Dale Young v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 6, 2019
• Docket: 18A-CR-2818
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 06 2019, 9:02 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Susan D. Rayl Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Hand | Ponist Attorney General of Indiana Horvath Smith & Rayl, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dale Young, June 6, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2818 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven Rubick, Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G19-1808-CM-29189

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 1 of 6 [1] Dale Young appeals his convictions of Class B misdemeanor possession of

marijuana 1 and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. 2 Young

argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove he constructively

possessed the marijuana and paraphernalia found in a backpack in the locked,

detached garage on his property. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Because of a prior conviction, Young signed a contract with Marion County

Community Corrections (“MCCC”) that “waive[d] his right against search

seizure” and permitted MCCC staff or any law enforcement officer acting on

MCCC’s behalf to “search [his] person, residence, motor vehicle, or any

location where [his] personal property may be found, to insure compliance with

the requirements of community correction” while on probation. (State’s Ex. 1

at 1.) Young was not to possess alcohol or non-prescribed drugs, and he was to

notify Community Corrections of any changes in his home situation. (Id. at 1,

5.)

[3] On August 28, 2018, MCCC case managers, Frankie Piland and Brooklynn

Baker, and Officer Steve Hoffman conducted a home visit with Young to verify

his compliance with the MCCC contract. While investigating, Officer Hoffman

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (2018). 2 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3 (2015).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 2 of 6 noted Young’s locked, detached garage and obtained the key from Young.

While inside the garage, Officer Hoffman noticed a backpack. Inside the

backpack was a cannabis pipe and a glass mason jar containing marijuana.

[4] Young was arrested and subsequently charged with Class B misdemeanor

possession of marijuana and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.

The trial court found Young guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 180

days for possession of marijuana and a sixty-days for possession of

paraphernalia, to be served concurrently.

Discussion and Decision [5] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will

consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The

decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the

credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the

evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).

Reversal is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the

evidence is not required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence

and “is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 3 of 6 verdict.” Id. at 147 (quoting Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App.

2001)).

[6] Possession can be actual or constructive. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268,

1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh’g on other grounds, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997).

“Actual possession occurs when a defendant has direct physical control over an

item, whereas constructive possession occurs when a person has the intent and

capability to maintain dominion and control over the item.” Griffin v. State, 945

N.E.2d 781, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We must determine whether the State

proved Young constructively possessed the drugs and paraphernalia when he

did not have direct physical control over the items the police found. “In cases

where the accused has exclusive possession of the premises on which the

contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he or she knew of the

presence of contraband and was capable of controlling it.” Holmes v. State, 785

N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). If possession is non-exclusive, the

inference of possession is not permitted unless additional circumstances indicate

“knowledge of the presence of the contraband and the ability to control it.”

Person v. State, 661 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Young

argues the State did not provide sufficient evidence he knew the marijuana and

paraphernalia were in the garage. We disagree.

[7] Young maintains that he was not in exclusive possession of the garage because

his part-time roommate had access to the garage. Yet Piland testified that

Young failed to “notify Community Corrections of any changes in [his] home

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 4 of 6 situation(s)…” as required by his contract with MCCC, (State’s Ex. 1 at 5), and

Officer Hoffman testified that Young “was the sole occupant of that house.”

(Tr. Vol. II at 12.) Still, Young contends the State failed to include details

useful in determining how many individuals lived in the house—e.g., what

clothing or personal items were in the bedrooms—thus his testimony that he

had a roommate was uncontradicted and should be presumed truthful.

(Appellant’s Br. at 10.) However, the trial court did not find Young’s testimony

credible. (See Tr. Vol. II at 41) (trial court said, “I simply don’t believe your

client’s testimony”). Because we do not assess the credibility of the witnesses or

reweigh the evidence in determining whether the evidence is sufficient, we

cannot rely on the evidence to which Young points.

[8] Because Young had exclusive possession and control over the detached garage,

there was sufficient evidence to infer Young not only knew of the presence of

the marijuana and paraphernalia but was also capable of controlling them.

Young owned and lived in the house and, thus, owned the detached garage.

“[A] house or apartment used as a residence is controlled by the person who

lives in it and that person may be found in control of any drugs discovered

therein, whether he is the owner, tenant, or merely an invitee.” Martin v. State,

372 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). Young possessed the key that

opened the locked, detached garage. Young’s belongings—clippers,

lawnmowers, and tools—were in the garage near the backpack containing the

marijuana and paraphernalia. This evidence is sufficient to support the court’s

conclusion that Young had constructive possession of the marijuana and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 5 of 6 paraphernalia. See Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999) (defendant

possessed cocaine when he had the key that opened the trunk of the car and his

clothes were near the cocaine).

Conclusion [9] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove Young possessed the marijuana

and paraphernalia found in his locked, detached garage. Accordingly, we

affirm his convictions.

[10] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2818 | June 6, 2019 Page 6 of 6