Daiber v. Scott

3 Ohio C.C. 313
CourtOhio Circuit Courts
DecidedApril 15, 1888
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Ohio C.C. 313 (Daiber v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Circuit Courts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daiber v. Scott, 3 Ohio C.C. 313 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1888).

Opinion

Bentley, J.

We have carefully considered the questionsarising upon the demurrer to the second defense in this case, and have consulted the authorities cited, except an Iowa case, which is inaccessible. In this second defense there is no denial of the allegations in the petition regarding Sixteenth street being a public street duly dedicated. That denial is contained in the first defense; hut the second defense sets up certain affirmative matters by which it is sought to estop the plaintiffs, as follows : That even conceding, for the sake of this discussion, that this street was a public street, yet from the fact that since 1860 the city has taxed it, and the defendant from time to time has paid taxes and assessments upon it, and from the further fact that the city, in 1873-5, and at other dates sought to' [317]*317condemn it for street purposes, and that the defendant here, in those cases was allowed damages (which, however, were never paid,' and the street not taken possession of by the city under these proceedings) ; that from the fact that the city has treated this property in this way, it is estopped from asserting that it is a public street, and that the plaintiffs are therefore estopped in like manner.

It seems to us that the mere fact that the city has taxed this property for a series of years, and that the defendant, for some reason or other, has paid the taxes, would not necessarily estop the city, or those claiming under the public right, from claiming that it was in fact a public and duly dedicated street.

The judgment in the condemnation proceedings would, of course, have no more effect than it would under the general statute. Condemnation proceedings are not proceedings in which questions of title can be settled-or adjudicated. When judgment is rendered the city may or may not take possession of the property and pay the condemnation money. Whether the property sought to be condemned belongs to one person or another is not settled, and cannot be settled in condemnation proceedings. The most that can be" alleged for these things in the second defense would seem to be that they might be evidence bearing upon the question at issue; whether in fact this street is a public street, whether it has been so regarded and so treated. For these purposes it is possible that these matters may be used as evidence bearing upon that question. But that they are sufficient to have a greater effect, and to amount to an estoppel, we cannot conclude.

It is also set forth in this second defense that plaintiff Daiber, “at the time he purchased the lot now claimed to be owned by him, agreed, and by the deed conveying the title, undertook upon his part to pay for the costs of opening and extending Sixteenth street alongside of his said lot, which extension contemplated the taking of the lot, owned by this defendant as aforesaid, in case said Sixteenth street should be opened and extended.” It is claimed that there is enough involved in this allegation, together with the other matters in the answer, to constitute an estoppel. But it is not alleged, and does not appear anywhere, that the defendant was in the line of this title, or that [318]*318this agreement, however made, was at all for the benefit of the defendant, or that he was in a situation to take advantage of it. It was a mere matter between the parties to that particular deed, and it does not appear that the defendant was so connected with it that he could take advantage of the recitals of that deed, whatever they were.

Now, it is further alleged in this second defense, “ That at the time when the defendant made the improvement complained of, both of the plaintiffs resided in the vicinity, and had full knowledge that such improvements were contemplated, and that the same were being made, but made no complaint to defendant or protest against the building thereof; nor did they at the time claim or for a long time thereafter claim that said improvements obstructed any right claimed by them in said extension of Sixteenth street.”

It is not alleged that the plaintiffs in that case did any active thing by way of encouragement to the erection of these buildings. They simply stood by and made no protest or objection. It does not seem, for all that appears in this pleading, but that at the time this building was erected the defendant had as full knowledge of the situation regarding this street as did the plaintiffs. And it does not' appear by this averment that the defendant did any other thing differently from what he would have done on account of what the plaintiffs did, or failed to do. He was going to build, and they knew it; he was proceeding to build, and they made no objection. We think there is not sufficient facts in these allegations to constitute an estoppel. Treating the second defense together as we must, we are unable to find that the allegations therein contained constitute a defense to the action. Whatever the effect of the facts therei|i recited may have upon the issue in the case, made by the general denial in the first defense, we have decided that the demurrer to the second defense should be sustained, and it is so sustained.

(rendering the opinion of the court upon the merits of the case).

The plaintiffs in this case allege that they are the owners of certain lots in the city of Toledo, that abut on Sixteenth [319]*319street, plaintiff Daiber’s lot being upon the corner of Jefferson street and Sixteenth street, and plaintiff Southard’s premises abutting u^on Sixteenth street. They allege that Jefferson street and Sixteenth street are public streets and highways in the city of Toledo, and have been for a number of years. That the defendant, Maurice A. Scott, in 1884, obstructed a certain portion of Sixteenth street by building therein certain houses, fences, and other structures, and that they intercept the view, the light and the air of plaintiff Daiber, and are also an obstruction, an annoyance and a nuisance to both the plaintiff Southard and the plaintiff Daiber. They bring this action to restrain the defendant from continuing these nuisances in the public street, and the question made in the case is, whether Sixteenth street, where it is obstructed by the defendant with his buildings, is or is not a public street.

There is no dispute as to the erection of the structures complained of in the locality specified, and that the defendant is maintaining them, and has maintained them there since 1884.

The defendant denies that he obstructs any public street; denies in effect that Sixteenth street, as designated by plaintiffs, is or was a public highway or street of the city.

In 1837, January 7th, an act was passed by the legislature of the state of Ohio, specially incorporating the city of Toledo. The first section of the act defines the boundaries of the city, and it is sufficient to say those boundaries include the land-in controversy here, and, of course, very much other land. Section 30 of that act provides:

“ This act shall be taken-and received in all courts and by all judges, magistrates, and other public officers as a public act, and all printed copies of the same which shall be printed by or under the authority of the general assembly shall be admitted as good evidence thereof without any other proof whatever.”

At that time, so far as the evidence shows, the only plats of lands laid out in lots within the limits of the city as designated by this act, were perhaps three ; the plats of Vistula, Port Lawrence and Oliver’s additions, so-called.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Ohio C.C. 313, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daiber-v-scott-ohiocirct-1888.