NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, No. 25-2109; 25-3830 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-01471-CAB-DDL v. MEMORANDUM* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, No. 25-3495 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01471-CAB-DDL v.
DANIEL CALAC, Dr. , M.D. an individual; LAURENCE H. BOGGELN, Dr, M.D., an individual,
Defendants - Appellees,
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Defendants.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 31, 2026**
Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Randal Jerome Dalavai appeals pro se from the district court’s final
judgment and orders dismissing his claims and denying default judgment. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in
the Second Amended Complaint against Universal Health Services of Rancho
Springs, Inc. dba Southwest Healthcare Inland Valley Medical Center (“IVMC”),
for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). Even
construed liberally, see Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014), the
complaint does not plead state action by IVMC. See DeGrassi v. City of Glendora,
207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he plaintiff must allege facts tending to
show that [the defendants] acted under color of state law or authority.” (citation
modified)). The decision to admit Ms. Dalavai as an inpatient to IVMC, a private
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 25-2109 hospital, was made by IVMC physicians. IVMC’s compliance with Medicare and
Medi-Cal regulations relating to coverage of inpatient treatment does not transform
that medical decision by private parties into state action. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1010 (1982).
2. We affirm the dismissal of Counts 1–4 of the Second Amended Complaint
against Donna Loza and Deo Besana, on the ground that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. To invoke federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must plead
facts demonstrating Article III standing: injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). And “a plaintiff
must demonstrate standing . . . for each form of relief sought.” TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 436 (2021) (citation modified). Ms. Dalavai’s inpatient
admission was determined by IVMC, not “retroactively” by Loza and Besana in
their investigation. Dalavai brings his claims against Loza and Besana, but he does
not allege facts showing his injury is traceable to them nor how enjoining them
would redress it. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 62–63 (2024); Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
3. The district court did not err in dismissing all claims against the Regents
of the University of California (the “Regents”). Dalavai pled Counts 6–8 of the
Second Amended Complaint contingent on Counts 1–4. Therefore, we affirm the
dismissal of Counts 6–8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(b). Dalavai does not challenge the
3 25-2109 district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law
claims in Counts 9–13 of the Second Amended Complaint. See Hernandez v.
Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (Issues not specifically and distinctly
argued in the opening brief are forfeited.). We deny Dalavai’s request to vacate the
district court’s alleged timeliness ruling; the district court made no such ruling
because it declined to exercise jurisdiction.
4. The district court did not err in dismissing Count 14 of the Second
Amended Complaint for failure to state a fraudulent misrepresentation claim
against Drs. Calac and Boggeln. The complaint does not plead that Drs. Calac and
Boggeln made the October 16 misrepresentation, nor that they had the requisite
knowledge or intent when making the hospice certification. See Lazar v. Superior
Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 984–85 (Cal. 1996); Cansino v. Bank of Am., 224 Cal. App. 4th
1462, 1470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
because it correctly determined that amendments would be futile. See In re
Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2024). Dalavai is precluded
from relitigating the issue of his mother’s inpatient status at UCSD and the
Regents’ liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. See Dalavai v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. 23-55412, 2024 WL 3842100, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024); Snoqualmie
4 25-2109 Indian Tribe v. Washington, 8 F.4th 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2021). Thus, no
amendments would allow Dalavai to plead EMTALA claims against the Regents
or standing for injunctive relief against Loza and Besana. See Brown v. Brita
Prods. Co., 172 F.4th 1113, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2026) (holding that the district court
did not err in dismissing a complaint without leave to amend where claims
“fail[ed] as a matter of law” and no “additional allegations [would] change [that]
conclusion”). Nor does Dalavai identify additional facts he could plead that would
cure the lack of state action by IVMC or state the missing elements for fraud by
Drs. Calac and Boggeln. See id.; In re Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th at 1190.
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying default judgment
on Count 1 of the Third Amended Complaint. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470,
1471–72 (9th Cir.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, No. 25-2109; 25-3830 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-01471-CAB-DDL v. MEMORANDUM* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, No. 25-3495 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01471-CAB-DDL v.
DANIEL CALAC, Dr. , M.D. an individual; LAURENCE H. BOGGELN, Dr, M.D., an individual,
Defendants - Appellees,
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Defendants.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 31, 2026**
Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Randal Jerome Dalavai appeals pro se from the district court’s final
judgment and orders dismissing his claims and denying default judgment. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in
the Second Amended Complaint against Universal Health Services of Rancho
Springs, Inc. dba Southwest Healthcare Inland Valley Medical Center (“IVMC”),
for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). Even
construed liberally, see Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014), the
complaint does not plead state action by IVMC. See DeGrassi v. City of Glendora,
207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he plaintiff must allege facts tending to
show that [the defendants] acted under color of state law or authority.” (citation
modified)). The decision to admit Ms. Dalavai as an inpatient to IVMC, a private
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 25-2109 hospital, was made by IVMC physicians. IVMC’s compliance with Medicare and
Medi-Cal regulations relating to coverage of inpatient treatment does not transform
that medical decision by private parties into state action. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1010 (1982).
2. We affirm the dismissal of Counts 1–4 of the Second Amended Complaint
against Donna Loza and Deo Besana, on the ground that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. To invoke federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must plead
facts demonstrating Article III standing: injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). And “a plaintiff
must demonstrate standing . . . for each form of relief sought.” TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 436 (2021) (citation modified). Ms. Dalavai’s inpatient
admission was determined by IVMC, not “retroactively” by Loza and Besana in
their investigation. Dalavai brings his claims against Loza and Besana, but he does
not allege facts showing his injury is traceable to them nor how enjoining them
would redress it. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 62–63 (2024); Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
3. The district court did not err in dismissing all claims against the Regents
of the University of California (the “Regents”). Dalavai pled Counts 6–8 of the
Second Amended Complaint contingent on Counts 1–4. Therefore, we affirm the
dismissal of Counts 6–8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(b). Dalavai does not challenge the
3 25-2109 district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law
claims in Counts 9–13 of the Second Amended Complaint. See Hernandez v.
Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (Issues not specifically and distinctly
argued in the opening brief are forfeited.). We deny Dalavai’s request to vacate the
district court’s alleged timeliness ruling; the district court made no such ruling
because it declined to exercise jurisdiction.
4. The district court did not err in dismissing Count 14 of the Second
Amended Complaint for failure to state a fraudulent misrepresentation claim
against Drs. Calac and Boggeln. The complaint does not plead that Drs. Calac and
Boggeln made the October 16 misrepresentation, nor that they had the requisite
knowledge or intent when making the hospice certification. See Lazar v. Superior
Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 984–85 (Cal. 1996); Cansino v. Bank of Am., 224 Cal. App. 4th
1462, 1470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
because it correctly determined that amendments would be futile. See In re
Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2024). Dalavai is precluded
from relitigating the issue of his mother’s inpatient status at UCSD and the
Regents’ liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. See Dalavai v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. 23-55412, 2024 WL 3842100, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024); Snoqualmie
4 25-2109 Indian Tribe v. Washington, 8 F.4th 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2021). Thus, no
amendments would allow Dalavai to plead EMTALA claims against the Regents
or standing for injunctive relief against Loza and Besana. See Brown v. Brita
Prods. Co., 172 F.4th 1113, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2026) (holding that the district court
did not err in dismissing a complaint without leave to amend where claims
“fail[ed] as a matter of law” and no “additional allegations [would] change [that]
conclusion”). Nor does Dalavai identify additional facts he could plead that would
cure the lack of state action by IVMC or state the missing elements for fraud by
Drs. Calac and Boggeln. See id.; In re Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th at 1190.
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying default judgment
on Count 1 of the Third Amended Complaint. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470,
1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092–93 (9th Cir.
1980) (per curiam). “To state a claim under the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff
must first establish that he possessed a property interest that is deserving of
constitutional protection.” See Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch.
Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation modified). The California
Department of Public Health (“DPH”) notified Dalavai “in writing of the
department’s determination as a result of” its inspection. Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 1279.2(d). Dalavai has not identified a source for “a legitimate claim of
5 25-2109 entitlement” to the details of DPH’s investigation. See Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
AFFIRMED.1
1 Dalavai’s Motion to Reset Briefing Schedule, see Dkt. No. 9, is DENIED as moot.
6 25-2109