuries alleged to have-been sustained while he was work *525 ing on the construction of the Holiday Inn in the city of Providence on October 5, 1967. On January 7, 1971, a justice of the Superior Court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Holiday Inns, Inc. because that defendant did not prepare the architectural plans, nor did it supervise the construction of the building.

On February 9, 1971, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Allen & O’Hara — Joint Venture, hereinafter referred to as Allen & O’Hara, as a defendant. On November 23, 1971, Allen & O’Hara filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings alleging that the action was not commenced against them within the 2-year statute of limitations as provided by the statute in effect on October 5, 1967. 1 The motion of Allen & O’Hara for judgment on the pleadings was granted by a justice of the Superior Court on May 29, 1973. From the judgment thereafter entered, plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The issue presented by plaintiff’s appeal is whether the Superior Court justice erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the theory that Super. R. Civ. P. 15(c) 2 has no application to the circumstances of the in *526 stant case. Before Rule 15(c) can be applied there are three requirements which must be met:

(1) The claim “* * * asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading * * *.”
(2) The new party “* * has received such notice of the institution of the action that he would not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits * *
(3) The new party “* * * knew or should have known that but for a mistake the action would have been brought against him.”

The parties are in agreement that the claim asserted in the amended complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. Thus, the sole question before us is whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second requirement of Rule 15(c) that “* * within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he would not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits (Emphasis added.)

The trial justice based his decision on the ground that Allen & O’Hara had not received, during the period provided by law for commencing an action against it, such notice of the institution of the action that it would not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits. By his decision, the trial justice impliedly found that Allen & O’Hara’s knowledge of the accident and plaintiff’s injury was not adequate or sufficient to serve as notification of the institution of the action.

*527 The plaintiff points out that Allen & O’Hara and Holiday Inns, Inc. had the same business address and had other business dealings together. He argues that these facts plus the knowledge of the accident and an on-site investigation by Allen & O’Hara within a few days of the accident are sufficient circumstances to support a finding that Allen & O’Hara had received within the period provided by law such notification of the institution of the action that it would not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits. In other words, plaintiff attempts to equate knowledge of an accident with knowledge of a claim based on such an accident.

In support of such contention plaintiff cites and relies on Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966) 3 wherein the court held that where a contractor was required to defend its agent’s conduct before an administrative inquiry, the contractor might be added as a defendant in a civil suit under Rule 15(c). In that case, the court was apparently greatly influenced by the fact that the administrative hearing on the conduct of the pilot had provided sufficient notice of the possibility of a civil claim, and found that the defendant’s investigation in preparation for the administrative inquiry eliminated any prejudice to the defendant.

In Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 987, 90 S.Ct. 483, 24 L.Ed.2d 451 (1969), a case decided by the Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit 3 years after Meredith, supra, the court held that a complaint would not relate back despite an on-site investigation in connection with another but timely action by the defendant to be added, as Rule 15(c) required notice of the institution of the suit, not merely of the incident giving *528 rise to the suit. See also Archuleta v. Duffy’s Inc., 471 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1973); Wentz v. Alberto Culver Co., 294 F.Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969); Nayer v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 195 F.Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1961).

We believe the position taken in Craig to be sound and interpret Rule 15(c) to require that the defendant sought to be added have knowledge of the institution of the suit, since the term “action” as used in the rule means a lawsuit and not the incident giving rise to the lawsuit. The trial justice consequently did not err in holding that Rule 15(c) has no application under the circumstances, that the amended complaint does not relate back, and that the action against Allen & O’Hara is barred by the statute of limitations.

The plaintiff next argues that the issue was improperly decided by the trial justice on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Such a motion by a defendant under Rule 12(c) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Swanson v. Speidel Corp., 110 R. I. 335, 293 A.2d 307 (1972). Here on the face of the complaint, the action is barred unless it is shown that the case comes within Rule 15(c). It is the burden of the plaintiff to show that the circumstances place the case within the rule. Laliberte v. Providence Redevelop. Agency, 109 R. I. 565, 288 A.2d 502 (1972).

The plaintiff was afforded full opportunity through the discovery process to establish the facts necessary to bring the case within Rule 15(c).

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Bluebook (online)
336 A.2d 563, 114 R.I. 524, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dalessio-v-bt-equipment-company-ri-1975.