DAKER v. WARD

District Court, M.D. Georgia·Decided June 28, 2023·No. 7:20-cv-00113·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

WASEEM DAKER, : : Plaintiff, : : VS. : NO. 7:20-CV-00113-HL-TQL : TIMOTHY WARD, et al., : : Defendants. : ________________________________ :

ORDER Presently pending before the Court are motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Waseem Daker seeking (1) expedited consideration of his motion for service (ECF No. 41); (2) a transfer of this action to the Northern District of Georgia (ECF No. 42); and (3) leave to file a third amended and supplemental complaint (ECF No. 43). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED. DISCUSSION I. Motion for Expedited Ruling on Motion for Service Plaintiff has first filed a motion requesting expedited consideration of his motion for service. Plaintiff’s motion for service was denied on May 2, 2023, and Plaintiff was ordered to effect service of process within sixty (60) days of the date of that Order. Order Den. Mot. Service 10, May 2, 2023, ECF No. 40. Plaintiff’s motion to expedite a ruling (ECF No. 41) is therefore DENIED as moot. Although Plaintiff’s copy of the May 2nd Order was not returned to the Court as undeliverable due to Plaintiff’s recent transfer to another facility, in an abundance of caution the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a copy of the May 2nd Order (ECF No. 40) to his new address at the Hays State Prison. The

Court will also provide Plaintiff an additional FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS from the date of this Order to perfect service in this case. II. Motion for Leave to File Third Supplemental Complaint Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to file a third supplemental complaint in this action (ECF No. 43), and he has attached a copy of his proposed pleading (the “PTSC”) to his motion (ECF No. 43-1). Plaintiff requires the Court’s leave to supplement. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(d). While the Court “should freely give leave [to supplement] when justice so requires,” leave to supplement need not be granted where—among other things— amendment would be futile or there exists “bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant[.]” Cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 987 n.6 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part) (observing that standard for

supplementing pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) is the same as that for amending pleadings under Rule 15(a)). The Court again finds that the motion in this case was filed in bad faith and/or that amendment would be futile. Plaintiff’s motion must first be denied because it is yet another improper attempt to expand the scope of the claims that are proceeding for further factual development in this

case. This was not originally a case about the confiscation of Plaintiff’s religious paraphernalia. Rather, Plaintiff’s claims centered on his allegations that Defendants’ policies forbade him from obtaining certain religious items in the first place. See, e.g., Compl. 18, ECF No. 1 (“Plaintiff has requested to be allowed to receive food packages from halal food mail-order vendors, paid for by family members or friends, so that he may maintain a halal diet, whenever possible. All his requests have been ignored.”); id. at 24

(“Defendant Union Supply Direct is denying him and refuses to allow anybody to order him property or food packages, including CD’s and religious paraphernalia, including . . . prayer rugs, kufi and yarmulke religious caps, and religious medallions.”); Am. Compl. 34, May 14, 2021, ECF No. 11 (challenging “the GDC Defendants’ and Union Supply Direct’s policy denying him access to shaving clippers with which to practice Islamic fitrah” and the “GDC Defendants’ and Union Supply Direct’s policy denying Islamic halal food to

him”); Order & Recommendation 10, Jan. 5, 2023, ECF No. 30 (“[T]he crux of the remaining claims in this case is that Plaintiff has been denied all access to halal meat and dairy, clippers, a kufi, a prayer rug, and Qur’an recordings.”). Because the policies also allowed Plaintiff to submit a special religious request to obtain those items, however, the Court found the policies could not facially violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Instead,

any constitutional violation necessarily stemmed from the denial of Plaintiff’s special religious requests. It thus followed that the only individuals who could be responsible for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were those individuals who denied Plaintiff’s special religious requests. This case was therefore permitted to proceed only on Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise clause and RLUIPA claims that Defendants

Riser, Hill, Emmons, Adams, Crickmar, Shepard, Toole, Turner, and Ammons substantially burdened Plaintiff’s religious practice by denying his special religious requests for access to halal meat and dairy, clippers, a kufi, a prayer rug, and Qur’an recordings. Plaintiff now alleges that he did have access to many of these items, but GDC officials confiscated them at various points during his incarceration. See, e.g., Mot. Suppl.

Compl. 2-6, May 31, 2023, ECF No. 43. Plaintiff’s proposed supplement would therefore add an entirely new dimension to this case: instead of focusing on the alleged decisions to deny Plaintiff access to religious materials, the PTSC—and for that matter, the PSASC— focus on the later decisions to confiscate those materials. Those decisions involve largely different Defendants and would be based on different theories of recovery. See, e.g., PTSC 1, ECF No. 43-1 (adding nearly a dozen additional Defendants to this action); id. at 9

(adding entirely new equal protection claim regarding kosher food package). Allowing Plaintiff to again amend or supplement his allegations to add these unrelated claims would thus permit the Plaintiff to evade (1) this Court’s order limiting the scope of this case to the claims described in the April 26, 2022 Order, (2) the “three-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and (3) the filing restrictions imposed by this Court and others. The

Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s proposed supplement amounts to a bad faith attempt to circumvent the Court’s earlier restrictions on his filings and that his motion should be denied. See, e.g., Daker v. Bryson, 841 F. App’x 115, 123 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to comply with magistrate judge’s orders regarding amendment of complaint and finding that dismissed claims could

be considered malicious where “filed to circumvent court orders” in another case). Moreover, even if the PTSC was not filed in bad faith, the supplementation sought by Plaintiff would be futile. “A supplemental pleading is futile when the claim, as amended, would still be subject to dismissal.” Ga. Ass’n of Latino Elected Officials, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections, 36 F.4th 1100, 1126 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff made no effort to ensure that the PTSC

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DAKER v. WARD, (M.D. Ga. 2023).

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Related

Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
DESKOVIC v. City of Peekskill
673 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Harris v. Garner
216 F.3d 970 (Eleventh Circuit, 2000)