Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In Re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.)

242 B.R. 147, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18710, 1999 WL 1138256
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedNovember 24, 1999
DocketCIV.A. 98-52-JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 242 B.R. 147 (Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In Re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In Re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 242 B.R. 147, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18710, 1999 WL 1138256 (D. Del. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION

FARNAN, Chief Judge.

Presently before the Court is an appeal by The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd., The Fuji Bank, Ltd., The Long-Term Credit Bank, Ltd., The Sakura Bank, Ltd. and The Sanwa Bank, Ltd. (collectively the “Bank Group”) from the September 17, 1997 Order (the “Order”) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) granting the Debtors’ motion to approve various employee incentive programs. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Bankruptcy Court’ will be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

I. Statement of Facts

On July 7, 1997 (the “Petition Date”), Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (“MW Corp.”) and Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorporated (“Montgomery Ward”) (collectively, the “Debtors”) filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases were consolidated for procedural purposes only and are being administered jointly. The Debtors are continuing in possession of their respective properties and are operating and managing their businesses, as debtors in possession, pursuant to Sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Appellant’s Designation of the Record on Appeal (“App.Rec.”) at 1-2).

Pursuant to Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, the United States Trustee for the District of Delaware appointed a statutory committee of unsecured creditors (the “Creditors’ Committee”) on July 18, 1997. The entities comprising the Bank Group are not members of the Creditors’ Committee. However, the membérs of the Creditors’ Committee include five banks, who like the members of the Bank Group, extended financing to the Debtors prior to the Petition Date. (App. Rec. at 50).

On September 3, 1997, the Debtors filed a Motion Of Debtors And Debtors In Possession For An Order (A) Authorizing Key Employee Retention Program, (B) Authorizing Implementation of Severance Program, (C) Approving Amendment To Retirement Security Plan and (D) Granting Certain Related Relief (the “Motion”). (App. Rec. at 1-16; D.I. 9 at Ex. 1). On September 16, 1997, the Bank Group filed an objection to the Motion on the grounds that (a) the Motion provided no factual support for the Debtors’ implied assumption that the Debtors can reorganize; (b) the Motion contained no information supporting the Debtors’ implied assumption that creditors would benefit from a reorganization; (c) the Motion contained no factual support for the Debtors’ assertion that various benefits programs represented necessary and reasonable amounts to pay employees for remaining in the Debtors’ employ, and (d) the Motion failed to estimate the cost to the Debtors of the Severance Program if the Debtors liquidated. (App.- Rec. at 17-38; D.I. 9 at Ex. 2). On September 17, 1997, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Motion.

At the hearing, the Debtors offered the testimony of two witnesses, Mr. Robert Kasenter, Montgomery Ward’s Executive Vice-President of Human Resources and *150 Corporate Communications, and Mr. James Giardina, a partner with Ernst & Young who specializes in the compensation consulting area and acts as a consultant to the Debtors. (D.I. 9 at Ex. 4). Mr. Ka~ senter’s testimony focused on the necessity of the proposed employee incentive programs and the manner in which the Debtors developed and adopted the programs. Mr. Kasenter testified that the Debtors have been “targeted by the rest of the industry,” and that competitors, aware of the Debtors’ vulnerability, have approached the Debtors’ best employees and offered them employment contracts. (App. Rec. 62-67). Mr. Kasenter further testified that turnover rates have increased for management and wage level employees by 50% and 33%, respectively, since the Petition Date. (App. Rec. at 65). If the turnover rate could not be stabilized, Mr. Kasenter testified that the Debtors would incur significant expenses associated with replacing employees including search fees, hiring bonuses, relocation expenses and disruption at the store and corporate levels. (App. Rec. at 68-69). With regard to existing employees, Mr. Kasenter testified that as a result of the large amount of publicity surrounding the Debtors’ bankruptcy, employees are very insecure and morale is at a low. (App. Rec. at 67). In addition, Mr. Kasenter testified that the employees’ stock options have been rendered worthless by the current bankruptcy. Accordingly, Mr. Kasenter testified that the Debtors need to compensate employees for the fact that there is no longer an equity component to their compensation package, and that it is “absolutely essential” to the Debtors’ reorganization to keep certain “key executives” in the Debtors’ employ. (App. Rec. at 59, 60, 61, 63, 74).

To effectuate the goal of retaining key employees during the reorganization process, Mr. Kasenter testified that the Debtors decided they needed a Retention Incentive Plan. In selecting the employees who would be eligible to participate in the Retention Incentive Plan, the Debtors comprised a list of “absolutely essential” employees. From this list, the Debtors went through a “sifting process,” the result of which was a list of employees representing about 10% of their management force. (App. Rec. 70-71). Mr. Kasenter testified that the Debtors then worked with Ernst & Young, to determine what it would take to retain these key employees. In making this determination, the Debtors considered the types of programs utilized by other Chapter 11 and' non-Chapter 11 retailers. (App. Rec. at 70-72, 82). Mr. Kasenter testified that the resulting incentive program was negotiated with the Creditors’ Committee and was a product of “certain business judgments based upon what we thought we could afford.” (App. Rec. at 71, 72, 82 and 97.)

Following Mr. Kasenter’s testimony, Mr. Giardina testified as to the reasonableness of the Employee Incentive Programs in comparison with other companies’ incentive programs. Mr. Giardina testified that Ernst & Young assessed the competiveness of the Debtors’ current compensation package based on several survey sources that are commonly used for these types of analyses, as well as some independent proxy analysis reviews of retailers. (App. Rec. at 119-121). As a result of their evaluation, Ernst & Young concluded the Debtors’ compensation was significantly trailing the marketplace. In addition, Mr. Giardina testified that the Debtors were being “targeted at a very rapid rate” by outside organizations, search groups, executive recruiter agencies, as well as direct competitors. To this effect, Mr. Giardina testified “of all the retail organizations that I have dealt with in Chapter 11, they probably were under the gun more than any other I had encountered, which, obviously, became a factor when we started to put our recommendations together.” (App. Rec. at 122-23). Based on their evaluation and observations, Ernst & Young recommended that the Debtors implement a retention program as quickly as possible to (1) motivate people to stay with the company and (2) mitigate the total loss *151 of incentive compensation. To this effect, Ernst & Young recommended that the Debtors’ reinstate an annual incentive potential tied to some Chapter 11 performance hurdle and that they formalize severance arrangements for a broad class of employees to give them some type of comfort level with the company. Ernst &

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242 B.R. 147, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18710, 1999 WL 1138256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dai-ichi-kangyo-bank-ltd-v-montgomery-ward-holding-corp-in-re-ded-1999.