Dakota Lodge No. 1, I. O. v. Yankton County

223 N.W. 330, 54 S.D. 402, 1929 S.D. LEXIS 340
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 26, 1929
DocketFile No. 6529
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 223 N.W. 330 (Dakota Lodge No. 1, I. O. v. Yankton County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dakota Lodge No. 1, I. O. v. Yankton County, 223 N.W. 330, 54 S.D. 402, 1929 S.D. LEXIS 340 (S.D. 1929).

Opinions

MISER, C.

This is an action by Dakota Lodge No. i, Independent Order of O’dd Fellows, a South Dakota corporation, against Yankton county, for the return and refund of $776.57, with interest, being taxes paid for the years 1907 to 1918., inclusive, and for the years 1922 to 1923, inclusive, on certain lots owned by plaintiff. The ground for claiming the refund is that, under the Constitution and statutes of this state, the property upon which the taxes were paid is exempt from taxation, because Dakota Lodge No. 1, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, is a charitable institution within the meaning of section 6, art. 11, Constitution of South Dakota, section 2056, Rev. Pol. Code of 1903, section 6670, Rev. Code 1919, and chapter 106, Laws of 1919. Inasmuch as important changes in the fundamental law relating to exemption from taxation were made 'by a constitutional amendment in 1918, and by the enactment of chapter 106 of the Session Laws of 19119 we shall first examine into the question of right to exemption from the taxes thereafter paid.

In State ex rel. Eveland v. Johns, 43 S. D. 279, 178 N. W. 945, this court held that the express power given to the Legislature by section 2 of article 11 of the South Dakota Constitution, as amended in 1918, “to determine what class or classes of property shall be subject to taxation and what property, if any, shall not be subject to taxation,” made the inconsistent provisions of sections 6 and 7 of said article 11 “subservient to the purposes of the express power so granted.” The court also said: “We are therefore of the view that Chapters 105 and 106, Session Laws of 1919, is [404]*404a constitutional and valid exercise of legislative power and authority.”

It was, therefore, with a full consideration of sections 5, 6, and 7 of article n, as well as section 2 of said article as amended in 1918, as well as consideration of section 6670, R. C. 1919, as amended by chapter 106, Laws 1919, that this court said, in Re Dakota Wesleyan University, 48 S. D. 84, 202 N. W. 284, that “Under our-present Constitution and existing statute all property that is owned by religious, educational, charitable or benevolent societies, * * * and all property * * * that is used exclusively for charitable, benevolent, religious, or educational purposes, is exempt from taxation.”

In the case at bar, the trial court found that the lots in question ha-di at no time since plaintiff became the owner of the same been used exclusively for charitable or benevolent purposes within the meaning of section 6670, and that the plaintiff is not a charitable or benevolent society within the meaning of that section, and rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and confirming the action of defendant county in rejecting- the application for refund. From this judgment plaintiff has appealed. Respondent does not agree with the appellant that the question whether this lodge is a charitable institution is the sole question presented on this appeal; but, in the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to decide whether the method of recovery chosen by plaintiff •was the proper method, nor to decide the applicability of the statute of limitations to the law relating to refunds.

Was Dakota Lodge No. 1, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, a charitable society within the meaning of subdivision 3 of Section 6670, R. C. 1919, after the amendment by chapter 106, S. L. 1919, and prior to the amendment by chapter 46, S. L. 1927?

It may be accepted as a fact that the Independent Order of Odd Fellows is a great fraternity, which “was founded from a desire for human brotherhood,” and that, as the proof shows, from 1830 to 1924, it spent in the United States and in nine other countries where established over $200,000,000 in the relief of its members and their widowed families, out of a total revenue of about $600,000,000; but the lots on which these taxes were levied were not owned by the Independent Order of Odd Fellows nor by its Sovereign Grand Lodge, but by Dakota Lodge No.' 1. Conse[405]*405quently, the question of exemption is not determined by whether this great brotherhood is a charitable society within the meaning of section 6670, but by whether the owner of these lots, Dakota Lodge No-. 1, appellant herein, is a charitable society within: such, meaning; nor are we now concerned with the right of Legislature to specifically provide w-hat property of such fraternal lodges may be exempt, nor whether, in enacting chapter 46 of the Session Laws of 1927, the legislative intent was to exempt such property. Indeed, if this decision be limited, as it should be limited, to the facts as presented to the trial court, the question to be decided is whether the finding o-f the trial court that Dakota Lodge No-. 1 was not a charitable society within the meaning of section 6670, was or was not contrary to- the evidence adduced.

At the trial, the facts were stipulated, and by stipulation certain exhibits were admitted in- evidence. One exhibit showed the income received by plaintiff from all sources from 1907 to 19-26, inclusive, to be $40, 940.36. Another exhibit admitted by a stipulation to be “a statement showing the amount of money disbursed by plaintiff for charitable purposes each year, from the year 1907 to June 23, 1926, inclusive,” showed that, in a like period, plaintiff disbursed for relief $5,626.98, for home fund $4,340.35, and for Grand Lodge dues $3,455.67, or a total disbursement fo-r these purposes of $i3;423.oo. What was done by plaintiff with the remaining $27,5,17.3,6 -does not appear. By the by-laws of plaintiff corporation, it appears that the funds of the lodge- are to be expended only for its actual, necessary expenses and support, for the payment of benefits to sick and disabled members, for the relief of distressed members of the order or their families, and for the payment of funeral benefits. The by-laws further provide that, upon the decease of a member entitled to benefits, there shall be paid $30 as a funeral benefit, and further provide that weekly benefits for sickness shall be $2 per week for the first 52 weeks and $1 per week thereafter. Presumably the relief disbursed was in-accordance therewith. No evidence was introduced of any charity disbursed to others nor evidence offered to show further the character o-f the individual disbursements listed under the headings of "relief,” "home fund,” and “Grand Lodge dues,” the totals for which have hereinbefore been given.

In order to show the objects and purposes of the Independent [406]*406Order of Odd Fellows, it was stipulated, subject to certain objections by respondent, that a report of the Grand -Representatives of the Sovereign Grand Lodge of the Order was adopted by the Grand Lodge of .South Dakota at its meeting in 1926, which, in part, was as follows: “No guarantee except fellowship, no sick or health insurance. * * * To visit the sick, relieve the distressed, bury the dead and educate the orphan * * * when a guarantee is given to pay weekly sick benefits of a stipulated amount, it becomes a semi business organization and partially removed from the- realm of true brotherhood.”

Whether, if the sick visited, the distressed relieved, the dead buried, the orphan educated, be only members of a society and their families, such society may yet be a charitable society within the meaning of section 6670, we do> not decide.

In Lutheran Hospital Ass’n v. Baker, 40 S. D. 226, 167 N. W.

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Bluebook (online)
223 N.W. 330, 54 S.D. 402, 1929 S.D. LEXIS 340, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dakota-lodge-no-1-i-o-v-yankton-county-sd-1929.