Daimon McGuire v. City of Los Angeles

District Court, C.D. California·Decided June 5, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-09909·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAIMON MCGUIRE, CASE NO. 2:24-CV-09909-DSF-KES

Hon. Dale S. Fischer, Ctrm. 7D Hon. Karen E. Scott, Ctrm. 6D(Roybal) Plaintiffs, PROTECTIVE ORDER v.

THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; ARRESTING OFFICER JOHN DOE;

Defendants.

1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. This action involves employees of the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) which include members of the City’s Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”). The nature of the incident that gives rise to Plaintiff’s suit and Plaintiff’s claims and allegations, will result in discovery production that includes: police reports and evidence; investigation reports and evidence; potentially peace officer personnel materials; information implicating the privacy rights of third parties (i.e., bystander witnesses, emergency personnel information); and other private and confidential materials for which require special protection from public disclosure. Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking materials and information that Defendants maintain as confidential such as personnel files of the police and/or sworn officers involved in this incident, Internal Affairs materials and information, video recordings, audio recordings, photographs, and information and other administrative materials and information currently in the possession of the City and which Defendants believe need special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation. Plaintiff may also seek official information contained in the personnel files of the police and/or sworn officers involved in the subject incident, which are maintained as strictly confidential and which Defendants believe need special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation. Defendants assert that the confidentiality of the materials and information sought California Penal Code section 832.7 and Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). Defendant has not publicly released the materials and information referenced above except under protective order or pursuant to a court order, if at all. The personnel materials and information are of the type that has been used to initiate disciplinary action against the City’s respective employees, and has been used as evidence in disciplinary proceedings, where the employee conduct was considered to be contrary to policy. Defendants contend that absent a protective order delineating the responsibilities of nondisclosure on the part of the parties hereto, there is a specific risk of unnecessary and undue disclosure Plaintiff or anyone he involves or employs to be involved in this case, as well as the corollary risk of embarrassment, harassment and professional and legal harm on the part of the City’s employees referenced in the materials and information. Defendants also contend that the unfettered disclosure of the materials and information, absent a protective order, would allow the media to share this information with potential jurors in the area, impacting the rights of Defendants herein to receive a fair trial. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. The Court finds Good Cause for, by entry of this Protective Order regarding confidential documents consistent with the terms and provisions of this Order. However, the entry of a Protective Order by the Court pursuant to this Stipulation shall not be construed as any ruling by the Court on the aforementioned legal statements or privilege claims in this section, no shall this section be construed as part of any such Court Order. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: McGuire v. City of Los Angeles, et al., case no. 2:24-cv-09909-DSF- 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party, and includes support staff. 2.11 Party: any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this Action. 2.13 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., photocopying, videotaping, translating, preparing exhibits or demonstrations, and organizing, storing, or retrieving data in any form or medium) and their employees and subcontractors. 2

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