Dakota Resource Council v. North Dakota Public Service Commission

2012 ND 72, 815 N.W.2d 286, 2012 WL 1205125, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 79
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedApril 10, 2012
DocketNo. 20110226
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2012 ND 72 (Dakota Resource Council v. North Dakota Public Service Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dakota Resource Council v. North Dakota Public Service Commission, 2012 ND 72, 815 N.W.2d 286, 2012 WL 1205125, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 2012).

Opinions

CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] The Dakota Resource Council (“DRC”) appeals a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Public Service Commission (“PSC”) order. DRC argues (1) the PSC’s decision was not in accordance with the law and (2) the PSC’s conclusions of law and order were not supported by its findings of fact. We affirm.

I

[¶2] In August 2008, Falkirk Mining Company filed an application with the PSC requesting revision of a surface mining permit. Falkirk proposed changing the postmining use of 428 acres of land from agricultural and industrial use to recreational use. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the transfer of approximately 730 acres of land from Falkirk to the North Dakota Department of Transportation (“NDDOT”). The NDDOT planned to use the land as mitigation acres to eliminate “no mow” areas within the rights-of-way of the state highway system in McLean County. To implement the mitigation plan, the NDDOT and the [288]*288North Dakota Game and Fish Department agreed Game and Fish would manage the land as a wildlife management area.

[¶ 3] In March 2010, the PSC granted the revision subject to the right of adversely affected parties to request a formal hearing. In April 2010, DRC requested a hearing. DRC asserted 86 acres located in noncontiguous parcels throughout the proposed wildlife management area should remain designated for agricultural use. Game and Fish planned to allow local farmers to grow crops on the 86 acres, harvesting 70 percent and leaving the remaining 30 percent standing as food for wildlife.

[¶ 4] McLean County, the NDDOT and Game and Fish petitioned to intervene. The PSC allowed intervention. In July 2010, the PSC held a public hearing. Several witnesses testified at the hearing including DRC’s staff director, the PSC’s reclamation division director, Falkirk’s environmental manager, the chairman of the McLean County Commission, the director of the NDDOT and the director of Game and Fish. The PSC affirmed its conditional approval of the revision to Falkirk’s permit. DRC appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the PSC’s decision.

II

[¶ 5] “Courts exercise limited review in appeals from administrative agency decisions under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32.” Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 157, ¶ 4, 772 N.W.2d 582. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49, our standard of review of an agency’s decision is the same as the standard applied by the district court under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. Industrial Contractors, at ¶ 4. We will not reverse an agency decision unless:

“1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
“2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
“3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
“4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
“5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
“6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
“7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
“8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.”

N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.

Ill

[¶ 6] Chapter 38-14.1, N.D.C.C., is part of North Dakota’s surface coal mining and reclamation program established in accordance with the requirements of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. See 30 U.S.C. § 1253. The North Dakota program makes the PSC “the state regulatory authority for all purposes relating to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.” N.D.C.C. § 38-14.1-02(4). The PSC has several program-related powers and duties, including “issuing] permits for surface coal mining operations” and “promulgatfing] such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of this chapter [289]*289and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.” N.D.C.C. § 38-14.1 — 03(10)—(11).

A

[¶ 7] DRC argues the PSC order was not in accordance with the law because under N.D.C.C. § 38-14.1-24(2) and its implementing regulations, recreational use can never be a “higher or better” use than agricultural use. The PSC responds that neither the statute nor the implementing regulations assign an order of priority to postmining land uses.

[¶ 8] “Statutory interpretation is a question of law.” Industrial Contractors, 2009 ND 157, ¶ 11, 772 N.W.2d 582. “Questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute, are fully reviewable on appeal from an administrative decision.” Id. at ¶ 6 (quotation omitted). “Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07.” Id. at ¶ 11 (quotation omitted). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, “the letter of [the statute] is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05.

[¶ 9] Section 38-14.1-24, N.D.C.C., establishes environmental protection performance standards for surface coal mining and reclamation operations. Under N.D.C.C. § 38-14.1-24(2):

“General performance standards are applicable to all surface coal mining and reclamation operations and must require the permittee at a minimum to:
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“2. Restore the land affected to a condition capable of supporting the uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better uses approved by the commission, which may include industrial, commercial, agricultural, residential, recreational, or public facilities. In approving the postmining land use, or changes thereto, the commission shall establish by regulation postmining land use criteria that must be demonstrated by the permittee and considered by the commission in making its decision.”

Section 69-05.2-23-02, N.D. Admin. Code, implementing N.D.C.C. § 38-14.1-24, lists ten permissible postmining land uses:

“Land use is categorized as follows:
“1. Cropland.
“2. Tame pastureland.
“3. Native grassland.
“4. Woodland.
“5. Fish and wildlife habitat.
“6. Developed water resources.
“7. Recreation.
“8. Residential.
“9. Industrial and commercial.
“10. Shelterbelts.”

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Related

Voigt v. North Dakota Public Service Commission
2017 ND 76 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2017)
Jangula v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2016 ND 116 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2016)
State v. White
2012 ND 67 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
2012 ND 72, 815 N.W.2d 286, 2012 WL 1205125, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dakota-resource-council-v-north-dakota-public-service-commission-nd-2012.