Daedalus Blue, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 1, 2022
Docket6:20-cv-01152
StatusUnknown

This text of Daedalus Blue, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation (Daedalus Blue, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daedalus Blue, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, (W.D. Tex. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WACO DIVISION

DAEDALUS BLUE, LLC, § Plaintiff § § W-20-CV-01152-ADA § -vs- § § § MICROSOFT CORPORATION, § Defendant § §

ORDER DENYING MICROSOFT CORPORATION’S OBJECTIONS TO AND APPEAL FROM MAY 12, 2022 NON-DISPOSITIVE ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s (“Microsoft”) Objections to and Appeal from the May 12, 2022 Non-dispositive Order of Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 64. Plaintiff Daedalus Blue, LLC’s (“Daedalus”) Opposition to Defendant’s Motion was timely filed in response. ECF No. 66. Microsoft filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. ECF No. 67. Having considered all the relevant briefing, the Court DENIES Microsoft’s Objection. I. BACKGROUND On April 18, 2022, the court held a sealed discovery hearing on requests to compel discovery raised by both Daedalus and Microsoft. ECF No. 61 at 1. A follow-up hearing was held on April 26, 2022, concerning Microsoft’s first request. Id. Subsequently, the Court held another sealed discovery hearing on May 11, 2022, on related issues. Id. Of the numerous discovery issues, Microsoft objects to and appeals Magistrate Judge Gilliland’s Discovery Order holding that “communications reflecting negotiations or drafts of unconsummated agreements are not discoverable absent a further showing of good cause.” ECF No. 64 at 1–2 (quoting ECF No. 61 at 4). Microsoft sought production of documents and email communications exchanged with third parties regarding Daedalus’s attempts to commercialize enforce, sell, monetize, or license the Asserted Patents. ECF No. 61 at 2. On May 12, 2022, the Court issued an order consolidating the Court’s ruling from all of the hearings. ECF No. 61 at 1 (the “Order”). In this Order, with regard to the communications about prospective monetization or licensing of the patents, the Court held that the identity of the parties contacted about a license

to the Asserted Patent are discoverable, as are any final consummated agreements that include the Asserted Patents. ECF No. 61 at 4. Additionally, the Court held that communications reflecting negotiations or drafts of unconsummated agreements are not discoverable absent a further showing of good cause. ECF No. 61 at 4. On May 26, 2022, Microsoft filed an objection to and appeal from the Court’s May 12, 2022 Order. ECF No. 64. Microsoft argued that Magistrate Judge Gilliland’s Discovery Order, regarding the communications about prospective monetization of licensing of the patents, was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. ECF No. 64 at 1. In addition, Microsoft argued the Discovery Order incorrectly applies a heightened standard of “good cause” for documents and

communications reflecting Daedalus’s efforts to monetize the Asserted Patents. ECF No. 64 at 2. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “A magistrate judge’s determination regarding a nondispositive matter is reviewed under the ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’ standard.” Baylor Health Care Sys. v. Equitable Plan Serves., 955 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (N.D. Tex. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact. See Baylor Health Care Sys., 955 F. Supp. 2d at 689. That standard is a “highly deferential” one; the Court must affirm the Magistrate’s decision unless “on the entire evidence [the Court] is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Gomez v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 5201797, at *2 (W.D. Tex. April 2017) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, even were the Court disposed to differ with the Magistrate, such a difference of opinion would not alone entitle it to reverse or reconsider the Order. Id. (citing Guzman v. Hacienda Records &

Recording Studio, Inc., 808 F.3d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 2015)). On the other hand, a magistrate judge’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the less stringent “contrary to law” standard. See id.; Gandee v. Glasser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Currier v. Fogel, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).

III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Relevance of Discovery Parties are permitted discovery of any non-privileged material relevant to a party’s claim of defense that is proportional to the needs of the case. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Hawkins v. AT&T, 812 F. App’x 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the scope of discovery is broad and permits the discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.’”) (quoting Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.

2011)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant the courts broad discretionary powers. According to Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the court must limit the extent of discovery otherwise allowed by the rules, or by local rule, if it determines that the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). Furthermore, even when a party shows information is not readily accessible because of undue burden or cost, the court may nonetheless order discovery from it if the requesting party shows good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). With respect to whether records of unconsummated negotiations should be discoverable, the courts are currently split. Courts have both required and not required parties to produce documents regarding unconsummated negotiations. In Phoenix Sols. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., the plaintiff was ordered to produce documents regarding settlement negotiations as relevant to show plaintiff’s view of infringement, reasonable royalty, invalidity, and licensing over time. 254 F.R.D. 568, 582–85 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Courts have ordered the production of “ongoing and unconsummated patent licensing communications with third parties in the absence of a consummated agreement” because they are “relevant to whether prior licenses are comparable and to the calculation of a reasonable royalty.” High Point Sarl v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59529, at *28–29 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2012). On the other hand, the court in Mondis Tech., Ltd. V. LG Elecs., Inc., found

unconsummated settlement negotiation communications not to be discoverable for multiple reasons. No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 1714304, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011).

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Related

United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
333 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Crosby v. Louisiana Health Service and Indem. Co.
647 F.3d 258 (Fifth Circuit, 2011)
Anderson (Bill) v. United States
19 F.3d 1432 (Sixth Circuit, 1994)
Gandee v. Glaser
785 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Ohio, 1992)
Guzman v. Hacienda Records & Recording Studio, Inc.
808 F.3d 1031 (Fifth Circuit, 2015)
Hemphill v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, Inc.
225 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. California, 2005)
Phoenix Solutions Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
254 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. California, 2008)
Fogel v. Chestnutt
668 F.2d 100 (Second Circuit, 1981)
Currier v. Fogel
459 U.S. 828 (Supreme Court, 1982)

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Daedalus Blue, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daedalus-blue-llc-v-microsoft-corporation-txwd-2022.