Dale v. Biegasiewicz

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 6, 2021
Docket1:17-cv-01211
StatusUnknown

This text of Dale v. Biegasiewicz (Dale v. Biegasiewicz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dale v. Biegasiewicz, (W.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ______________________________________

DAVID DALE, DECISION Plaintiff, and v. ORDER

DEPUTY SIMON BIEGASIEWICZ, 17-CV-01211F DEPUTY JOSEPH RACZYNSKI, and (consent) DEPUTY WARREN LUICK,

Defendants. ______________________________________

APPEARANCES: THE LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW A. ALBERT Attorneys for Plaintiff MATTHEW A. ALBERT, of Counsel 2166 Church Road Darien Center, New York 14040 and GRIFFIN DAVIS DAULT, of Counsel 388 Evans Street Williamsville, New York 14221

MICHAEL A. SIRAGUSA ERIE COUNTY ATTORNEY Attorney for Defendants JEREMY C. TOTH Second Assistant County Attorney, of Counsel ERIE COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 95 Franklin Street Room 1634 Buffalo, New York 14202

JURISDICTION

On June 4, 2018, the parties to this civil rights action consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to proceed before the undersigned. (Dkt. 17). The matter is presently before the court on Plaintiff’s motion filed December 23, 2020 seeking an extension of time to file an appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Dkt. 39). BACKGROUND and FACTS1 On November 24, 2017, Plaintiff David Dale (“Plaintiff” or “Dale”), commenced this civil rights action asserting against Defendants, all employees of Erie County Sheriff Department (“Defendants”), two claims for relief originating with a traffic stop on March

5, 2015, including for unreasonable seizure, false arrest, and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an award of attorney fees. In a Decision and Order filed October 21, 2020 (Dkt. 37) (“the D&O”), the undersigned granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment filed May 8, 2019 (Dkt. 27). Judgment in favor of Defendants was entered on October 22, 2020 (Dkt, 38) (“October 22, 2020 judgment”). Plaintiff maintains he learned of the D&O and judgment on October 28, 2020 when his attorney, Matthew Albert, Esq. (“Albert”), telephoned and advised Plaintiff of the judgment. Plaintiff’s Declaration ¶ 4. According to Plaintiff, in early November

2020, after both he and Albert spent several days researching the merits of an appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Albert advised Plaintiff he was not able to represent Plaintiff in the appeal but that Albert’s associate might be willing to handle the appeal. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. On November 12, 2020, Albert advised Plaintiff the associate was not able to represent Plaintiff, and Plaintiff arranged to pick up the case file from Albert who to date has not formally withdrawn from representing Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. The case file was not available for Plaintiff to retrieve from Albert until November 23, 2020, and

1 The Facts are taken from the pleadings and motion papers filed in this action. Plaintiff was not aware of the deadline for filing an appeal with the Second Circuit. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. No timely notice of appeal was filed and the matter is presently before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), and to proceed in forma pauperis in this court (Dkt. 39) filed December 23, 2020 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), attaching the Declaration of David Dale (Dkt. 39 at 2-5) (“Plaintiff’s Declaration”), the Affidavit of Matthew Albert, Esq. (Dkt. 39 at 6-7) (“Albert Affidavit”), and a Notice of Appeal (Dkt. 39 at 8) (“Notice of Appeal”). In opposition, Defendants filed on January 4, 2021 the Attorney Declaration of Second Assistant County Attorney Jeremy C. Toth in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Deadline to Appeal (Dkt. 40) (“Toth Declaration”), attaching exhibits A through E (Dkts. 40-1 through 40-5) (“Defendants’ Exh(s). __”), and the Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Relief (Dkt. 40-6) (“Defendants’ Memorandum”). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.

Based on the following, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

DISCUSSION As relevant here, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a notice of appeal “be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgement or order appealed from.” Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A) (“Rule 4(a) __”). Should a party fail to timely file a notice of appeal, Rule 4(a) further provides that (A) The district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if: (i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and (ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before or during the 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party showed excusable neglect or good cause.

Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i) and (ii) (italics added). “‘The power of the federal courts to extend the time limits on the invocation of appellate jurisdiction is severely circumscribed.’” See Goode v. Winkler, 252 F.3d 242, 245 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mendes Junior Int'l Co. v. Banco Do Brasil, S.A., 215 F.3d 306, 312 (2d Cir.2000)). Further, “[a] district court's order granting or denying motions under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, with the entry of judgment on October 22, 2020, Plaintiff had until November 21, 2020 to file his notice of appeal Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A), and having failed to do so, Plaintiff had until December 21, 2020 to filed a motion for an extension of time in which to file the notice of appeal provided Plaintiff also demonstrated either excusable neglect or good cause for the delay. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(A). Plaintiff’s Motion, however, was not filed until December 23, 2020 and, as such, is untimely, a point not discussed by the parties. Nevertheless, the untimely nature of Plaintiff’s Motion alone is grounds for denying it. See Goode, 252 F.3d at 245 - 46 (finding district court abused its discretion in granting extension of time pursuant to Rule 4(a) to file notice of appeal filed more than 30 days after original appeal filing deadline based on district’s policy of “back-dating” pro se filings). Even assuming, arguendo, Plaintiff’s Motion requesting an extension of time to file his notice of appeal with the Second Circuit was timely filed, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) requires “excusable neglect or good cause,” neither of which Plaintiff has demonstrated and, in fact, Plaintiff’s argument asserts only excusable neglect. The so-called “Pioneer factors” articulated by the Supreme Court in discerning excusable neglect in the context of a federal bankruptcy case, Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.

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Dale v. Biegasiewicz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dale-v-biegasiewicz-nywd-2021.