1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, Case No.: 22-cv-1992-CAB-WVG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 13 v. DISMISS
14 THE REGENTS, et al,
15 Defendants. [Doc. Nos. 11, 13] 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants The Regents and The Elizabeth 18 Hospice’s motions to dismiss. The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court finds 19 them suitable for determination on the papers. For the reasons set forth, the motions to 20 dismiss [Doc. Nos. 11, 13] are GRANTED. 21 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 22 This case was filed shortly after this Court dismissed a previous action filed by 23 Plaintiff for lack of Article III standing. See 22-cv-1471-CAB-WVG at Doc. No. 15. In 24 that case, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint on behalf of himself alleging the 25 same violation of federal law presented by his current complaint. Plaintiff’s federal claim 26 made in his individual capacity was dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing and the 27 case was dismissed. 28 1 Plaintiff then sought to reinstate the previous action alleging the same violation of 2 federal law still naming himself as plaintiff but in the capacity of appointed special counsel 3 on behalf of the estate of his mother Geetha Dalavai (the “Decedent”). The Plaintiff was 4 advised however that he could not proceed pro se as the representative of the Decedent’s 5 estate and the amendment substituting the estate as plaintiff was not allowed. Plaintiff was 6 advised that he could file a new case on behalf of the Decedent’s estate, but he needed to 7 obtain counsel to do so. See 22-cv-1471-CAB-WVG at Doc. No. 16. 8 Plaintiff then filed the present action, proceeding pro se, not on behalf the 9 Decedent’s estate, but in a new capacity as “successor in interest” of the Decedent. This 10 new complaint [Doc No. 1] alleges one federal claim against The Regents, as 11 representatives of UC San Diego Health (“UCSD Health”), under the Emergency Medical 12 Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (“EMTALA”). He also alleges multiple state 13 law violations against The Regents and The Elizabeth Hospice. On January 24, 2023, The 14 Regents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 11]. On January 15 27, 2023, The Elizabeth Hospice filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 16 jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 13]. Plaintiff filed a consolidated 17 response to both motions on March 14, 2023. [Doc. No. 23]. Both Defendants filed their 18 reply on March 21, 2023. [Doc. No. 25]. Plaintiff, without leave, filed a surreply on March 19 27, 2023. [Doc. No. 26]. 20 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 21 Plaintiff alleges that on September 1, 2020, the Decedent went to the Inland Valley 22 Medical Center Emergency Room (“IVMC”) for shortness of breath. [Doc. No. 1 at 10]. 23 IVMC admitted the Decedent to their care shortly after her arrival to the hospital. [Doc. 24 No. 1 at 11]. In the time she was at IVMC, the Decedent was not diagnosed with the 25 emergency medical condition listed on her death certificate. [Doc. No. at 13]. When IVMC 26 determined the Decedent needed a higher-level of care, she was transferred to Jacobs 27 Medical Center at UCSD Health on September 16, 2020. [Doc. No. 1 at 13]. UCSD Health 28 allegedly did not treat all the diseases identified at IVMC, and failed to diagnose or stabilize 1 the underlying disease that caused the Decedent’s emergency medical condition. [Doc. 2 No. 1 at 22]. UCSD Health allegedly determined the Decedent was not a candidate for a 3 lung transplant and transferred the Decedent to The Elizabeth Hospice. [Doc. No. 1 at 23]. 4 In transferring her to The Elizabeth Hospice, UCSD Health allegedly prevented Decedent 5 from being transferred to another facility to receive life-saving treatment. [Doc. No. 1 at 6 26]. 7 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 a. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 9 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a complaint must be dismissed for 10 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 11 jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a 12 ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill 13 Pub. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). “In a facial attack, 14 the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their 15 face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 16 (9th Cir. 2004). “[I]n a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations 17 that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. When assessing a 18 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, “the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, 19 but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes 20 concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 21 (9th Cir. 1988). 22 “The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject matter 23 jurisdiction.” In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 24 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 25 377 (1994)). 26 b. Failure to State a Claim 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 28 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”— 1 generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states 2 a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 4 is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it 5 [does] demand . . . more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 6 accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 8 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 9 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 11 when the collective facts pled “allow . . . the court to draw the reasonable inference that 12 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be “more than a sheer 13 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “merely consistent with a 14 defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 15 550 U.S. at 557).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, Case No.: 22-cv-1992-CAB-WVG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 13 v. DISMISS
14 THE REGENTS, et al,
15 Defendants. [Doc. Nos. 11, 13] 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants The Regents and The Elizabeth 18 Hospice’s motions to dismiss. The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court finds 19 them suitable for determination on the papers. For the reasons set forth, the motions to 20 dismiss [Doc. Nos. 11, 13] are GRANTED. 21 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 22 This case was filed shortly after this Court dismissed a previous action filed by 23 Plaintiff for lack of Article III standing. See 22-cv-1471-CAB-WVG at Doc. No. 15. In 24 that case, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint on behalf of himself alleging the 25 same violation of federal law presented by his current complaint. Plaintiff’s federal claim 26 made in his individual capacity was dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing and the 27 case was dismissed. 28 1 Plaintiff then sought to reinstate the previous action alleging the same violation of 2 federal law still naming himself as plaintiff but in the capacity of appointed special counsel 3 on behalf of the estate of his mother Geetha Dalavai (the “Decedent”). The Plaintiff was 4 advised however that he could not proceed pro se as the representative of the Decedent’s 5 estate and the amendment substituting the estate as plaintiff was not allowed. Plaintiff was 6 advised that he could file a new case on behalf of the Decedent’s estate, but he needed to 7 obtain counsel to do so. See 22-cv-1471-CAB-WVG at Doc. No. 16. 8 Plaintiff then filed the present action, proceeding pro se, not on behalf the 9 Decedent’s estate, but in a new capacity as “successor in interest” of the Decedent. This 10 new complaint [Doc No. 1] alleges one federal claim against The Regents, as 11 representatives of UC San Diego Health (“UCSD Health”), under the Emergency Medical 12 Treatment & Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (“EMTALA”). He also alleges multiple state 13 law violations against The Regents and The Elizabeth Hospice. On January 24, 2023, The 14 Regents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 11]. On January 15 27, 2023, The Elizabeth Hospice filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 16 jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 13]. Plaintiff filed a consolidated 17 response to both motions on March 14, 2023. [Doc. No. 23]. Both Defendants filed their 18 reply on March 21, 2023. [Doc. No. 25]. Plaintiff, without leave, filed a surreply on March 19 27, 2023. [Doc. No. 26]. 20 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 21 Plaintiff alleges that on September 1, 2020, the Decedent went to the Inland Valley 22 Medical Center Emergency Room (“IVMC”) for shortness of breath. [Doc. No. 1 at 10]. 23 IVMC admitted the Decedent to their care shortly after her arrival to the hospital. [Doc. 24 No. 1 at 11]. In the time she was at IVMC, the Decedent was not diagnosed with the 25 emergency medical condition listed on her death certificate. [Doc. No. at 13]. When IVMC 26 determined the Decedent needed a higher-level of care, she was transferred to Jacobs 27 Medical Center at UCSD Health on September 16, 2020. [Doc. No. 1 at 13]. UCSD Health 28 allegedly did not treat all the diseases identified at IVMC, and failed to diagnose or stabilize 1 the underlying disease that caused the Decedent’s emergency medical condition. [Doc. 2 No. 1 at 22]. UCSD Health allegedly determined the Decedent was not a candidate for a 3 lung transplant and transferred the Decedent to The Elizabeth Hospice. [Doc. No. 1 at 23]. 4 In transferring her to The Elizabeth Hospice, UCSD Health allegedly prevented Decedent 5 from being transferred to another facility to receive life-saving treatment. [Doc. No. 1 at 6 26]. 7 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 a. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 9 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a complaint must be dismissed for 10 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 11 jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a 12 ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill 13 Pub. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). “In a facial attack, 14 the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their 15 face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 16 (9th Cir. 2004). “[I]n a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations 17 that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. When assessing a 18 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, “the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, 19 but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes 20 concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 21 (9th Cir. 1988). 22 “The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject matter 23 jurisdiction.” In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 24 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 25 377 (1994)). 26 b. Failure to State a Claim 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 28 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”— 1 generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states 2 a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 4 is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it 5 [does] demand . . . more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 6 accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 8 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 9 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 11 when the collective facts pled “allow . . . the court to draw the reasonable inference that 12 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be “more than a sheer 13 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “merely consistent with a 14 defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 15 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the 16 complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 17 fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 18 (9th Cir. 2010). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 a. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Claims Made Against 21 The Elizabeth Hospice 22 The Elizabeth Hospice argues the claims against it should be dismissed for lack of 23 subject matter jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 13 at 8-9]. The Complaint indicates that subject 24 matter jurisdiction should exist via diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For a federal court 25 to have subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity (1) all plaintiffs must be citizens of 26 different states from all defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy must exceed 27 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Complaint indicates that Plaintiff and two Defendants 28 1 are citizens of California. Because the parties are not citizens of different states there is no 2 diversity jurisdiction. 3 The only basis for subject matter jurisdiction in this matter is the federal claim under 4 the EMTALA. Plaintiff brings his federal claim against The Regents alone. The Court 5 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. The 6 Elizabeth Hospice is hereby DISMISSED from this action for lack of subject matter 7 jurisdiction over the claims alleged against them.1 8 b. EMTALA 9 Plaintiff’s sole federal claim against The Regents is pursuant to the Emergency 10 Medical Treatment & Labor Act. The Regents argue this case should be dismissed because 11 (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his EMTALA claim; (2) Plaintiff’s EMTALA claim is 12 barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state an EMTALA claim. [Doc. 13 No. 11]. The Court addresses each argument separately. 14 1. Standing 15 The Regents assert this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing 16 and his EMTALA claim is barred by collateral estoppel. The Court finds Plaintiff has 17 standing to bring this case. 18 Plaintiff brings the present case as the Decedent’s successor in interest pursuant to 19 California Code of Civil Procedure 377. “A cause of action for . . . a person is not lost by 20 reason of the person’s death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period.” Cal. 21 Civ. Code Proc. (“CCP”) 377.20(a). A deceased’s “successor in interest” is “defined as the 22 beneficiary of the decedent’s estate or ‘other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause 23 of action.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2018). All that is 24 required under the California Code of Civil Procedure to become successor in interest is 25 an affidavit comporting with the requirements in CCP 377.32. 26
27 1 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it declines to consider the merits of The Elizabeth 28 1 Successors in interest have standing to sue in EMTALA claims. See Bryant v. 2 Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2002). While it is well established 3 that an individual cannot appear on behalf of another, Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 4 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2009), some courts have determined that pro se successors in 5 interest can establish claims without counsel. See Raymond v. Martin, No. 6 118CV00307DADJLT, 2018 WL 2047202 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2018) (finding that father, 7 pro se, had standing to bring § 1983 claim as son’s successor in interest); See also Gutierrez 8 v. Tucker, No. 219CV0878JAMDMCP, 2021 WL 5263847 at *4 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2021) 9 (denying pro se successor in interest’s motion to appoint counsel because he could 10 “articulate claims on his own”); See also Doss v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 18- 11 CV-5512-EDL, 2018 WL 11471479 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (allowing pro se successor 12 in interest to amend complaint to establish affidavit requirement). 13 Here, Plaintiff has filed an affidavit sufficient to meet the requirements of CCP 14 377.32. [Doc. No. 5]. The Court finds Plaintiff has standing to sue as successor in interest, 15 and he may proceed with this action as a pro se litigant. The Regents’ collateral estoppel 16 argument is inapplicable here because Plaintiff, as successor in interest to the Decedent, is 17 a new party alleging new claims. Accordingly, The Regents’ motion to dismiss based on 18 standing is DENIED. 19 2. Statute of Limitations 20 The Regents assert this case should be dismissed because the EMTALA claim is 21 barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues his claim is not barred by the statute of 22 limitations because he filed the lower numbered case prior to the statute of limitations 23 deadline, and his current claims “relate-back” to the timely complaint. See 22-cv-1471- 24 CAB-WVG at Doc. No. 1. 25 The statute of limitations for an EMTALA claim is two years. 42 U.S.C. § 26 1395dd(d)(2)(C). The latest date of wrongdoing by UCSD Health alleged in the Complaint 27 is October 1, 2020. [Doc. No. 1 at 22]. The statute of limitations required this claim to be 28 filed by October 1, 2022, and the Complaint was brought on December 15, 2022. This case 1 does not relate back, as Plaintiff has filed a new complaint with new parties. See O’Donnell 2 v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding a second complaint does not 3 relate back to a first complaint because it is not an amendment, “but rather a separate 4 filing”). The statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff’s EMTALA claim, and the Court 5 does not see any reason to grant tolling of the statute of limitations. 6 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s EMTALA claim is BARRED by the statute of limitations, 7 and the Regents’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED on that ground. 8 3. Failure to State Claim 9 Even if this case was not barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiff fails to state 10 an EMTALA claim. Plaintiff alleges the EMTALA was violated when UCSD Health (1) 11 failed to take reasonable steps to secure Decedent’s written informed consent to refuse 12 examination and treatment available under the statute; (2) failed to provide necessary 13 screening for the emergency medical condition Decedent had “when she checked in to the 14 emergency at Inland Valley Medical Center.”; and (3) prematurely transferred Decedent to 15 hospice care. The Regents argue Plaintiff fails to state an EMTALA claim because UCSD 16 Health was not an emergency department liable under the EMTALA. 17 EMTALA requires a hospital’s emergency department to “provide [] an appropriate 18 medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency 19 department . . . to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.” 20 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). A participating hospital “has a duty to stabilize only those 21 emergency medical conditions that its staff detects.” Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1166 (quoting 22 Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2001)). “EMTALA’s 23 stabilization requirement ends when an individual is admitted for inpatient care.” Id. at 24 1168. 25 The Complaint alleges IVMC was the emergency department Decedent visited for 26 shortness of breath on September 1, 2020. IVMC later admitted Decedent to inpatient care 27 from September 1, 2020 to September 16, 2020 prior to transferring her to UCSD Health. 28 [Doc. No. 1 at 10]. The only hospital liable under the EMTALA would be IVMC, who is 1 not a party to this action, and IVMC’s liability ended once they admitted the Decedent to 2 inpatient care. Plaintiff also acknowledges that “IVMC did not violate EMTALA as they 3 conducted an [appropriate medical screening examination] within their capacity.” [Doc. 4 No. 23 at 24]. The Decedent was transferred to UCSD Health after she visited the 5 emergency department and was admitted to inpatient care at IVMC. Plaintiff has not 6 alleged facts sufficient to establish UCSD Health violated the EMTALA. 7 Accordingly, The Regents’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is 8 GRANTED. 9 4. Leave to Amend 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 states that courts “should freely give leave [to 11 amend] when justice so requires.” “But a district court need not grant leave to amend where 12 the amendment: (1) prejudices the other party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an 13 undue delay in litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 14 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). “Futility of amendment is analyzed much like a Rule 15 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—an amended complaint is futile when it would be subject to 16 dismissal.” Woods v. First Am. Title, Inc., No. CV111284GHKVBKX, 2011 WL 17 13218022, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011). Because Plaintiff fails to state an EMTALA 18 claim and this claim is barred by the statute of limitations, the Court finds any further 19 amendment to Plaintiff’s EMTALA claim would be futile. The Court declines to grant 20 leave to amend. 21 //// 22 //// 23 //// 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 1 Vv. CONCLUSION 2 In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS: 3 1. The Elizabeth Hospice’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 4 jurisdiction is GRANTED. 5 2. Plaintiffs EMTALA claim is BARRED by the statute of limitations. 6 3. The Regent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state an EMTALA claim is 7 GRANTED without leave to amend. 8 || This order is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing his state law claims in state court.” The 9 || Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case. 10 11 It is SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: April 5, 2023 € ZL 13 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Court does not take a position as to whether those claims would be time barred by the statute of limitations.