Dacha v. Medical Board of Cal. CA3

Opinion

Filed 8/25/26 Dacha v. Medical Board of Cal. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

PHOEBE OGUDA DACHA, C104690 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 25WM000035)

v.

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.

Phoebe Oguda Dacha appeals from a judgment entered denying her petition for writ of mandate after the trial court sustained respondent Medical Board of California’s (Board) demurrer to her petition without leave to amend. On appeal, she argues: (1) the 30-day period for seeking judicial review in the superior court set forth in Government Code section 11523 does not bar her petition, and (2) the court abused its discretion in sustaining the Board’s demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2025, Dacha filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 against the Board. It alleged that, in 2020, she was issued a probationary medical license subject to terms and conditions. In 2023, the

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Board filed a petition to revoke probation alleging non-compliance with reporting and practice requirements. Dacha’s petition alleges the Board improperly pressured her into surrendering her license by requiring a formal stipulated surrender, misled her into believing she had no other viable option, and coerced her into signing the stipulation under duress.

The Board accepted the stipulated surrender of license in October 2023 and classified the surrender as a disciplinary action in February 2025. Dacha’s petition challenges both the Board’s decision to accept the stipulated surrender of her license and its report to the National Practitioner Data Bank.

The Board filed a demurrer to the petition, and the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded the petition was not filed within the 30-day statute of limitations set by Government Code section 11523. The court agreed that the allegation that the Board falsely reported Dacha’s stipulated surrender as a disciplinary matter to the National Practitioner Data Bank was not subject to section 11523, but concluded the petition failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action regarding the report.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Board on July 16, 2025, and Dacha filed a direct appeal on August 26, 2025.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review “In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]

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When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

“ ‘[E]rror must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Moreover, any arguments raised or only supported by authority on reply have been waived. (People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.)

We note that at times Dacha provides citations to authority that lend no support to her arguments. Other times, she cites cases without providing “jump cites to the pages of those cases where pertinent holdings purportedly exist.” (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 411.) It is not the role of an appellate court to carry appellant’s burden. (Id. at p. 412.) B. Government Code Section 11523 Dacha argues the 30-day limitation period for filing a petition for a writ of mandate seeking review of an administrative decision set forth in Government Code section 11523 does not apply where the petition alleges that no legally operative final administrative decision exists. Put differently, Dacha argues that because the petition alleges she executed the stipulated surrender of her license without informed consent, the

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resulting administrative action may not constitute a valid final administrative decision capable of triggering the limitations period contained in the statute. She argues a void administrative act may be challenged at any time. None of the authorities she cites support her assertion that lack of informed consent in the execution of the underlying stipulation would render the administrative acts at issue void or the statute of limitations set forth in Government Code section 11523 inapplicable. (Cf. Miller v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1377 [explaining assertion of a constitutional claim does not avoid the bar of the statute of limitations].)

As a threshold matter, the Board argues the judgment is not an appealable order as to claims brought by a petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 because Business and Professions Code section 2337 requires that review of a denial of such a petition be by a petition for extraordinary writ. The statute provides that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” review of a superior court’s decision that reviews “a decision revoking, suspending, or restricting a license” “shall be pursuant to a petition for an extraordinary writ.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2337.) The Board is correct: “Plaintiff appealed despite the express language of Business and Professions Code section 2337 … that requires us to review by ‘a petition for an extraordinary writ’ a trial court decision in a physician disciplinary matter that affects the status of a physician’s license.” (Sela v. Medical Bd. of California (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 221, 225.) On reply, Dacha argues we should exercise our discretion to reach the merits because of her pro per status and the importance of the issues she raises regarding coercion in administrative proceedings, lack of informed consent, and professional consequences. This argument does not directly explain why Dacha chose to proceed by direct appeal and does “not provide a sufficient justification for the unreasonable delay in the disposition of this matter caused by [her] failure to follow [Business and Professions Code] section 2337 and seek expedited review pursuant to a petition for an extraordinary writ.” (Id. at p.

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231.) We decline to exercise our discretion to treat this unauthorized portion of her appeal as a petition for an extraordinary writ. C. Reporting Claim The trial court agreed with Dacha that the alleged reporting of the revocation of her license as a disciplinary action was not an adjudicatory decision subjection to Government Code section 11523. Dacha’s opening brief does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that she nonetheless failed to state a claim for a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Only on reply does she argue that this claim “remains independently viable.” “We reject this contention because, without good cause, it was not raised until the reply brief.” (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn.8.) D. Leave to Amend Dacha argues the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the Board’s demurrer without leave to amend. Her opening brief asserts “amendment could have alleged additional specific facts concerning the circumstances surrounding execution of the stipulation, including the communications between the parties, the understanding conveyed regarding the disciplinary classification of the surrender, and the misrepresentation or failure to correct a known misunderstanding concerning the consequences of execution. [¶] Such allegations would further clarify that Appellant’s consent was not informed and that the stipulation therefore did not create a legally operative administrative decision.” Because Dacha has failed to demonstrate these factual assertions would render any of her claims legally viable, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

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III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Medical Board of California shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/S/ RENNER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/ KRAUSE, J.

/S/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.