Dakota A.W. Stinson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 12, 2019
• Docket: 18A-CR-2241
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 12 2019, 7:41 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kay A. Beehler Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Terre Haute, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Jesse R. Drum Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA Dakota A.W. Stinson, July 12, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2241 v. Appeal from the Lawrence Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John M. Plummer Appellee-Plaintiff. III, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 47D01-1802-F2-228

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 1 of 11 [1] Dakota Stinson (“Stinson”) appeals from Lawrence Superior Court’s denial of

his Motion for Discharge, arguing that the State failed to bring him to trial

within the period mandated by Indiana Criminal Rule 4.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On February 9, 2018, Stinson was charged with Level 2 felony burglary and

Level 3 felony robbery. Three days later, on February 12, 2018, the trial court

held Stinson’s initial hearing in conjunction with his co-defendants. The

following exchange occurred at Stinson’s initial hearing:

THE COURT: Do any of the four of you have any questions about the charges, your rights, or the possible penalties? Mr. Stinson. Don’t say anything about the facts of the case. I don’t want you to do anything that would implicate your guilt or innocence.

THE DEFENDANT: I was going to request a speedy and public trial (inaudible).

THE COURT: We’ll let the Public Defender’s Office know if I appoint them. Oh, no. You didn’t ask – yes, you did – for a public defender. And I’m assuming, the State, there will be, therefore, no offers to Mr. Stinson since he’s asked for a speedy trial.

[STATE]: That is right, Your Honor.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 2 of 11 THE DEFENDANT: I have three witnesses.

THE COURT: I don’t care if you’ve got 25 witnesses.

THE DEFENDANT: (inaudible).

THE COURT: Tell somebody else about it. So the State has acknowledged that it will – there will be no offers related to Mr. Stinson given his request. Now we’re not going to make that request effective as of today, Mr. Stinson, because you’re going to need to talk to your attorney about it. And then they can file something with the Court.

Tr. pp. 4–5.

[4] A public defender, James Spangler (“Spangler”), was appointed to represent

Mr. Stinson the next day, on February 13, 2018. Spangler filed his appearance

on February 22, 2018 and appeared on behalf of Stinson at pre-trial conferences

held on April 4, April 18, May 7, and May 23 of 2018. Stinson, who was

housed at the Lawrence County Jail, was only transported to the April 4

hearing. Spangler stated at the hearings on April 18 and May 23 that Stinson

was not requesting a trial date. Tr. pp. 12,18. At no time during his

representation of Stinson did Spangler mention his client’s request for a speedy

trial to the court.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 3 of 11 [5] On May 26, 2018, Stinson filed a letter with the court, informing the court that

Spangler had “resigned from” his case.1 Appellant’s App. p. 24. He also

informed the court that he had learned from his family, not from his counsel,

that several pre-trial hearings had taken place.2 Id. Three days later, on May 29,

2018, the State requested a trial date “no later than August 9, 2018.” Id. at 26.

[6] On June 13, 2018, the trial court held another pre-trial hearing. At this pre-trial

hearing, a different public defender, Kristine Kohlmeier (“Kohlmeier”), attended

the hearing on behalf of the Public Defender’s office. Kohlmeier represented that

Spangler was no longer employed by the Public Defender’s office, and that the

agency was searching for a public defender outside of the agency because of

conflicts and the “high level of the charges.” Tr. p. 22. The court reminded

Kohlmeier, “[t]he clock is ticking against the Defense for Criminal Rule 4

purposes. I want you to know that. That the delay here is certainly not

attributable to the State.” Id. The trial court further admonished her department

to “get counsel on board ASAP, okay?” Id. at 23. Kohlmeier then declined to

schedule a trial date and advised the court that she understood that “all delay

under Criminal Rule 4 from this point forward until another trial date is set is

attributable to the Defense.” Id. at 24. The parties then set another hearing for

1 The court was aware that Spangler moved to Texas on May 30, 2018. Tr. p. 42. However, the CCS does not show an entry of withdrawal of appearance for Spangler. 2 The record shows that Stinson appeared in person with Spangler for the April 4, 2018 pre-trial conference. Tr. p. 8.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 4 of 11 July 16, 2018, and the trial court, at the request of the State, noted for the record

that Stinson should be transported to court on that date.

[7] On July 5, 2019, the Lawrence County Public Defender Agency appointed Kay

Beehler (“Beehler”) to serve as a Special Public Defender representing Stinson.

On July 9, 2018, Beehler filed her appearance and a Motion to Reduce Bond.

The trial court held a hearing on the Motion to Reduce Bond on July 16, 2018.

The court denied the request to reduce his bond, but the following exchange

occurred between Beehler and the court:

MS. BEEHLER: Your Honor, and I know this from speaking with Madame Prosecutor here this afternoon. Apparently, Mr. Stinson has had several settings in this court for which he’s not been transported. And I don’t know why. It was way before my time.

THE COURT: Well, he- let me explain here while we have the tape recorder running. The – due to the number of incarcerated people in this county, when a court sets a pretrial conference, we leave it up to the defense attorney to let the Court know whether they would like to have the Defendant transported. And if the Defense lawyer does not ask for that, then the Court assumes that the Defendant is not needed.

MS. BEEHLER: Sure. Sure.

THE COURT: So we let Defense counsel tell us whether or not the Defendant-

MS. BEEHLER: Okay.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 5 of 11 THE COURT: -should be transported.

MS. BEEHLER: Well, apparently, prior counsel did not ensure that he was brought here.

THE COURT: That has been a problem. I will tell you right now on the record. It has been a lengthy problem with the Lawrence County Public Defender Agency. And you can take that up with Mr. Shircliff as to why. But nonetheless, finish your argument, please.

Tr. p. 36.

[8] The parties then turned to the court’s calendar. The Court suggested that

Stinson’s trial be combined with a co-defendant’s trial that was set for speedy

trial on August 29, 30, and 31. Beehler objected to a joint trial. The court had a

two-week murder trial beginning on July 23, 2018. Immediately after that trial,

beginning on August 7, 2018, the court was set for a four-and-a-half-week

murder trial. The court then had a mandatory conference in the beginning of

September and was set for another high-level felony trial the following week.

The court also had a second option set for that same week. The court also

offered to bump the second setting on September 26 for this matter because the

other defendant was not in jail; however, Beehler planned to be out of the

country between September 20 and October 4, 2018. At the conclusion of the

hearing, and noting court congestion, the court ultimately set this matter for the

third setting on September 12, 13, and 14 and denied Stinson’s request to

reduce the bond. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 6 of 11 [9] On July 19, Stinson, through Beehler, filed a Motion for Discharge pursuant to

Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) as well as a supporting memorandum. The State

filed its response on July 24, 2018. Stinson filed a rebuttal on July 27, and, on

August 2, the trial court denied Stinson’s request for discharge. Stinson then

requested that the trial court certify the matter for interlocutory appeal, which

the trial court granted after a brief hearing on August 29. Our court agreed to

hear the matter, and the trial court stayed all proceedings during the appeal.

Discussion and Decision [10] Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

If any defendant held in jail . . . shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.

[11] The broad goal of Criminal Rule 4 is to provide functionality to a defendant’s

fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial. Cundiff v.

State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 2012). “It places an affirmative duty on the

State to bring the defendant to trial, but at the same time is not intended to be a

mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution.”

Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013). When a defendant requests a

speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 4, the matter:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 7 of 11 must be assigned a meaningful trial date within the time prescribed by the rule, if necessary superseding trial dates previously designated for civil cases and even criminal cases in which Criminal Rule 4 deadlines are not imminent. We recognize, however, that emergencies in either criminal or civil matters may occasionally interfere with this scheme. Similarly, there may be major, complex trials that have long been scheduled or that pose significant extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses, which will, on rare occasions, justify application of the court congestion or exigent circumstances exceptions.

Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 551–52 (Ind. 1995)). “Crim. Rule

4(b)’s direction to discharge is mandatory and ‘nothing will prevent the rule’s

operation save its own exceptions.’” Paul v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Crosby v. State, 597 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Ind. Ct. App.

1992)). However, courts recognize that a 4(B) motion “does not necessarily

present a bright-line approach whereby all other cases must yield to the

defendant who files a speedy trial motion.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040.

[12] Once counsel is appointed, a defendant speaks to the court through counsel.

Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000). In the absence of a proper

request to proceed pro se, requiring a trial court to respond to both defendant

and counsel “would effectively create a hybrid representation to which

Defendant is not entitled.” Id.

[13] Stinson argues that he made his request for speedy trial at the initial hearing.

He further argues on appeal that the State did not make any attempt to

“expedite prosecution” until Stinson filed a letter with the court on May 26, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 8 of 11 2018, well after the seventy-day deadline had passed. In support, Stinson relies

on Robinson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In that case,

Robinson filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial in accordance with Criminal

Rule 4(B); however, he was not tried until eighty-four days after his request for

a speedy trial although he did not make any requests for continuances or cause

other delays. Id. at 694. Ultimately, Robinson was discharged pursuant to

Criminal Rule 4(B).

[14] The State argues that Stinson was represented by counsel and that he spoke to

the court through counsel, making any delay attributable to him. The State

relies on Underwood v. State in support. 722 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 2000). Underwood

argued that he was entitled to discharge under Crim. R. 4(B) because he was

not tried within the appropriate time frame because his counsel requested a

continuance to which Underwood objected. Id. at 832. On review, our supreme

court noted that the trial court was under no obligation to respond to

Underwood’s objection to his own counsel’s request for continuance as this

would “effectively create a hybrid representation to which Defendant is not

entitled.” Id.

[15] Here, the trial court did not accept Stinson’s initial pro se request for a speedy

trial until after he had the opportunity to discuss with counsel. Once counsel

was appointed, he appeared on Stinson’s behalf, made several requests to

continue, and made no further mention of a request for speedy trial. As such,

the delay, assuming we were to accept the request made at the initial hearing,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 9 of 11 cannot be attributable to the State. Even if we were to accept this request on

appeal, Stinson, through counsel, then made several requests for continuances

in the following months.

[16] Analyzing Stinson’s second pro se request for a speedy trial, even if we were to

require the trial court accept it because the public defender agency was

searching for new counsel for him, any further delay again is not attributable to

the State. Three days after Stinson once again told the court pro se he wanted a

speedy trial, the State filed a request for a trial date “no later than August 9,

2018.” Appellant’s App. p. 26. At the next hearing on June 13, 2018, the trial

court made an attempt to schedule a trial date pursuant to the State’s request,

and the public defender, who had not filed an appearance on Stinson’s behalf

but was covering the hearing, declined to schedule a trial date and accepted

responsibility for any delay on behalf of the defense from that point forward.

[17] While Stinson made two pro se attempts to request a speedy trial, once at the

initial hearing and the other in his May 26 letter once Spangler resigned, he is

bound by the actions of his attorneys. We are dismayed by the delays incurred

due to a lack of attention to the matter by both the public defender’s office and

the trial court. However, as the delay is attributable to Stinson through the

action and inaction of counsel, his remedy, if any, is not through the workings

of Criminal Rule 4(B).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 10 of 11 Conclusion

[18] Because any delay in this matter is attributable to the defense, and not to the

State, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Stinson’s request for discharge

pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B).

Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2241 | July 12, 2019 Page 11 of 11