Peterson, Justice.
Two methods of selecting grand and petit jurors are provided by statute, depending upon the population of the county. In counties of more than 100,000 population, selection is made by the judges of district court; in all other counties, the County Board of Commissioners
makes the selection.
The question in this case is whether the selection of jurors in Dakota County shall be by the court or by the commissioners, and the answer depends upon whether or not Dakota County has a population of more or less than 100,000. The answer is to be found in a proper construction of the statutory definition of “population” contained in Minn. St. 645.44, which provides:
“Subdivision 1. The following words, terms, and phrases used in Minnesota Statutes or any legislative act shall have the meanings given them in this section, unless another intention clearly appears.
* * * * *
“Subd. 8. When used in reference to population, ‘population’ and ‘inhabitants’ mean that
shown by the last preceding
census, state or United States, unless otherwise expressly provided.” (Italics supplied. )
What is apparently a simple question and answer is complicated only by the fact that Dakota County has had
two
censuses in this decade. The regular county-wide 1960 Federal decennial census established a population of 78,303. However, a special Federal census
was taken in six of the larger municipal subdivisions in 1965
and established population gains in those six subdivisions in such numbers that, if substituted for the 1960 census figures in those subdivisions and added to the 1960 figures for the other subdivisions, this census would ostensibly increase the county-wide population to 104,905.
The Board of County Commissioners, acting upon the exclusive use of the county-wide 1960 decennial census, has selected the jurors for 1967. This action is challenged by petitioners, who claim that the combined result of
both
censuses must be used. The trial court found, “The challenge not true,” and ordered the proceeding dismissed. Petitioners appeal from that order.
It is doubtful, at the outset, whether these petitioners have standing to raise the issues presented.
This proceeding was commenced by challenge
pursuant to § 631.23, which provides:
“A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all the petit
jurors returned, and may be taken by either
party.
It can be founded only on a material departure from the forms prescribed by law in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, and shall be taken before a jury is sworn, and be in writing, specifying plainly and distinctly the facts constituting the ground of challenge.” (Italics supplied.)
Petitioners are “Dakota County Members of the Bar” and the petition is subscribed by two members of the bar “for themselves and for various other members of the Bar.” They do not purport to act for any identified party to litigation but, rather, only “for their respective clients whose cases may appear for trial” by the jurors selected by the county commissioners.
If we were to treat this challenge as in the nature of an action for declaratory judgment, it is doubtful that a justiciable controversy is presented. Persons having only such interest in a statute as does the public generally ordinarily do not have the necessary legal interest for maintaining an action for declaratory judgment. State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 25 N. W. (2d) 474, 174 A. L. R. 544.
We can appreciate that attorneys as officers of the court have a peculiar interest in the proper selection of jurors as a vital part of our judicial processes, but this aspect of the administration of justice
should be an equal concern of all citizens. State ex rel. Passer v. Renville County Board, 171 Minn. 177, 213 N. W. 545, 52 A. L. R. 916.
Notwithstanding these expressions of doubt, we have concluded to dispose of the case on its merits and to affirm the order of the trial court. The issue is clear-cut; the issue has been fully briefed and argued; and the record is as complete as ever it could be, regardless of whether an actual litigant might subsequently more properly invoke the challenge. No useful purpose would be served by disposing of the case without an expression of opinion on the merits. Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co. Inc. 246 Minn. 1, 5 to 6, 74 N. W. (2d) 305, 309.
It is our opinion that the challenge is not well taken. The statutory reference to the official census, in the singular, would itself seem to exclude the plural use of both a 1960 and a 1965 census. This is not a question of taking judicial notice of what the population may in fact be in Dakota County, if indeed it were judicially cognizable.
Rather, it is a question of what the legislature intended the test to be for the purpose of this statute. The legislature obviously intended that the largest counties should have a different method of jury selection, both as to the method of selection and the numbers of jurors selected. It was deemed advisable to identify such counties by population rather than name, a common method of classification.
Having established a
clear-cut standard of classification by population, the legislature established a clear-cut test of population.
The statutory test applies “unless another intention clearly appears.” Had the legislature intended any piecemeal census determination for any county it could have specifically so provided. There is no indication whatever of a legislative intent that authorization of a special census for apportionment of cigarette and liquor taxes was to be used for any other purpose than that.
It is one thing to apportion tax receipts to a specific municipality — a matter of direct concern only to that municipality. It is quite another thing to use such a partial census in determining the population of a county as a whole when less than all of the municipal subdivisions of the county are contemporaneously enumerated by census.
Petitioners rely mainly upon Ellis v. Village of Bloomington, 245 Minn. 292, 72 N. W. (2d) 350, but this reliance is misplaced. Although the case did result in crediting population figures established by a special census subsequent to the regular decennial census, the facts dictating that result were otherwise controllingly different. And, al
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Peterson, Justice.
Two methods of selecting grand and petit jurors are provided by statute, depending upon the population of the county. In counties of more than 100,000 population, selection is made by the judges of district court; in all other counties, the County Board of Commissioners
makes the selection.
The question in this case is whether the selection of jurors in Dakota County shall be by the court or by the commissioners, and the answer depends upon whether or not Dakota County has a population of more or less than 100,000. The answer is to be found in a proper construction of the statutory definition of “population” contained in Minn. St. 645.44, which provides:
“Subdivision 1. The following words, terms, and phrases used in Minnesota Statutes or any legislative act shall have the meanings given them in this section, unless another intention clearly appears.
* * * * *
“Subd. 8. When used in reference to population, ‘population’ and ‘inhabitants’ mean that
shown by the last preceding
census, state or United States, unless otherwise expressly provided.” (Italics supplied. )
What is apparently a simple question and answer is complicated only by the fact that Dakota County has had
two
censuses in this decade. The regular county-wide 1960 Federal decennial census established a population of 78,303. However, a special Federal census
was taken in six of the larger municipal subdivisions in 1965
and established population gains in those six subdivisions in such numbers that, if substituted for the 1960 census figures in those subdivisions and added to the 1960 figures for the other subdivisions, this census would ostensibly increase the county-wide population to 104,905.
The Board of County Commissioners, acting upon the exclusive use of the county-wide 1960 decennial census, has selected the jurors for 1967. This action is challenged by petitioners, who claim that the combined result of
both
censuses must be used. The trial court found, “The challenge not true,” and ordered the proceeding dismissed. Petitioners appeal from that order.
It is doubtful, at the outset, whether these petitioners have standing to raise the issues presented.
This proceeding was commenced by challenge
pursuant to § 631.23, which provides:
“A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all the petit
jurors returned, and may be taken by either
party.
It can be founded only on a material departure from the forms prescribed by law in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, and shall be taken before a jury is sworn, and be in writing, specifying plainly and distinctly the facts constituting the ground of challenge.” (Italics supplied.)
Petitioners are “Dakota County Members of the Bar” and the petition is subscribed by two members of the bar “for themselves and for various other members of the Bar.” They do not purport to act for any identified party to litigation but, rather, only “for their respective clients whose cases may appear for trial” by the jurors selected by the county commissioners.
If we were to treat this challenge as in the nature of an action for declaratory judgment, it is doubtful that a justiciable controversy is presented. Persons having only such interest in a statute as does the public generally ordinarily do not have the necessary legal interest for maintaining an action for declaratory judgment. State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 25 N. W. (2d) 474, 174 A. L. R. 544.
We can appreciate that attorneys as officers of the court have a peculiar interest in the proper selection of jurors as a vital part of our judicial processes, but this aspect of the administration of justice
should be an equal concern of all citizens. State ex rel. Passer v. Renville County Board, 171 Minn. 177, 213 N. W. 545, 52 A. L. R. 916.
Notwithstanding these expressions of doubt, we have concluded to dispose of the case on its merits and to affirm the order of the trial court. The issue is clear-cut; the issue has been fully briefed and argued; and the record is as complete as ever it could be, regardless of whether an actual litigant might subsequently more properly invoke the challenge. No useful purpose would be served by disposing of the case without an expression of opinion on the merits. Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co. Inc. 246 Minn. 1, 5 to 6, 74 N. W. (2d) 305, 309.
It is our opinion that the challenge is not well taken. The statutory reference to the official census, in the singular, would itself seem to exclude the plural use of both a 1960 and a 1965 census. This is not a question of taking judicial notice of what the population may in fact be in Dakota County, if indeed it were judicially cognizable.
Rather, it is a question of what the legislature intended the test to be for the purpose of this statute. The legislature obviously intended that the largest counties should have a different method of jury selection, both as to the method of selection and the numbers of jurors selected. It was deemed advisable to identify such counties by population rather than name, a common method of classification.
Having established a
clear-cut standard of classification by population, the legislature established a clear-cut test of population.
The statutory test applies “unless another intention clearly appears.” Had the legislature intended any piecemeal census determination for any county it could have specifically so provided. There is no indication whatever of a legislative intent that authorization of a special census for apportionment of cigarette and liquor taxes was to be used for any other purpose than that.
It is one thing to apportion tax receipts to a specific municipality — a matter of direct concern only to that municipality. It is quite another thing to use such a partial census in determining the population of a county as a whole when less than all of the municipal subdivisions of the county are contemporaneously enumerated by census.
Petitioners rely mainly upon Ellis v. Village of Bloomington, 245 Minn. 292, 72 N. W. (2d) 350, but this reliance is misplaced. Although the case did result in crediting population figures established by a special census subsequent to the regular decennial census, the facts dictating that result were otherwise controllingly different. And, al
though our primary function there, as here, was to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, the differences in the statutes appeared to manifest a different legislative intent. The village of Bloomington, which sought the power to establish a municipal liquor dispensary, was limited by the statute permitting such a dispensary only in villages of not more than 10,000 inhabitants.
The village, accordingly, claimed that its population was less than 10,000. The last Federal census, 1950, established a population of 9,902; but a special census taken in 1953, as provided by statute for incorporation purposes,
established a population of 12,643.
A first difference was that the determination of population involved neither an estimate of population nor a combination of the results of more than one census. There was, indeed, no real basis in fact for asserting a lesser population, for the village had at all times accepted an apportionment of cigarette and liquor taxes from the state auditor on the basis of the later, larger population figures. A second difference was in the distinctly different legislative history of the municipal liquor statute manifesting an intent to use a population test different than that prescribed by § 645.44, subd. 8, for § 645.44, subd. 1, provides that the test of the last preceding census is applicable only “unless another intention clearly appears.” The statute providing for an incorporation census antedated the statute governing establishment of municipal liquor dispensaries. We held, on that record, “The express provision for an incorporation census contained [in § 412.011, subd. 2] indicates a clear legislative intent that the population figure established thereby should govern the classification of such villages for statutory purposes.” 245 Minn. 298, 72 N. W. (2d) 354.
Affirmed.