Dailey v. Lipman, Wolfe & Co.

88 F.2d 362, 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 488, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3127
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 15, 1937
DocketNo. 8118
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 88 F.2d 362 (Dailey v. Lipman, Wolfe & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dailey v. Lipman, Wolfe & Co., 88 F.2d 362, 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 488, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3127 (9th Cir. 1937).

Opinion

HANEY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an adverse decree in a suit for infringement of a patent issued to plaintiff, No. 1,945,422.

The relief asked by plaintiff was that his patent be declared valid and infringed by defendant; that defendant be enjoined from using, manufacturing, or selling devices made in accordance to the invention patented; for an accounting, and other relief unnecessary to relate. The answer denied infringement, and alleged- that plaintiff’s patent was invalid because it was anticipated by prior patents. The cause was referred to a special master. The master found that there was no infringement, and that plaintiff’s patent was anticipated by prior patents. Exceptions filed to the master’s report were overruled, and the report confirmed. The decree, from which this appeal is taken, dismissed the bill of complaint with prejudice and with costs to defendant.

The device for which the patent in suit was issued is called a “Spring wire collar snubber,” and is made from a single piece of spring wire. It is described in the specification as follows:

“The invention consists of a one piece element made from spring material that is adapted for being worn in a manner to engage the under side of each of the collar ends and to engage the points of the collar and maintain the same in normal position and alignment. The central portion of the one piece element rests substantially horizontal when in normal wear, and a leg downwardly extends from the ends of the horizontal portion with a pointed end adapted for engagement with the underside of the collar point and to maintain the same in a taut condition and in normal position and alignment. Offsets are placed near the end of the horizontal portion of the body element with upturned bends being placed at opposite sides of the body elements. The purpose of the upturned loops is to engage upon and rest upon the neck tie of the wearer and to maintain the tie in precise placement and position. A return bend is placed at the end of the bottom of each leg, with a point terminating the leg. The purpose of the return bend is to limit the distance that the, point may penetrate the collar and to facilitate a compression being developed with the leg portion of the device, to thereby develop a tension with the end and point portion of the collar. To facilitate the placement of the device, and to develop a tension within the collar end and point, I place a fold or loop within each of the leg elements at a point that may be easily grasped by the user.”

There are five claims to the invention, all of which are in issue. The device, as claimed in the first three claims has the following features: (1) The ends of the spring wire are needle points, terminating in half circle involuted loops; (2) legs upwardly extending from such loops; (3) a hand engaging loop disposed upon each leg; (4) inverted U-shaped bends terminating each of the legs; (5) and a central portion forwardly extending from said bends. Claims 4 and 5 cover the same structure, except that “a hand engaging loop disposed upon each leg” is not included.

It is here pertinent to note that both parties construe plaintiff’s patent as one covering a combination of elements, and speak of each feature enumerated as being an element. • The specification, however, states that “the invention consists of a one piece element. * * * ” Since the parties have assumed that plaintiff’s device consists of a combination of elements, we will decide the case on that theory, without expressing an opinion, either one way or the other, as to the justification for the assumption.

The master found the patent in issue to be anticipated. He said in his report:

“Noakes discloses every element of plaintiff’s structure, with the exception of the hand manipulating loops or bends in the legs and the penetrating points. He discloses legs ending in studs instead of points to engage the free ends of the collar.
“Noakes shows legs terminating in U-shaped bends, a crossbar, the central portion forwardly extending from said legs. He discloses means for penetrating the collar fabric. Noakes’ U-shaped bends, crossbar, legs and studs will perform every function which Dailey’s U-shaped bends, crossbar, legs and penetrating points will perform.
“If Dailey’s crossbar can exert any outward pressure upon the tie knot, Noakes’ crossbar docs the same. The question then remaining is whether or not Dailey exercised invention by including among his elements means of limited penetration, not requiring previously formed holes in the fabric, such as eyes or buttonholes, either [364]*364alone or with the hand manipulating loops or bends in the legs.
“Unfortunately, however, Vanderbilt and Ahrens both disclosed penetrating points, whose powers of penetration are limited by bends or loops immediately adjacent thereto. They are part of the same art and Dailey is presumed to have knowledge of the state of that art.”

With respect to the feature of penetration points, the master further stated:

“This particular method was already known. It was disclosed by Ahrens who used it for the same purposes and in the same manner as did Dailey. Vanderbilt discloses like means, used however to engage the tie rather than the collar points, but the principle is identical.”

We agree with thes'e statements of the master. Appellants contend that Noakes’ device is distinguishable because (1) when the Noakes’ device is used as intended by him, it is necessary either to loosen or to-remove the tie when removing the device; (2) it does not keep necktie in place because if there was sufficient tension on the legs to do so, the tension would distort the buttonholes at the points of the collars, in which the studs of the device are placed; (3) it is not concealed; (4) it does not maintain itself by its own inherent characteristics, but depends on buttonholes in the points of the collar for support.

With respect to. the first point, it is plainly seen by an inspection of Noakes’ patent, that the Noakes device may be removed without loosening or removing the tie, Noakes’ patent is not distinguishable on that ground, because as was said in Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157, 23 L.Ed. 267: “It is no new invention to use an old machine for a new purpose. The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.” See, also, Ansonia Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18, 12 S.Ct. 601, 36 L.Ed. 327.

There is no merit in the second claimed distinction. It appears to us that .in both-devices the upper points or bends of the devices rest in the folds of the collar, one bend being on either side of the knot of the necktie. It is these bends which hold the knot in place, except possibly that it might be an outward pressure of the crossbar. The bends of the Noakes’ device are held in place because of the studs in the collar points, whereas in the Dailey device the bends are held in place by the pointed ends inserted in the fabric of the collar points. The only difference is the manner in which the bends are fixed in place. The difference is a matter of form, and not a difference in manner of holding the knot in place.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
88 F.2d 362, 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 488, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dailey-v-lipman-wolfe-co-ca9-1937.