Dail v. Kellex Corp.

64 S.E.2d 438, 233 N.C. 446, 1951 N.C. LEXIS 322
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedApril 11, 1951
Docket382
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 64 S.E.2d 438 (Dail v. Kellex Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dail v. Kellex Corp., 64 S.E.2d 438, 233 N.C. 446, 1951 N.C. LEXIS 322 (N.C. 1951).

Opinion

Babnhill, J.

The Industrial Commission found as a fact that plaintiff has suffered no loss of wages for which he has not been compensated except during the period from 23 August to 18 September 1948 and three days in November 1948. For this additional loss compensation was awarded. But the Commission further found that plaintiff has a twenty per cent permanent partial disability of a general nature which may in the future develop into a compensable disability, and undertook to retain jurisdiction for three hundred weeks pending future developments. In this the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction.

The disability of an employee because of an injury is to be measured by his capacity or incapacity to earn the wages he was receiving at the time of the injury. Branham v. Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E. 2d 865; Anderson v. Motor Co., ante, p. 372. Loss of earning capacity is the *449 criterion. If there is no loss of earning capacity, there is no disability within the meaning of the Act.

The function of the Industrial Commission in respect of plaintiff’s claim was to determine whether and to what extent he had suffered a disability within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and to make an award either granting or denying compensation as the evidence might warrant. This it has done and in so doing it discharged its full duty.

There is nothing in the statute, G.S. Chap. 97, that contemplates or authorizes an anticipatory finding by the Commission that a physical impairment may develop into a compensable disability. Neither does the statute vest in the Commission the power to retain jurisdiction of a claim, after compensation has been awarded, merely because some physical impairment suffered by the claimant may, at some time in the future, cause a loss of wages. The Commission is concerned with conditions existing prior to and at the time of the hearing. If such conditions change in the future, to the detriment of the claimant, the statute affords the claimant a remedy and fixes the time within which he must seek it. G.S. 97-47.

Branham v. Panel Co., supra, is cited by the Commission and relied on by plaintiff as authority for the order asserting and retaining jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s claim. But that decision is bottomed on a substantially different factual situation. It is not controlling here.

The plaintiff has been awarded compensation for the disability he was able to establish at the hearing. This award was affirmed by the court below. Thus he has recovered in full the compensation to which he was entitled.

For that reason the judgment entered is

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lipscomb v. MAYFLOWER VEHICLE SYSTEMS
716 S.E.2d 345 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2011)
Styron v. Duke University Hospital
385 S.E.2d 519 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1989)
Carothers v. Ti-Caro
350 S.E.2d 95 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1986)
Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp.
342 S.E.2d 798 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1986)
Gibson v. Little Cotton Mfg. Co.
325 S.E.2d 698 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1985)
Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp.
317 S.E.2d 120 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1984)
Smith v. American and Efird Mills
277 S.E.2d 83 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1981)
Ridenhour v. Fisher Transport Corp.
272 S.E.2d 889 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1980)
Tucker v. FCX Inc.
245 S.E.2d 77 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1978)
Little v. Anson County Schools Food Service
236 S.E.2d 801 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1977)
Ashley v. Rent-A-Car Company
155 S.E.2d 755 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1967)
Burton v. Peter W. Blum and Son
155 S.E.2d 71 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1967)
Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc.
139 S.E.2d 857 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1965)
Holt v. West Kentucky Coal Company
350 S.W.2d 155 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1961)
Baldwin v. Amazon Cotton Mills
117 S.E.2d 718 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1961)
Evans v. ASHEVILLE CITIZEN TIMES COMPANY
100 S.E.2d 75 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1957)
Harris v. ASHEVILLE CONTRACTING COMPANY
83 S.E.2d 802 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1954)
Keeter v. CLIFTON MFG. CO.
82 S.E.2d 520 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1954)
Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co.
70 S.E.2d 426 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1952)
Hill v. DU BOSE
67 S.E.2d 371 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
64 S.E.2d 438, 233 N.C. 446, 1951 N.C. LEXIS 322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dail-v-kellex-corp-nc-1951.