Dahl v. Dahl

Opinion

2026 UT App 131

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES DAHL,

Appellee,

v.

KIM DAHL, Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20240740-CA Filed August 27, 2026

Fourth District Court, Provo Department The Honorable Robert A. Lund No. 064402232

Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall, Attorneys for Appellant

Rosemond G. Blakelock and Megan P. Blakelock, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl divorced in 2010. At the time of the divorce, the marital home and some other marital assets were held in a trust. But the trust was not joined as a party in the divorce action. Because the trust was not a party, the divorce court lacked authority to adjudicate the Dahls’ respective rights in the trust’s assets, and the court therefore did not consider those assets in distributing the marital estate. Instead, issues regarding the trust were litigated in a separate action, which concluded with the district court ruling on summary judgment that Ms. Dahl 1 had no enforceable interest in the trust’s assets.

¶2 Ms. Dahl appealed both the divorce decree and the summary judgment order from the trust litigation to this court. We certified the two appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which consolidated the two cases “for the purposes of appeal and remand” and held that Ms. Dahl retained an enforceable interest in the marital property held by the trust. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶¶ 1, 8, 11, 37, 459 P.3d 276. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment in the trust litigation and remanded the consolidated case to the district court that handled the divorce case, instructing the court to “determine what property contained in the [t]rust [was] properly characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of the property.” Id. ¶ 212.

¶3 On remand, the district court made determinations as to which of the assets in the trust were properly characterized as marital property, valued the relevant portion of that property as of the date of the divorce decree, and distributed the marital property that had been held in the trust. The court also distributed funds that had been deposited with the court—following remand—after the sale of certain marital property that had not been held in the trust. Ms. Dahl now appeals a number of the court’s rulings associated with the foregoing distributions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Our usual practice in divorce cases is to refer to the parties by their given names. However, because the Utah Supreme Court referred to the parties as Dr. Dahl and Ms. Dahl in its opinion resolving the prior appeals, see Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276, we do the same for consistency.

20240740-CA 2 2026 UT App 131

BACKGROUND

The Marriage, the Trust, and the Relevant Assets

¶4 The Dahls married in 1992 and remained married for nearly eighteen years. Prior to the marriage, Dr. Dahl had “accumulated substantial assets” that “included stocks, mutual funds, and insurance policies, totaling $356,201.” During the marriage, Dr. Dahl and his brother established the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Ms. Dahl “had nothing to do with the preparation of the Trust agreement and did not sign the Trust or any related documents,” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 37, 459 P.3d 276 (cleaned up), but she “conveyed her interest in the couple’s marital home to the Trust via a warranty deed,” id. ¶ 27. Dr. Dahl conveyed his interest in the marital home to the Trust as well. In addition to the marital home, the Trust held “an investment account at Fidelity called ‘Marlette’” (the Marlette account). The Marlette account contained both marital assets and Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets. During the marriage, the parties also acquired marital assets that were not placed in the Trust, including (as relevant here) two parcels of investment property known as Pheasant Run.

The Divorce Proceedings

¶5 In 2006, Dr. Dahl filed for divorce and the parties separated. “The divorce proceedings were extremely contentious,” and the “discovery process was rife with abuses on both sides, which delayed trial.” Id. ¶ 5. “[T]he divorce court conducted a bench trial over fourteen nonconsecutive days, beginning in September 2009,” id. ¶ 4, and ending in November 2009. “Despite years of pretrial proceedings in the divorce action,” Ms. Dahl’s counsel “failed to join the Trust as a defendant.” Id.

¶ 9. Instead, “just weeks before the start of the divorce trial,” id., Ms. Dahl initiated a separate lawsuit against the Trust, Dr. Dahl, Dr. Dahl’s brother, and a real estate investment company owned by Dr. Dahl (collectively, the Trust Defendants), see id. ¶ 7. “The divorce court refused to consider the Trust assets in distributing

20240740-CA 3 2026 UT App 131 the marital estate, ruling that the eve of trial was too late to join a new party and that it could not consider Trust assets that were the subject of other pending litigation.” Id. ¶ 9. Thus, in July 2010, the divorce court issued a decree that did not address the Trust assets but otherwise distributed the marital estate. See id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 118.

¶6 In the decree, the divorce court ordered, among other things, that Pheasant Run was to “be immediately liquidated and any proceeds, or loss, divided equally between the parties.” Relatedly, the court directed that “until such time as [Pheasant Run was] sold,” Dr. Dahl was to “continue to pay the monthly payment on” Pheasant Run and that he would “be entitled to a credit against [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the proceeds for one-half of the payments he [made from the date of the court’s findings and conclusions] until such time as [Pheasant Run was] sold.” The decree also noted that the marital home and some other marital assets were part of the Trust and stated that the divorce court was issuing “no orders in regard to” the Trust.

The Trust Litigation

¶7 Meanwhile, in her action against the Trust Defendants, Ms. Dahl sought “a declaration of her rights in the Trust assets and request[ed] an accounting of the Trust’s activities and a copy of the Trust agreement.” Id. ¶ 12. Following discovery, “both [sides] moved for summary judgment,” and “[u]ltimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust Defendants.” Id. In its November 2011 order, the “district court held that the Trust was irrevocable and that Ms. Dahl had no enforceable interest in the Trust assets.” Id. ¶ 13. After the district court made this ruling, Dr. Dahl began commingling certain of his personal assets with the assets already in the Marlette account.

The Initial Appeal

¶8 Ms. Dahl appealed—to this court—both the divorce decree and the summary judgment order from the Trust litigation. Id. ¶ 8. We certified the appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which

20240740-CA 4 2026 UT App 131 consolidated the two cases. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. As to the Trust litigation, the supreme court held that the Trust was “revocable under Utah law”; that Ms. Dahl was a settlor of the Trust, “regardless of the fact that she [was] not so named in the Trust agreement”; and that because she was a settlor, she could “revoke that portion of the Trust funded with either her separate or marital property.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 35–38.

¶9 Regarding the divorce case, the supreme court did “not fault the divorce court for refusing to consider the Trust assets” where Ms. Dahl had “fail[ed] to join the Trust as a defendant in the divorce action.” Id. ¶ 9. But the supreme court determined that because “[t]he Trust assets included marital property” and the divorce court lacked “the power to consider and distribute the Trust assets, the [divorce] court lacked the authority to fully and fairly distribute the marital estate.” Id. ¶ 11. Thus, the supreme court held that “the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action.” Id.

¶10 The supreme court ordered a remand of the consolidated case to the divorce court with instructions that it “join the Trust as a party to the divorce action.” Id. It further ordered that “[o]n remand, the district court [was to] determine what property contained in the Trust [was] properly characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of the property.” Id. ¶ 212. The supreme court remitted the consolidated case to the district court in early 2015.

The Sale of Pheasant Run

¶11 Not long after the supreme court remitted the consolidated case, the parties sold Pheasant Run. Although the divorce decree—which issued in 2010—required the “immediate[] liquidat[ion]” of Pheasant Run, and although the parties had contracted with “a qualified realtor” to facilitate a sale, the parcels making up Pheasant Run did not sell until August and November

20240740-CA 5 2026 UT App 131 2015, netting $1,289,575.74. “Those funds were deposited with the [district] court at the time of sale.”

The Appointment of a Special Master

¶12 In January 2017, the district court—proceeding on remand—ordered the appointment of an accounting firm to serve as a special master. 2 The special master was to “have complete and unfettered access to all financial records of [the Trust] and any records that [had] been or [were] associated with [the Trust],” and it was ordered to “report to the [c]ourt the contributions to the [T]rust, management of those assets and the current value and nature of [the Trust’s] assets.”

The Sale of the Marital Home

¶13 In the meantime, Dr. Dahl had continued to live in the marital home. But the home was sold in June 2019, netting $805,845.05. “Those funds were [also] deposited with the court at the time of sale.”

The Proceedings on Remand

¶14 In December 2019, nearly three years after its appointment, the special master produced its report. Following a hearing in October 2021, the district court determined that the report was “dissatisfactory and not helpful for ascertaining what money

2. The delay between the early 2015 remittitur by the supreme court and the January 2017 appointment of a special master by the district court appears to have been due largely to Ms. Dahl filing an unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; motions related to Pheasant Run that are not relevant here; and discovery disputes that arose upon remand.

20240740-CA 6 2026 UT App 131

[was] in the [T]rust and how it should be divided.” 3 At the same time, the court granted a request by Ms. Dahl for additional discovery, with the court explaining that there was “no way to fill [the] gaps [in the special master’s report] without discovery.”

¶15 More discovery disputes then ensued, including the filing by Ms. Dahl of two statements of discovery issues. At a status hearing in May 2023, the court considered, among other things, one of Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues. In response to that statement of discovery issues, the court approved an order requiring Fidelity—the entity maintaining the Marlette account— to comply with a subpoena Ms. Dahl had served upon it but with which it had thus far failed to comply. The court otherwise reserved ruling on Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues and, instead, ordered the matter to proceed to an evidentiary hearing that had already been scheduled for two days in August 2023.

¶16 At the evidentiary hearing, the parties offered evidence and argument regarding (1) the outstanding issues raised by Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues; (2) the marital versus nonmarital status of the Trust assets; (3) the distribution of the marital property held by the Trust, including the marital portion of the Marlette account and the proceeds of the sale of the marital home; and (4) the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of Pheasant Run. During the hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Dahl, Ms. Dahl, and two forensic accountants—one for each side.

¶17 Among other things, Dr. Dahl testified that his premarital assets originally included stock in several companies, that the

3. Both the poor quality of the report and the delay in its production appear to be due, at least in part, to several circumstances: the firm appointed as special master was purchased while it was conducting its work, a key employee left the firm, and the project was reassigned from the firm’s Salt Lake City office to its Arizona office.

20240740-CA 7 2026 UT App 131 stock in one of those companies was sold in 2000 and the stock in another was sold in 2001, and that the cash proceeds of those sales were “mixed in with all of the . . . other money in [the] Marlette [account].” When asked whether he would “be able to trace those amounts,” Dr. Dahl did not provide a definitive response, saying instead, “You could look at the dollar amount and see if it stayed the same.”

¶18 Also during Dr. Dahl’s testimony, Ms. Dahl’s counsel introduced an exhibit containing account statements that showed transfers from the Marlette account to accounts outside the Trust. In connection with that exhibit, Ms. Dahl’s counsel asked Dr. Dahl whether he remembered “making wire transfers out of [the] Marlette [account] in the summer and fall of 2009 in the amount of $31,200.” Dr. Dahl responded that he could not recall. After Ms. Dahl’s counsel drew Dr. Dahl’s attention to another transfer from the Marlette account of “about $17,000”—this one to an account number ending in 0442—Dr. Dahl said that he could not recall what the transfer was for but that it looked like it went to a mutual fund labeled “DWS Latin America.”

¶19 The forensic accountants each testified regarding a reasonable rate of return on the assets in the Marlette account between 2010 and 2023. Dr. Dahl’s expert opined that a rate of 7.23% compounded annually would be reasonable, while Ms. Dahl’s expert opined that a rate of 11% compounded annually would be reasonable.

¶20 Prior to issuing its ruling following the evidentiary hearing, the court received written closing arguments from the parties. In her closing argument, Ms. Dahl contended that Dr. Dahl had dissipated assets of the Trust, stating, “At trial, Ms. Dahl asserted that Dr. Dahl dissipated Trust assets. Dr. Dahl did not provide any adequate response or explanation. This dissipation totals $92,391.18 worth of Trust assets . . . .” Ms. Dahl asserted that the $92,391.18 total consisted of these amounts:

20240740-CA 8 2026 UT App 131 • “$44,844.92 [in] Wire Transfers from Fidelity 2482 to Fidelity 0442”;

• “$16,290.00 [in] Checks from Fidelity 2482 to Unidentified Recipients”; and

• “$31,289.26 in Wire Transfers from Fidelity 2481 to Unidentified Recipients.”

The District Court’s Ruling on Remand

¶21 In November 2023, the district court issued its Ruling and Order Regarding Property Distribution, which addressed the following issues.

1. Discovery

¶22 The court first addressed the outstanding issues related to Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues, saying,

Regarding the history of the case at bar, the [Utah] Supreme Court noted that the “divorce proceedings were extremely contentious,” and the “discovery process was rife with abuses.” [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 5, 459 P.3d 276.] Lamentably, contentious discovery disputes have persisted, despite the [Utah] Supreme Court’s observations. The passage of 14 years since the original trial and 9 years since the remand from the [Utah] Supreme Court [has] exacerbated the [in]ability to comply with certain discovery demands and the [in]ability of the court to manage the discovery disputes. The available records do not allow for forensic tracing of every financial transaction that occurred over a period of many years and that occurred many years ago. Therefore, the court must decide the matter based on the available records.

20240740-CA 9 2026 UT App 131

Before trial, Ms. Dahl filed two separate Statements of Discovery Issues. The court denied the requested relief in each instance.[4] In ruling on the matters, the court found that Dr. Dahl produced in discovery all the documentation that he possessed that was relevant to the proceedings. In addition to those materials, Ms. Dahl received by way of subpoena to Fidelity Investments and [the special master] a combined 13,843 pages of financial records. One of the accounts for which Ms. Dahl sought records did not belong to Dr. Dahl, rather it belonged to Fidelity, and the records corresponding to that account are not relevant to the instant proceedings. The court determine[s] that materials Ms. Dahl did receive were sufficient for her to fairly address the issues at trial. The court further determine[s] that requiring the production of any additional materials sought by Ms. Dahl would be disproportionate to the needs of the case and would be unreasonably burdensome to attempt to produce ....

2. The Trust Assets

¶23 The court then addressed the question of which assets in the Trust were marital property and which assets in the Trust were Dr. Dahl’s separate property. The court began by finding that “[a]t the time of divorce, the Trust held two assets: the family

4. On the same day the district court issued its Ruling and Order Regarding Property Distribution, it also issued an Order Denying Respondent’s Statements of Discovery Issues. Therein, the court denied Ms. Dahl’s request for additional discovery, “find[ing] that the requested additional discovery [was] not proportional to the needs of the case . . . [and was] unreasonable and burdensome given documents produced and the issues remaining in the dispute.”

20240740-CA 10 2026 UT App 131 home . . . and [the Marlette account].” Regarding those assets, the court further determined as follows.

a. The Marlette Account

¶24 As to the Marlette account, the court noted that the divorce decree had already “established that Dr. Dahl accumulated substantial assets before the marriage,” which were held in the Trust in the Marlette account and totaled $356,201. The court found that “Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle those assets with marital assets.”

¶25 The court then valued the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree. It explained,

Consistent with the [Utah] Supreme Court’s admonition, the court determine[s], to the extent possible, that it [will] value the [T]rust assets as of the date of the divorce decree. [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 131, 459 P.3d 276] (“And it is well-settled that assets should be valued at the time of the divorce decree.” (citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990))). Ms. Dahl suggests that the court should value the Marlette account assets as of the date of trial. However, the commingling by Dr. Dahl of his separate property with the [T]rust property, after entry of the order awarding the [T]rust assets to him, together with the lack of certain records, makes the calculus using that method too speculative for the court to make a fair estimation of the value [of the Marlette account as of the date of trial]. Furthermore, that determination would likely require expert testimony. The parties offered no evidence in that regard. Based on the evidence in the record, the court can more easily determine the value of the property at the time of divorce and apply the appropriate rate of return.

20240740-CA 11 2026 UT App 131

¶26 The court found that “[a]s of the date of the divorce decree, the Marlette account held $1,842,089.81 in assets” and that, “[e]xcluding Dr. Dahl’s separate property, the value of the marital portion of the [Marlette account] at the time of divorce was $1,485,888.81.” The court found “that Ms. Dahl’s share of the assets in [the Marlette] account [was] $742,944.41, one half of the marital portion of the [Marlette account] at the time of divorce.”

¶27 The court then awarded Ms. Dahl prejudgment interest on her portion of the marital funds in the Marlette account at the time of the divorce, explaining, “When a party proves that its damages were fixed at a particular point in time—even when it does not establish that proof until trial—that party is entitled to the benefit of its money from that time. Prejudgment interest remedies this injury.” (Quoting Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, ¶ 27, 355 P.3d 1047 (cleaned up).) The court acknowledged that both parties had offered expert testimony regarding a reasonable rate of return on the assets in the Marlette account at the time of the divorce. But the court “decline[d] to follow either party’s proposal.” Instead, it applied the statutory interest rate formula for judgments not based on a contract. See generally Utah Code § 15-1-4(3)(a) (setting the interest rate for judgments not based on a contract “at the federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%”). Using that formula, it arrived at an interest rate of 6.73%, which the court ordered would “remain the interest rate for the duration of the judgment.” The court also declined to award compound interest, explaining that “[c]ompound interest is not favored by the law.” (Quoting Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979) (per curiam).)

¶28 Applying simple interest at the rate of 6.73%, the court found that “the applicable interest total[ed] $666,502.12.” Adding that interest to the underlying principal, the court awarded Ms. Dahl $1,409,446.53 as her share of the Marlette account. The court did not address Ms. Dahl’s contention that Dr. Dahl had dissipated assets from the Marlette account.

20240740-CA 12 2026 UT App 131 b. The Marital Home

¶29 Regarding the marital home, the court found that it had been sold in June 2019 and that the sale had “netted $805,845.05,” which had been deposited with the court. The court further found that over the nine-year period between the divorce and sale of the home, Dr. Dahl had paid expenses related to the family home totaling $511,293, including “mortgage payments, insurance payments, property taxes, and routine maintenance.” But the court denied Dr. Dahl’s request for reimbursement of those expenses. In denying that request, the court observed that, rather than “immediately liquidating the house,” Dr. Dahl had “decided to keep the house and use it as his residence” for nine years following entry of the divorce decree. The court then said it was denying Dr. Dahl’s request because (1) Dr. Dahl “had the exclusive use and enjoyment of the” marital home during those years, (2) Dr. Dahl “did not cover any of Ms. Dahl’s housing costs during those years,” (3) “[t]he expenses for which Dr. Dahl [sought] reimbursement represent[ed] basic living expenses that he would have incurred irrespective of where he lived,” and (4) “a significant portion of the expenses related to issues that occurred with the house several years after the divorce.”

¶30 Ultimately, the court awarded “each party one half of the sale proceeds of the home, $402,922.52.” And because the parties had elected to leave the proceeds of the sale of the marital home “on deposit with the court, rather than placing them in an interest- bearing investment vehicle, the court decline[d] to award interest on the underlying principal.”

3. Pheasant Run

¶31 Turning to Pheasant Run, the court observed that the Pheasant Run parcels had been sold in August and November 2015 and that the net sales proceeds—$1,289,575.74—had also been deposited with the court. The court explained that although it was “attempt[ing] to value all the marital property at the time of the divorce, the evidence produced at trial prove[d] insufficient

20240740-CA 13 2026 UT App 131 to do so regarding [Pheasant Run]” and, therefore, “the actual sales price represent[ed] the only workable approach” for valuing Pheasant Run. And, as with the proceeds of the marital home, the court declined to award interest on this amount, which had been deposited with the court.

¶32 As to expenses related to Pheasant Run, the court found that “Dr. Dahl incurred $522,683.61 in expenses related to maintenance of [Pheasant Run], including mortgage payments, taxes, and fees,” following entry of the divorce decree. In this instance, the court determined that Dr. Dahl was “entitled to reimbursement of one half of the expenses he incurred” because (1) Pheasant Run “was an investment property, not Dr. Dahl’s residence, and he did not have exclusive use and enjoyment of the investment property like he did with his home” and (2) “Dr. Dahl made a good faith effort to sell [Pheasant Run] in a timely manner” but, due to “factors beyond his control, the property took [five] years to sell.”

¶33 The court further ruled that Dr. Dahl was entitled to interest on the amount he had paid in expenses, with the interest running “from the sale of the property in November of 2015 to the date of entry of the [court’s order] in November of 2023.” The court calculated the interest amount to be $281,412.86. The interest and underlying principal together “produce[d] an ending balance of $804,096.47” of reimbursable expenses associated with Pheasant Run. The court determined that the parties were each entitled to half of the Pheasant Run sale proceeds and were each responsible for half of the ending balance of reimbursable expenses incurred by Dr. Dahl for maintenance of Pheasant Run.

4. The Total Award

¶34 Based on the foregoing, the court awarded Ms. Dahl “$1,409,446.53 for the Marlette account, $402,922.52 for the marital

20240740-CA 14 2026 UT App 131 home, [and] $433,516.07 for the Pheasant Run property,[5] totaling $2,245,885.12.” From that total, the court deducted “$402,048.24 for her share of the Pheasant Run costs, resulting in a total award of $1,843,836.88.” The court authorized the clerk of court “to release to Ms. Dahl all of the funds [then] held with the court,” which “result[ed] in a balance owing to Ms. Dahl in the amount of $40,661.65.” Thus, the court entered “judgment against Dr. Dahl in favor of Ms. Dahl in the amount of $40,661.65.”

Ms. Dahl’s Post-Judgment Motion

¶35 Ms. Dahl filed a post-judgment motion seeking additional findings regarding (1) the court’s rulings on certain discovery issues she raised before trial, (2) the court’s determination that assets could not be traced, (3) the court’s decision to not use the date of trial as the valuation date of the Marlette account, and (4) the court’s determination that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets had not been commingled with the marital assets in the Marlette account in light of “evidence . . . that it would be impossible to separate them now.” Ms. Dahl also reasserted her claim that Dr. Dahl had dissipated marital assets from the Marlette account.

¶36 Except as to one item that is not relevant here, the court denied Ms. Dahl’s post-judgment motion. Regarding Ms. Dahl’s request for additional findings on the discovery issues she raised before the evidentiary hearing, the court reiterated that Ms. Dahl had received more than enough discovery to make her case, and it declined to make additional findings. As to asset tracing and the court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the date of divorce, the court repeated its reasoning from its original order and concluded that “those findings sufficiently addressed the issues.” With respect to potential commingling of Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets with the marital assets in the Marlette account, the court simply said that its existing findings were supported by

5. Ms. Dahl had previously received a distribution of $211,271.80 of the Pheasant Run sale proceeds.

20240740-CA 15 2026 UT App 131 the record. The court again did not address Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶37 Ms. Dahl now appeals. She asserts that the district court committed various errors in identifying, valuing, and distributing the marital assets in the Marlette account and in distributing the Pheasant Run assets. “Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court, and an appellate court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 12, 525 P.3d 534 (cleaned up). We will likewise “not disturb a court’s distribution of marital property unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.” Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 10, 348 P.3d 751 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Valuing the Trust Assets in the Marlette Account

¶38 Ms. Dahl first contends that the district court abused its discretion by valuing the Trust assets in the Marlette account “as of 2010 (instead of 2023)” and by awarding Ms. Dahl “only simple interest on her share of the [Trust assets in the Marlette account] as of 2010.” We disagree on both fronts. Ms. Dahl further asserts that the offset the district court awarded to Dr. Dahl based on his premarital assets was not adequately supported by the court’s findings and that the district court abused its discretion by repeatedly overlooking her dissipation claims. Ms. Dahl’s arguments in these regards are well taken. We address each of Ms. Dahl’s arguments related to the Marlette account in turn.

A. Valuation Date

¶39 “Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial.” Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62,

20240740-CA 16 2026 UT App 131 509 P.3d 265 (cleaned up). “In its discretion, however, the trial court may value the parties’ marital assets at a different time, such as that of separation, if it determines that the circumstances so warrant.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 42, 560 P.3d 151 (cleaned up). “But any deviation from the general rule must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court’s basis for such deviation.” Id. (cleaned up). On the other hand, if a court “follow[s] the general rule,” then it is “not required to articulate any additional findings of fact explaining its decision.” Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 65.

¶40 Here, not only did the district court follow the general rule and value the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree, 6 but it also provided findings to explain that decision. Specifically, the court stated that “the commingling by Dr. Dahl of his separate property with the [T]rust property, after entry of the order awarding the [T]rust assets to him, together with the lack of certain records,” made calculating the present value of the marital assets in the Marlette account “too speculative.” The court further explained that a present-value determination “would likely require expert testimony” that the parties had not provided. Additionally, the court noted that the supreme court opinion precipitating the remand in this case reiterated the “well-settled” general rule “that assets should be valued at the time of the divorce decree.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 131, 459 P.3d 276. Where the district court followed the general rule and provided findings and an explanation reasonably supporting its decision,

6. As noted, the general rule is that the marital estate is to be “valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial.” Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62, 509 P.3d 265 (cleaned up). Here, the divorce trial occurred in late 2009, and the decree was entered in July 2010. Although the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on remand in 2023, that was not the trial contemplated by the general rule. See Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 42, 560 P.3d 151 (“The general rule concerning the valuation of a marital estate is that it is valued at the time of the divorce.” (cleaned up)).

20240740-CA 17 2026 UT App 131 we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree.

¶41 Ms. Dahl pushes back by pointing to the following instructions by the supreme court in this case:

Ms. Dahl is entitled to withdraw her share of the marital property she contributed to the Trust as a settlor. On remand, the district court should determine what property contained in the Trust is properly characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of the property.

Id. ¶ 212. Ms. Dahl contends that this language amounted to a mandate that the district court perform a “present-day valuation” of the Marlette account. In so asserting, she says it is “important . . . to remember that part of the reason the supreme court ruled this way was that [Ms. Dahl] was effectively a settlor of a revocable trust.” This is important, Ms. Dahl asserts, because when “a trust is revoked, the trust property (including appreciation realized during the trust’s existence) goes back to the settlor.” We are not persuaded.

¶42 Given the supreme court’s reiteration prior to remand (albeit while addressing an issue other than the Marlette account), of the “well-settled” rule that “assets should be valued at the time of the divorce decree,” id. ¶ 131, we believe that had the supreme court intended to limit the district court’s discretion on that front when it came to the Trust assets in the Marlette account, the supreme court would have used more explicit language of limitation than the language Ms. Dahl points us to. Additionally, following the supreme court’s ruling and remand, Ms. Dahl took no action to revoke her portion of the Trust and withdraw her share of the property. Thus, while Ms. Dahl is correct that she was a settlor of the Trust and that when a trust is revoked, the settlor

20240740-CA 18 2026 UT App 131 is entitled to any appreciation realized during the trust’s existence, here the district court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the time of divorce effectively set the revocation date for Ms. Dahl’s portion of the Marlette account as the date of the divorce decree.

¶43 For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree. 7

7. In connection with her argument that the district court abused its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree, Ms. Dahl asserts that “[t]he district court’s decision to deny [her] request to compel [additional] fact discovery [was] an abuse of discretion.” She concedes, however, that this decision was “largely dependent on [the court’s] decision to value [the] Trust assets as of 2010.” Indeed, in this instance, the two issues are interdependent. And because we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of 2010, we also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Dahl’s requests for additional discovery related to events after 2010.

Moreover, the court made the following findings related to the discovery issues that arose on remand:

• “Dr. Dahl produced in discovery all the documentation that he possessed that was relevant to the proceedings”;

• “The available records do not allow for forensic tracing of every financial transaction that occurred over a period of many years and that occurred many years ago”;

• “[The] materials Ms. Dahl did receive were sufficient for her to fairly address the issues at trial”; and • “[R]equiring the production of any additional materials sought by Ms. Dahl would be disproportionate to the needs of the case and would be unreasonably burdensome to attempt to produce.”

(continued…)

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B. Interest

¶44 We are also not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Dahl simple interest on her share of the marital assets in the Marlette account. As the district court recognized, “compound interest is not favored by the law.” Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, ¶ 17, 302 P.3d 1220 (cleaned up). Moreover, as Ms. Dahl states in her principal brief, “[c]ompound interest was (or would have been) a substitute for determining the actual present-day value of the Trust.” Where the admitted purpose of using compound interest in this case would have been to approximate the present-day value of the Trust and we have affirmed the district court’s decision not to use present-day value, and where compound interest is disfavored in any event, we cannot say that the district court exceeded its discretion by declining to award compound interest.

C. Offset for Dr. Dahl’s Premarital Assets

¶45 Ms. Dahl argues that the offset the district court awarded to Dr. Dahl based on Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets—which were held in the Marlette account—was “not adequately supported by the [court’s] findings.” Ms. Dahl’s argument in this regard is well taken.

¶46 The district court found that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets totaled $356,201 and that they had been deposited into the Marlette account. The district court also found that Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle those assets with the parties’ marital assets. On that basis, after the court determined that the 2010 value of the Marlette account was $1,842,089.81, it subtracted $356,201 from that amount before evenly splitting the remaining balance ($1,485,888.81) and awarding the resulting amount ($742,944.41) plus interest (in the amount of $666,502.12) to Ms.

These findings—to which Ms. Dahl mounts no meaningful challenge—further demonstrate that the court did not abuse its discretion by declining her requests for additional discovery.

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Dahl to account for her portion of the marital assets in the Marlette account. To the extent that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets were not commingled with the marital assets in the Marlette account, the court did not abuse its discretion by subtracting $356,201 from the 2010 value of the account before distributing the remaining balance between the parties. However, the court’s findings are not adequate to support a determination that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets were not commingled with marital assets. See generally Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (“Findings are adequate when they contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally based.” (cleaned up)).

¶47 To be sure, “one rather obvious situation in which commingling occurs is where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate with the intent that it become joint property.” Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, ¶ 24, 554 P.3d 329 (cleaned up). And the court found that Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle his separate assets that were deposited in the Marlette account with the parties’ marital assets in that account. But the court’s ruling did not address another method of commingling potentially implicated here. Specifically, “even short of an outright intended contribution, property that started out as separate property may be considered commingled if it becomes inextricably and untraceably intertwined with marital assets.” Id. “Quite important to any commingling analysis, then, is whether the property in question has retained its separate character.” Id. (cleaned up). “[S]eparate property will be considered commingled when it has been mixed in with marital assets to such a degree that it is no longer reasonably possible to distinguish between the separate and marital property.” Id. “On the other hand, if the marital and premarital assets are still reasonably capable of being traced and identified, then the separate property retains its separate nature and will not be considered commingled.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶48 Here, Dr. Dahl testified that some of his premarital assets originally held in the form of stock were sold prior to 2010 and the

20240740-CA 21 2026 UT App 131 cash proceeds of those stock sales were “mixed in with all of the . . . other money in [the] Marlette [account].” When asked whether he would “be able to trace those amounts,” Dr. Dahl was not definitive and said, “You could look at the dollar amount and see if it stayed the same.” Despite this testimony, the district court made no findings as to whether by 2010 Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets had become inextricably and untraceably intertwined with marital assets. Without such a finding, we are unable to determine whether the district court exceeded its discretion by crediting Dr. Dahl with an offset of $356,201 before it distributed the assets in the Marlette account. We therefore vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to make additional findings as to whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained their separate character as of July 2010.

D. Dissipation

¶49 Next, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court exceeded its discretion by repeatedly overlooking her claims concerning dissipation. We agree.

¶50 “Where one party has dissipated an asset, . . . the trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, . . . hold one party accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital assets.” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d 455 (cleaned up). Factors that “may be relevant to determining whether a party should be held accountable for the dissipation of marital assets” include

how the money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses; the parties’ historical practices; the magnitude of any depletion; the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and divorce; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets.

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Id. (cleaned up). “After an initial showing of apparent dissipation by one party, the burden shifts to the other party to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some legitimate marital purpose.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶51 Here, Ms. Dahl’s counsel introduced account statements showing some transfers from the Marlette account to accounts outside the Trust. When Ms. Dahl’s counsel asked Dr. Dahl whether he remembered “making wire transfers out of [the] Marlette [account] in the summer and fall of 2009 in the amount of $31,200,” Dr. Dahl responded that he could not recall. He also could not recall another transfer from the Marlette account of “about $17,000” but said that it looked like it went to a mutual fund labeled “DWS Latin America.” In her closing argument, Ms. Dahl then contended that Dr. Dahl had dissipated the Trust assets and that “Dr. Dahl did not provide any adequate response or explanation.” She asserted that the dissipation totaled $92,391.18, and she broke that total down into three line items, two of which appear to correspond to transfers about which Dr. Dahl was specifically questioned and was unable to provide an explanation.

¶52 Despite the evidence of apparent dissipation and Ms. Dahl’s assertion of a dissipation claim in both her closing argument and her post-trial motion, the district court never ruled on Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim. For this additional reason, we vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to rule on Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim.

*****

¶53 In sum, as to the Marlette account, we affirm the district court’s decision to value the account as of the date of the divorce decree and its decision to award simple rather than compound interest to Ms. Dahl on her share of the marital assets in the Marlette account. We nevertheless vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand the matter for the court to

20240740-CA 23 2026 UT App 131 address both (1) whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained their separate character as of the date of the divorce decree and (2) Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim as argued in her closing argument and post-trial motion. After the court addresses those issues, it should redistribute the assets in the Marlette account in light of its findings on those issues.

II. Pheasant Run Maintenance

¶54 Next, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court’s “allowance of an adjustment in [Dr. Dahl’s] favor” based on amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree was “not adequately supported by the findings” and “ignore[d]” the fact that Dr. Dahl apparently used money from the Trust to pay at least some of the mortgage payments on Pheasant Run. We are not persuaded that the court’s findings were inadequate or that the court abused its discretion in granting Dr. Dahl an allowance for all of the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree.

¶55 The court found that “Dr. Dahl incurred $522,683.61 in expenses related to maintenance of [Pheasant Run], including mortgage payments, taxes, and fees,” following entry of the divorce decree. In allowing an adjustment of half that amount in favor of Dr. Dahl, the district court further found that Pheasant Run “was an investment property, not Dr. Dahl’s residence,” and that “he did not have exclusive use and enjoyment of the investment property like he did with his home.” Ms. Dahl does not dispute the foregoing findings. Instead, she contends that the court should have determined the amount of Pheasant Run maintenance costs that were paid after entry of the divorce decree with money from the Trust and not allowed Dr. Dahl an offset for maintenance costs that were paid with money from the Trust. However, our determination to uphold the district court’s decision to value the Trust as of the date of the divorce decree renders Ms. Dahl’s argument as to the Pheasant Run maintenance costs wholly unpersuasive.

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¶56 As Dr. Dahl explains in his brief,

Because the [c]ourt determined [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the Trust as of the date of the [divorce decree] and then elected to award [Ms. Dahl] one-half the value of the Trust at the time of the divorce plus interest, it is irrelevant where the source of the funds came from to pay the costs of Pheasant Run expenses after the divorce was granted because [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the Trust was not impacted. Therefore, no matter what funds [Dr. Dahl] used to pay for the expenses for Pheasant Run, after the divorce was granted, those funds could not possibly have come from [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the funds.

We agree with this reasoning and affirm the district court’s decision to allow an adjustment in favor of Dr. Dahl based on the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree.

III. Interest on Funds Deposited with the Court

¶57 Finally, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court “abused its discretion by not awarding [her] interest on the funds held on deposit with the district court,” which consisted of the proceeds of the sales of Pheasant Run and the marital home. Ms. Dahl’s argument is unavailing.

¶58 In denying Ms. Dahl’s request for an award of interest on her share of the deposited funds, the district court cited decisions from other states indicating that “[a]s a general rule, interest cannot be recovered while a fund is on deposit in the registry of the court.” Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of St. Louis v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 84 (Mo. 1964); see also Ernest B. Williams IV, PLLC v. Association of Unit Owners of Five Hundred & One Union Bldg., No. M2019-02114-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1306875, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2021) (“As a general rule, interest on funds deposited with the court in interpleader actions is not recoverable

20240740-CA 25 2026 UT App 131 from the unsuccessful claimant because the funds were not in his or her possession, available for investment. Awarding interest would thus act as a penalty against the claimant.”(cleaned up)); Washington Irrigation & Dev. Co. v. United States, 751 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (“It is well established . . . that interest is not charged against the party owing a debt when the funds owed are in custodia legis.”).

¶59 Ms. Dahl does not take issue with this general rule. Instead, she says that she did “not elect[] to have the money deposited in an interest-free account,” that Dr. Dahl was the one who “insisted on [the] funds being held in escrow” with the court, and that he did so to “prevent [Ms. Dahl] from having access to” them. We are not persuaded that these asserted facts provided any basis for the district court to deviate from the general rule and award interest to Ms. Dahl on her portion of the funds deposited with the court. If Ms. Dahl wished to receive interest on the deposited funds, she could have asked the district court to deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-301(2) (stating that when the amount of funds on deposit with the court exceeds $5,000, “the court may order or the litigant may request that such funds be deposited in an interest bearing trust account” whose interest accrues to the litigant). Ms. Dahl made no such request. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision not to award Ms. Dahl interest on her share of the marital funds deposited with the court.

CONCLUSION

¶60 We affirm the district court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree, as well as the court’s decision not to award compound interest to Ms. Dahl on her share of the marital assets in the Marlette account. We nevertheless vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to address both (1) whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained their separate character as of the date of the divorce decree and (2) Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim as

20240740-CA 26 2026 UT App 131 argued in her closing argument and post-trial motion. After the court addresses those issues, it should redistribute the assets in the Marlette account consistent with this opinion and in light of its findings on those issues.

¶61 We affirm the court’s decision to allow an adjustment in favor of Dr. Dahl based on the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree. And we affirm the court’s decision not to award Ms. Dahl interest on her share of the marital funds deposited with the court. 8

8. Dr. Dahl asks that we grant him an award of the fees he has expended in defending this appeal. He bases his request on rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows us to award fees if we determine that an appeal was “either frivolous or for delay.” Because Ms. Dahl’s appeal has prompted us to vacate the district court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand for additional proceedings, we cannot say that Ms. Dahl’s appeal was frivolous or for delay. We therefore deny Dr. Dahl’s request for an award of fees.

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