Dakoda Davis v. Farkhanda John, et al.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS DELTA DIVISION DAKODA DAVIS PLAINTIFF v. CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00168-BSM FARKHANDA JOHN, et al. DEFENDANTS ORDER Defendants Z-T Express Inc. and Farkhanda John’s motion for partial summary

judgment [Doc. No. 39] is granted. I. BACKGROUND Dakoda Davis is suing Z-T Express and its driver, Farkhanda John, for an accident she had with John. Statement Facts Supp. Pl.s’ Resp. Def. Mot. Partial Summ. J. (SUMF), Doc. No. 51 ¶ 1. Davis is suing Z-T express for negligent entrustment; negligent training,

supervision, and hiring; and for failure to use ordinary care based on John’s actions. Id. ¶ 8. Z-T Express admits that John was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Id. ¶ 9. Z-T Express and John are moving for partial summary judgment on Davis’s direct-negligence claims against Z-T Express. II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must

be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008). III. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is granted on Davis’s direct-negligence claims against Z-T Express because Z-T Express has admitted it is vicariously liable for John’s actions. Elrod v. G & R Const. Co., 628 S.W.2d 17, 18–19 (Ark. 1982). When a principal admits it is responsible for the actions of its agent, the plaintiff may not proceed on other theories of recovery. Id. Consequently, although Davis alleges that Z-T Express is liable for its own

negligent actions, he is precluded from going forward on those theories since Z-T Express has admitted John was acting in the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Answer, Doc. No. 7 ¶ 12. Although Davis cites cases from Georgia, Utah, and Tennessee showing that those states no longer follow rulings similar to Elrod because those states have passed comparative fault statutes, he has failed to point to a similar ruling in Arkansas. Br.

Supp. Pl.’s Resp. Def.s Mot. Partial Summ. J., Doc. No. 53 at 3–18. Consequently, Elrod appears to be good law. Davis also argues that his claims are an exception to the ruling in Elrod because he is seeking punitive damages and his claims relate to Z-T Express’s policies. Davis Br. at 19. Although Elrod would not apply if Davis sought damages based on Z-T 2 Express’s violation of its policies or if Davis had a punitive damages claim against Z-T Express for its direct negligence, see Regions Bank v. White, No. 4:06CV01475 JLH, 2009 WL 3148732 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 24, 2009); Wheeler v. Carlton, No. 3:06 CV 00068 GTE, 2007 WL 30261 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 4, 2007), Davis pleads neither of these in his complaint. Doc. No. 6. IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Z-T Express and John’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted and Davis’s direct-negligence claims against Z-T Express are dismissed. IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of May, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE