NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2425-24
DAIRYLAND USA CORPORATION, d/b/a CHEFS' WAREHOUSE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANCOIS D'ANJOU,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted November 5, 2025 – Decided November 19, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7531-24.
Chatarpaul Law Firm, PC, attorney for appellant (Jay Chatarpaul, on the briefs).
Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Daniel A. Baylson and Andrew W. Sheppard, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Francois D'Anjou appeals from a March 10, 2025 Law Division
Order granting plaintiff DairyLand Use Corporations (d/b/a Chefs' Warehouse)
order to show cause ("OSC") to compel arbitration and denying his cross-motion
to dismiss. We affirm.
I.
Chefs' Warehouse supplies food products to restaurants and food-service
businesses. It hired D'Anjou as an area sales manager in September 2022 and
terminated his employment in May 2024.
In October 2024, D'Anjou filed a complaint against Chefs' Warehouse
alleging violations of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act,
N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. In lieu of answering, Chefs' Warehouse filed a separate
action, a verified complaint via OSC to stay the litigation and compel arbitration.
An arbitration agreement purportedly signed by the parties was attached.
D'Anjou filed an answer and a cross-motion to dismiss, certifying that the
electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was not his. He argued the
signature was computer-generated, reversed the order of his names, and lacked
the apostrophe present in his true signature. He submitted three examples of his
handwritten signature and argued this discrepancy created a factual question.
A-2425-24 2 In response, Chefs' Warehouse provided an affidavit from its Human
Resources ("HR") Director. The affidavit explained that employees use the
Dayforce portal, which requires a unique password and multi-factor
authentication, to review and sign documents via the DocuSign e-signature
platform. HR had assigned the arbitration agreement through Dayforce in
December 2023 and notified employees that failure to sign would result in
suspension. HR received confirmation in February 2024 that D'Anjou had
signed the agreement.
On March 10, 2025, by way of written opinion and corresponding order,
the court granted plaintiff's OSC to compel arbitration and denied defendant's
cross-motion for dismissal of the OSC.
This appeal followed.
II.
"We review a trial court's order granting or denying a motion to compel
arbitration de novo because the validity of an arbitration agreement presents a
question of law." Ogunyemi v. Garden State Med. Ctr., 478 N.J. Super. 310,
315 (App. Div. 2024) (citing Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020))
(holding a trial court's interpretive analysis should not be deferred to unless an
appellate court finds its reasoning persuasive). In reviewing an order
A-2425-24 3 compelling arbitration, "we are mindful of the strong preference to enforce
arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level." Hirsch v. Amper
Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013). However, that preference is not
"without limits." Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs.,
P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001).
However, the Law Division's findings of fact are not reviewed de novo:
though "less deference may be afforded to factual findings made" on "motion
papers, without the court hearing any testimony," findings of fact are still
"entitled to deference if they are supported by substantial credible evidence in
the record." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 606-07 (App. Div. 2022). "The
general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Seidman v. Clifton Sav.
Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011).
III.
On appeal, D'Anjou contends the trial court erred by not holding a plenary
hearing, asserting a factual dispute over his assent to the arbitration agreement .
We disagree.
"An agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, 'must be the product
of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law.'"
A-2425-24 4 Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014) (quoting
NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404, 424,
(App. Div. 2011)). "Simply put, without an agreement to arbitrate, there can be
no arbitration." MZM Constr. Co. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit
Funds, 974 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 105, 107-08 (3d Cir. 2000)). "[A]n arbitration provision
cannot be enforced against an employee who does not sign or otherwise
explicitly indicate his or her agreement to it." Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J.
293, 306 (2003).
"When reviewing a motion to compel arbitration, courts apply a two-
pronged inquiry: (1) whether there is a valid and enforceable agreement to
arbitrate disputes; and (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the
agreement." Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC, 468 N.J.
Super. 483, 497 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J.
76, 83 (2002)). If a case involves "questions of fact concerning the mutuality of
assent to the arbitration provision," we may remand the matter for the trial court
to resolve those issues. Knight v. Vivint Solar Developer, LLC, 465 N.J. Super.
416, 427-28 (App. Div. 2020).
A-2425-24 5 However, a court need not always hold a plenary hearing to dispose of a
summary action. Rather, a court has discretion to "try the action on the
pleadings and affidavits, and render final judgment thereon," when "the
affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."
R. 4:67-5. Moreover, a summary action "is not a summary judgment
proceeding," so it is not subject to the summary-judgment standard. O'Connell
v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 306 N.J. Super. 166, 172 (App. Div. 1997). For that
reason, the opposing party in a summary action "is not entitled to favorable
inferences afforded the non-movant in a summary judgment proceeding." Ibid.
To begin with, the affidavit of Chefs' Warehouse's HR Director stated that
each of their employees has their own Dayforce account for which they must
create a unique password. In addition to entering that unique password,
accessing Dayforce requires employees to use multi-factor authentication. The
multi–factor authentication process generates a unique authentication code,
which employees receive via text message or email, when they attempt to access
the portal.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2425-24
DAIRYLAND USA CORPORATION, d/b/a CHEFS' WAREHOUSE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANCOIS D'ANJOU,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted November 5, 2025 – Decided November 19, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7531-24.
Chatarpaul Law Firm, PC, attorney for appellant (Jay Chatarpaul, on the briefs).
Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Daniel A. Baylson and Andrew W. Sheppard, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Francois D'Anjou appeals from a March 10, 2025 Law Division
Order granting plaintiff DairyLand Use Corporations (d/b/a Chefs' Warehouse)
order to show cause ("OSC") to compel arbitration and denying his cross-motion
to dismiss. We affirm.
I.
Chefs' Warehouse supplies food products to restaurants and food-service
businesses. It hired D'Anjou as an area sales manager in September 2022 and
terminated his employment in May 2024.
In October 2024, D'Anjou filed a complaint against Chefs' Warehouse
alleging violations of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act,
N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. In lieu of answering, Chefs' Warehouse filed a separate
action, a verified complaint via OSC to stay the litigation and compel arbitration.
An arbitration agreement purportedly signed by the parties was attached.
D'Anjou filed an answer and a cross-motion to dismiss, certifying that the
electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was not his. He argued the
signature was computer-generated, reversed the order of his names, and lacked
the apostrophe present in his true signature. He submitted three examples of his
handwritten signature and argued this discrepancy created a factual question.
A-2425-24 2 In response, Chefs' Warehouse provided an affidavit from its Human
Resources ("HR") Director. The affidavit explained that employees use the
Dayforce portal, which requires a unique password and multi-factor
authentication, to review and sign documents via the DocuSign e-signature
platform. HR had assigned the arbitration agreement through Dayforce in
December 2023 and notified employees that failure to sign would result in
suspension. HR received confirmation in February 2024 that D'Anjou had
signed the agreement.
On March 10, 2025, by way of written opinion and corresponding order,
the court granted plaintiff's OSC to compel arbitration and denied defendant's
cross-motion for dismissal of the OSC.
This appeal followed.
II.
"We review a trial court's order granting or denying a motion to compel
arbitration de novo because the validity of an arbitration agreement presents a
question of law." Ogunyemi v. Garden State Med. Ctr., 478 N.J. Super. 310,
315 (App. Div. 2024) (citing Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020))
(holding a trial court's interpretive analysis should not be deferred to unless an
appellate court finds its reasoning persuasive). In reviewing an order
A-2425-24 3 compelling arbitration, "we are mindful of the strong preference to enforce
arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level." Hirsch v. Amper
Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013). However, that preference is not
"without limits." Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs.,
P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001).
However, the Law Division's findings of fact are not reviewed de novo:
though "less deference may be afforded to factual findings made" on "motion
papers, without the court hearing any testimony," findings of fact are still
"entitled to deference if they are supported by substantial credible evidence in
the record." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 606-07 (App. Div. 2022). "The
general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Seidman v. Clifton Sav.
Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011).
III.
On appeal, D'Anjou contends the trial court erred by not holding a plenary
hearing, asserting a factual dispute over his assent to the arbitration agreement .
We disagree.
"An agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, 'must be the product
of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law.'"
A-2425-24 4 Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014) (quoting
NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 421 N.J. Super. 404, 424,
(App. Div. 2011)). "Simply put, without an agreement to arbitrate, there can be
no arbitration." MZM Constr. Co. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit
Funds, 974 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 105, 107-08 (3d Cir. 2000)). "[A]n arbitration provision
cannot be enforced against an employee who does not sign or otherwise
explicitly indicate his or her agreement to it." Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J.
293, 306 (2003).
"When reviewing a motion to compel arbitration, courts apply a two-
pronged inquiry: (1) whether there is a valid and enforceable agreement to
arbitrate disputes; and (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the
agreement." Wollen v. Gulf Stream Restoration & Cleaning, LLC, 468 N.J.
Super. 483, 497 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J.
76, 83 (2002)). If a case involves "questions of fact concerning the mutuality of
assent to the arbitration provision," we may remand the matter for the trial court
to resolve those issues. Knight v. Vivint Solar Developer, LLC, 465 N.J. Super.
416, 427-28 (App. Div. 2020).
A-2425-24 5 However, a court need not always hold a plenary hearing to dispose of a
summary action. Rather, a court has discretion to "try the action on the
pleadings and affidavits, and render final judgment thereon," when "the
affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."
R. 4:67-5. Moreover, a summary action "is not a summary judgment
proceeding," so it is not subject to the summary-judgment standard. O'Connell
v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 306 N.J. Super. 166, 172 (App. Div. 1997). For that
reason, the opposing party in a summary action "is not entitled to favorable
inferences afforded the non-movant in a summary judgment proceeding." Ibid.
To begin with, the affidavit of Chefs' Warehouse's HR Director stated that
each of their employees has their own Dayforce account for which they must
create a unique password. In addition to entering that unique password,
accessing Dayforce requires employees to use multi-factor authentication. The
multi–factor authentication process generates a unique authentication code,
which employees receive via text message or email, when they attempt to access
the portal. That unique authentication code is sent to a phone number or email
address chosen by the employee, not their company email account. Therefore,
to view and sign the agreement, D'Anjou had to access Dayforce using his
A-2425-24 6 unique password and a multi–factor authentication code that was sent to his
personal email address.
Moreover, the affidavit reflected that no one at Chefs' Warehouse collects
employees' passwords. They also cannot look up employee's passwords or
access an employee's Dayforce account on the employee's behalf. So, if an
employee forgets their password, HR's only recourse is the ability to
automatically reset the employee's account and generate a temporary password
that goes to the employee, who would still need to go through the multi–factor
authentication process to access their Dayforce account. And this password-
reset process does not allow anyone at Chefs' Warehouse to access an
employee's Dayforce account unless the employee shares their temporary
password and multi–factor authentication code.
The affidavit further provided that at "no point did Chefs' Warehouse
access any unsigned documents on behalf of any individual employee or sign a
document on any employee's behalf." Appended to the affidavit, in turn, was an
email sent to all Chefs' Warehouse employees to notify them of the agreement
and the need to sign it, as well as the confirmation from Dayforce that D'Anjou
A-2425-24 7 In contrast, D'Anjou advanced only his self-serving assertions to rebut that
evidence. Because the version of DocuSign used required a typed signature, not
a handwritten signature, defendant's reliance on three of his signatures does not
create a genuine issue of material fact pertaining to the authenticity of his
signature on the arbitration agreement. Neither does the fact that the computer-
generated signature had his last name first and did not include the apostrophe.
The confirmation shows that D'Anjou's name had been entered into Dayforce as
"Danjou, Francois"—the same as how it appeared in his DocuSign signature.
The only person with access to make signatures to the agreement was
D'Anjou himself because only he possessed the password to access and change
the document. This finding rests on substantial credible evidence and is unlike
the scenario in Knight, where the plaintiff asserted, she never saw or signed the
purported arbitration agreement and claimed the agreement presented in court
contained "a forged signature." Absent a genuine dispute of material fact, the
court correctly disposed of the matter without a plenary hearing. R. 4:67-5.
IV.
D'Anjou also asserts that the court erred by considering hearsay
statements in the HR director's affidavit. Specifically, D'Anjou contends that
the HR director could not testify via affidavit as to how a third-party software,
A-2425-24 8 such as Dayforce or DocuSign, operates. Instead, he believes that someone was
needed from Dayforce and DocuSign regarding how those programs/platforms
generate signatures. We are not persuaded.
The certification provided by Chefs' Warehouse does not contain hearsay
statements regarding the operation of Dayforce and DocuSign. Instead, the
affidavit was based on personal knowledge, and the HR director was not merely
repeating information she learned from another source. The affidavit was based
on her frequent firsthand use of Dayforce and DocuSign, so she was competent
to testify about how Chefs' Warehouse uses those systems on a corporate level.
Indeed, D'Anjou fails to cite any statement in the affidavit that he claims to be
an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See
N.J.R.E. 801(c) and N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).
Last, D'Anjou, citing to Rule 1:6-3, contends it was improper for Chefs'
Warehouse to attach the affidavit to their reply brief as it violates due process.
The opposition containing the affidavit was in response to a cross-motion
to dismiss. In New Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Oughla, 437 N.J. Super.
299, (App Div. 2014), we addressed the submission of additional certifications
in response to a cross-motion for summary judgment. There, we upheld the trial
A-2425-24 9 judge's discretion to consider additional certifications, emphasizing that such
matters are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 317. Chefs'
Warehouse was opposing D'Anjou's cross-motion, not merely replying in
support of the arguments set forth in its OSC. Based on the cross-motion, the
court was well within its discretion to consider the documents that Chefs'
Warehouse filed to rebut D'Anjou's claim that the signature on the arbitration
agreement was not his.
To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments raised by
defendant, we are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2425-24 10