Dagliolo v. Dagliolo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Dagliolo v. Dagliolo

91 A.D.3d 1260, 937 N.Y.2d 466

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 26, 2012

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 91 A.D.3d 1260 (Dagliolo v. Dagliolo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dagliolo v. Dagliolo, 91 A.D.3d 1260, 937 N.Y.2d 466 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).

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Opinion

Garry, J.

It is well settled that, where the parties have executed a valid stipulation or agreement, a domestic relations order may convey only those rights and awards upon which the parties agreed (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 304 [2002]; Smith v Smith, 59 AD3d 905, 906 [2009]). A “stipulation of settlement that is incorporated into a divorce judgment ‘is an independent contract, subject to the principles of contract interpretation’ ” (LaPierre v LaPierre, 84 AD3d 1497, 1498 [2011], quoting Ross v Ross, 16 AD3d 713, 714 [2005]). As such, if the language of a stipulation is unambiguous, its terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the parties’ intent is determined without resort to extrinsic evidence (see Smith v Smith, 59 AD3d at 906; Ross v Ross, 16 AD3d at 714; Stevens v Stevens, 11 AD3d 791, 792 [2004]). Whether language is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court (see Hendrix v Hendrix, 2 AD3d 1257, 1258 [2003]; Su v Su, 268 AD2d 945, 946 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 752 [2000]), and in rendering this determination a court may not “add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used” (Smith v Smith, 59 AD3d at 906 [internal quota[1261]*1261tion marks and citations omitted]; see Stevens v Stevens, 11 AD3d at 792).

We agree with Supreme Court that the language of the parties’ stipulation explicitly provides defendant with survivor benefits. The agreement provides that “[plaintiff] shall opt to have said pension throughout the life of [defendant] and [plaintiff].” Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, this provision can only be read as providing defendant with survivor benefits in plaintiffs pension; as defendant’s interest in plaintiffs pension is measured “throughout” his own life, and not just plaintiffs life, the plain meaning of this term in the stipulation is that plaintiff must choose a pension option that ensures lifetime benefits to defendant (compare Casella v Casella, 306 AD2d 800, 801 [2003]; De Gaust v De Gaust, 237 AD2d 862, 863 [1997]).

Mercure, A.P.J., Peters, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

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Garry, J.

It is well settled that, where the parties have executed a valid stipulation or agreement, a domestic relations order may convey only those rights and awards upon which the parties agreed (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 304 [2002]; Smith v Smith, 59 AD3d 905, 906 [2009]). A “stipulation of settlement that is incorporated into a divorce judgment ‘is an independent contract, subject to the principles of contract interpretation’ ” (LaPierre v LaPierre, 84 AD3d 1497, 1498 [2011], quoting Ross v Ross, 16 AD3d 713, 714 [2005]). As such, if the language of a stipulation is unambiguous, its terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the parties’ intent is determined without resort to extrinsic evidence (see Smith v Smith, 59 AD3d at 906; Ross v Ross, 16 AD3d at 714; Stevens v Stevens, 11 AD3d 791, 792 [2004]). Whether language is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court (see Hendrix v Hendrix, 2 AD3d 1257, 1258 [2003]; Su v Su, 268 AD2d 945, 946 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 752 [2000]), and in rendering this determination a court may not “add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used” (Smith v Smith, 59 AD3d at 906 [internal quota[1261]*1261tion marks and citations omitted]; see Stevens v Stevens, 11 AD3d at 792).

We agree with Supreme Court that the language of the parties’ stipulation explicitly provides defendant with survivor benefits. The agreement provides that “[plaintiff] shall opt to have said pension throughout the life of [defendant] and [plaintiff].” Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, this provision can only be read as providing defendant with survivor benefits in plaintiffs pension; as defendant’s interest in plaintiffs pension is measured “throughout” his own life, and not just plaintiffs life, the plain meaning of this term in the stipulation is that plaintiff must choose a pension option that ensures lifetime benefits to defendant (compare Casella v Casella, 306 AD2d 800, 801 [2003]; De Gaust v De Gaust, 237 AD2d 862, 863 [1997]).

Mercure, A.P.J., Peters, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

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91 A.D.3d 1260, 937 N.Y.2d 466, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dagliolo-v-dagliolo-nyappdiv-2012.

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