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SJC-13286
JASON DACEY vs. SANDY BURGESS.
Essex. December 5, 2022. – February 16, 2023.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
Landlord and Tenant, Habitability, Control of premises, Attorney's fees. Practice, Civil, Stipulation, Judgment, Entry of judgment, Execution, Relief from judgment, Vacation of judgment, Stay of proceedings, Attorney's fees, Costs. Judgment, Enforcement, Implementing settlement agreement, Relief from judgment. Housing Court, Jurisdiction, Costs and fees. Jurisdiction, Housing Court. Statute, Construction. Contract, Settlement agreement, Incapacity.
Civil action commenced in the Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department on February 26, 2020.
Motions for entry of judgment and for stay of execution were heard by Gustavo A. del Puerto, J., and motions to vacate the judgment and to alter or amend the judgment were also heard by him.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Paul R. Collier, III (Michael A. Weinhold also present) for the plaintiff. Patrick F. Bull for the defendant. 2
Andrew Hoffman, for MLPB, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Richard M.W. Bauer, Patricia Whiting, Louisa Gibbs, & Benjamin Golden, for City Life/Vida Urbana & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
CYPHER, J. In March of 2020, following mediation, the
plaintiff tenant, Jason Dacey, entered into a stipulation to
dismiss voluntarily all claims against the defendant landlord,
Sandy Burgess, and agreed to vacate his apartment. In exchange
for the release of claims and to assist with relocation, Burgess
agreed to waive rent for the month of March. Because of the
COVID-19 emergency eviction moratorium, however, Burgess was
unable to seek judgment on the parties' voluntary stipulation,
and execution on such judgment, until October of 2020. On
motion of Burgess, a judge of the Housing Court entered judgment
in her favor.1 Dacey then sought relief from the judgment, and
filed a motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment on
jurisdictional and equitable grounds. This motion was denied.
Dacey now appeals from both the judge's entry of judgment
in favor of Burgess and the denial of his motion to revise,
revoke, or vacate the judgment. This appeal presents, among
other issues, the question whether Burgess could seek to enforce
the parties' voluntary stipulation following mediation, and
attempt to recover possession of the leased premises absent the
1 The judge, however, granted Dacey's request to stay issuance of the judgment through April 30, 2021. 3
commencement of a summary process action pursuant to G. L.
c. 239. Where we conclude that the judge did have the authority
to award possession of the premises to Burgess in the
circumstances of this case, we affirm the entry of judgment in
favor of Burgess and the denial of Dacey's motion to revise,
revoke, or vacate such judgment.2
Background. The plaintiff, Dacey, leased a two-bedroom
apartment from the defendant, Burgess. The original lease
required Dacey to pay the sum of $1,250 per month. In November
2019, however, Burgess informed Dacey of a rental increase of
sixty-five dollars, increasing the total rent to $1,315 per
month. He refused to pay the rental increase, and as a result
of his refusal, Burgess sent a formal notice to quit via
certified mail, which remained unclaimed. Burgess subsequently
had a notice to quit hand-delivered to Dacey.
Following the notice to quit, Dacey filed a verified
complaint on February 26, 2020, and a motion seeking a temporary
restraining order for treatment of an alleged bedbug issue
within the apartment, as well as monetary compensation for
damages. On March 12, 2020, the parties agreed to mediation,
during which they reached a voluntary stipulation, which the
2 We acknowledge the amicus letter of MLPB, and the amicus brief of City Life/Vida Urbana and Lynn United for Change filed in support of Dacey. 4
judge also signed, dismissing all claims. According to the
terms of the stipulation, Dacey agreed to vacate the apartment
by no later than August 31, 2020. In exchange for his agreement
to waive all remaining claims against Burgess, Dacey received
one month free from rent for March 2020, to assist him with
relocation.3
Following the voluntary stipulation, Dacey did not vacate
the premises according to its terms, and remained in the
apartment until the expiration of the COVID-19 emergency
eviction moratorium in October 2020, at which time Burgess
sought judgment and execution in an attempt to regain possession
of the premises. After judgment entered in favor of Burgess, as
explained supra, Dacey unsuccessfully attempted to revise,
revoke, or vacate the judgment on both jurisdictional and
equitable grounds.
Discussion. 1. Housing Court's authority. Dacey argues
that, where Burgess failed to bring a summary process action
pursuant to G. L. c. 239, the Housing Court lacked the authority
to enforce the voluntary stipulation and award possession of the
premises to Burgess. We disagree.
3 Under the terms of the stipulation, Dacey was required to begin paying monthly use and occupancy to Burgess beginning in April 2020, until he vacated the premises. 5
Before reaching the merits of Dacey's argument, we note
that he argues that the Housing Court does not have "subject
matter jurisdiction" to order him to forfeit possession of the
premises without a summary process action brought pursuant to
G. L. c. 239. "[A]s a jurisdictional matter, the Housing Court
has broad authority to resolve civil claims and counterclaims
that relate 'directly or indirectly' to 'the health, safety, or
welfare, of any occupant of any place used . . . as a place of
human habitation,' as well as the authority to resolve all
'housing problems, including all contract and tort actions which
affect the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or
owners' of such housing." Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego,
474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016), quoting G. L. c. 185C, § 3. The
entire dispute between Dacey and Burgess arose from a civil
claim concerning an alleged bedbug issue within the apartment;
thus, it was a claim that directly related to the health,
safety, and welfare of Dacey as an occupant of the apartment
leased to him by Burgess. Therefore, the Housing Court
undoubtedly possessed the "subject matter jurisdiction" to enter
a judgment in Burgess's favor in this case. Dacey's argument on
appeal then more properly may be characterized as an argument
that Burgess could not enforce the parties' agreement because
she did not instate an action pursuant to G. L. c. 239 when 6
attempting to recover possession of the apartment. See G. L.
c. 184, § 18.
Our analysis begins with examining the actual words of
G. L. c. 184, § 18. See GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader,
484 Mass. 181, 187 (2020), quoting Plymouth Retirement Bd. v.
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019)
("When conducting statutory interpretation, this court strives
to effectuate the Legislature's intent by looking first to the
statute's plain language"). "A fundamental tenet of statutory
interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect
consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."
Marengi v. 6 Forest Rd. LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 24-25 (2022), quoting
Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).
Section 18 states: "No person shall attempt to recover
possession of land or tenements in any manner other than through
an action brought pursuant to [G. L. c. 239] or such other
proceedings authorized by law" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 184,
§ 18. Contrary to Dacey's argument, the plain language of the
statute clearly demonstrates that a summary process action under
G. L. c. 239, while likely the most common avenue for a landlord
to recover possession of a leased premises, is not the exclusive
avenue for Burgess to recover possession of the apartment. See
id. See also Serra v. Quantum Servicing, Corp., 747 F.3d 37, 43 7
(1st Cir. 2014), citing G. L. c. 184, § 18 ("it is clear that
'summary process' is not the exclusive means by which a
foreclosing entity [may] seek possession of real property in
Massachusetts"). The explicit language of the statute allows
recovery of possession of a leased premises by any "other
proceeding[] authorized by law," G. L. c. 184, § 18,
demonstrating that the Legislature understood that there may be
some limited circumstances in which a landlord's recovery of
possession of a leased property may arise outside the context of
summary process pursuant to G. L. c. 239.
With that in mind, we turn to the particular factual
circumstances of this case. Here, following the filing of the
complaint, Dacey filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order. A hearing was scheduled in the Housing Court, and the
parties were referred to a housing specialist for alternative
dispute resolution prior to trial. At this point, the parties
were "faced with a decision: proceed [on the current course
toward] trial, or attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory
agreement through negotiation or mediation." Adjartey v.
Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 856 (2019)
(Appendix).
"Mediation is an informal, confidential process during
which the parties meet with a housing specialist to discuss a
potential settlement." Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 856 (Appendix). 8
"Housing specialists are Housing Court employees who work as
impartial mediators in cases commenced in the court." Id. at
856 n.17. Where the parties reach a settlement by their own
accord or by way of the mediator's help, and it is approved by a
judge of the Housing Court, the settlement becomes a binding
court order. Id. at 856. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Cassio, 428
Mass. 112, 113-114 (1998). A judge then lawfully may enter the
approved settlement agreement as a judgment, also known as a
consent judgment. See Thibbitts v. Crowley, 405 Mass. 222, 226
(1989).
While the fair administration of justice does not require
settlement, parties freely may choose to settle. See Wong v.
Luu, 472 Mass. 208, 220 (2015). In settling, the parties make a
"free, calculated and deliberate choice to submit to an agreed
upon decree rather than seek a more favorable litigated
judgment." Kelton Corp. v. County of Worcester, 426 Mass. 355,
360 (1997), quoting Thibbitts, 405 Mass. at 227. Once judgment
is entered based on the parties' voluntary settlement, the
judgment "conclusively determines the rights of the parties as
to all matters within its scope." Kelton Corp., supra at 359,
citing Fishman v. Alberts, 321 Mass. 280, 281 (1947).
Here, through the aid of mediation, Dacey voluntarily
entered into the stipulation with Burgess. He agreed to vacate
the apartment by no later than August 31, 2020, in exchange for 9
one month free from rent during March of 2020. This stipulation
then was approved by a judge of the Housing Court, and judgment
ultimately was entered in accordance with the stipulation's
terms once the COVID-19 emergency eviction moratorium had
expired in October of 2020.
While summary process actions likely are the more common
avenue in which a landlord may recover possession of leased
premises, as evidenced by the express language of G. L. c. 184,
§ 18, both Dacey and Burgess instead used court-referred
mediation in the Housing Court, which this court previously has
recognized and approved of, see Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 856
(Appendix), to enter voluntarily into a valid, binding contract
to settle all of their outstanding claims, in lieu of a trial.
See Kelton Corp., 426 Mass. at 359-360. In the circumstances of
this case, any summary process action following the voluntary
stipulation would have been superfluous, as Dacey voluntarily
surrendered possession of the premises to which Burgess lawfully
was entitled as of August 31, 2020. See Nautican Realty Co. v.
Nantucket Shipyard, Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 904 (1989)
(where lessor was entitled to recover possession of property in
equity proceeding, "summary process proceeding may be treated as
superfluous"). Furthermore, were we to permit the parties
subsequently to challenge their settlement agreement, which
already has been approved by a judge, we would eviscerate the 10
efficacy of the mediation process, as any agreement from such
process would be worthless. See Cassio, 428 Mass. at 113
(allowing party to renege on agreement, to which parties
voluntarily agreed and which judge had approved, would render
agreement "nugatory").
Ultimately, "[w]e . . . endeavor to interpret a statute to
give effect 'to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous.'" Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790,
796 (2011), quoting Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers
Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010). The statutory
phrase "other proceedings authorized by law" found in § 18 must
be afforded substance to effectuate the Legislature's intent
behind its inclusion. See Worcester v. College Hill Props.,
LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013), citing Selectmen of Topsfield v.
State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 312-313 (1949) ("All the
words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual
meaning, and each clause or phrase is to be construed with
reference to every other clause or phrase without giving undue
emphasis to any one group of words, so that, if reasonably
possible, all parts shall be construed as consistent with each
other so as to form a harmonious enactment effectual to
accomplish its manifest purpose"). Dacey's reading of the
statute fails to do just that, as his interpretation ignores the
provision "other proceedings authorized by law." See Monell v. 11
Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 576 (2015) (additional express
statutory language may not be overshadowed and deemed
superfluous by other express language found within same
statutory provision). Therefore, we hold that Burgess could
seek to enforce the parties' voluntary stipulation following
mediation, and the judge had the authority to award possession
of the leased premises to Burgess, as the entry of judgment
based on a voluntary stipulation in these circumstances
constituted an "other proceeding[] authorized by law" within the
context of § 18.
2. Dacey's disability claim. Dacey argues that where the
Housing Court failed to provide him with a reasonable
accommodation for his disability, the judge abused his
discretion in denying Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or
vacate the judgment.4 Dacey filed the motion to revise, revoke,
or vacate the judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59, 365
Mass. 827 (1974), as well as Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365 Mass. 828
(1974). We review the denial of a motion filed under each of
4 Dacey also argues that where equity does not favor forfeiture, and where the COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected tenants across the Commonwealth, including Dacey, the balance of harms is "vastly disproportionate," such that equity precludes enforcement of the stipulated judgment. See Howard D. Johnson Co. v. Madigan, 361 Mass. 454, 456 (1972) ("In our decisions we have followed the rule that equity does not favor a forfeiture"). Burgess argues that this issue is waived because Dacey raised it for the first time on appeal. See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 562 (2020). 12
these rules for an abuse of discretion. See Matter of M.C., 481
Mass. 336, 344 (2019) (review of denial of motion under Mass. R.
Civ. P. 60 is for abuse of discretion); Clifton v. Massachusetts
Bay Transp. Auth., 445 Mass. 611, 623 (2005) (review of denial
of motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 is for abuse of discretion).
"[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion where [the appellate court] conclude[s] the judge
made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant
to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the
range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation omitted). Miller
v. Miller, 478 Mass. 642, 653 (2018), quoting L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).
Here, Dacey argues that where he was not given a reasonable
accommodation for his alleged mental disability, the Housing
Court judge erred in entering judgment based on the parties'
voluntary stipulation. We disagree.
In Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 848-849, we held that "where a
party in a summary process eviction action alerts the court and
the adverse party to a disability requiring accommodation, the
court, if it determines that the party indeed has a disability,
shall provide the disabled party with reasonable accommodation."
"What accommodation is reasonable must be determined on an
individualized basis depending on the particular circumstances 13
presented." Id. at 849, citing Garcia v. Department of Hous. &
Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 749 (2018).
Following the entry of judgment based on the parties'
voluntary stipulation, Dacey claimed that he was affected by a
"disabling mental illness," and that the Housing Court judge's
failure to provide a reasonable accommodation during mediation
rendered the voluntary stipulation void, such that this court
ought to vacate the judgment against him. On this record, Dacey
has provided no evidence that he ever "alert[ed] the court and
the adverse party" of any alleged mental disability prior to, or
during, the mediation process.5 Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 848. His
submission on this issue, in his motion to revise, revoke, or
vacate the judgment, was quite limited. Although Dacey averred
that he suffered from depression and bipolar disorder, the
record does not support such a claim with any medical evidence,
or any evidence suggesting a disability that would have
interfered with his ability to negotiate a voluntary settlement
with the assistance of a court mediator. The record only
5 When determining whether a party requires a reasonable accommodation, a judge must "accompany [his or her] decision[] with 'findings adequate to permit [appellate] review.'" Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 849, quoting McDonough, petitioner, 457 Mass. 512, 526 (2010). While the judge did not make explicit findings as to Dacey's disability, this requirement nonetheless was satisfied where such findings were implicit in the judge's memorandum and order of decision on Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment. 14
reflects that Dacey suffered from a disability that was physical
in nature, one which arose from back and neck issues. This
physical disability did not "interfere[] with his . . . ability
to appear in court," though, id. at 849, as Dacey physically was
present during mediation.
"A settlement agreement is a contract and its
enforceability is determined by applying general contract law."
Sparrow v. Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 327 (2012), citing Warner
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 406 Mass. 354, 360 n.7 (1990).
Such an agreement "is voidable by a person who, due to mental
illness or defect, lacked the capacity to contract at the time
of entering into the agreement." Sparrow, supra, citing Bucklin
v. National Shawmut Bank, 355 Mass. 338, 341 (1969). However,
"[t]he burden is on the party seeking to void the contract to
establish that the person was incapacitated at the time of the
transaction." Sparrow, supra, citing Meserve v. Jordan Marsh
Co., 340 Mass. 660, 662 (1960). On this record, while we can
appreciate Dacey's averment in his affidavit that he suffers
from depression and bipolar disorder, Dacey has failed to meet
his burden to demonstrate that he lacked the capacity to enter
into the voluntary stipulation, so as to render the stipulation
void. There is no medical evidence -- indeed, no evidence at
all -- to support a claim that Dacey lacked the capacity to
enter into the stipulation during mediation with the housing 15
specialist. See Sparrow, supra at 332 ("medical evidence is
necessary to establish that a person lacked the capacity to
contract due to the existence of a mental condition"). Where
Dacey's limited showing of a mental disability failed to
properly alert the Housing Court judge of his alleged need for a
reasonable accommodation, in accordance with this court's
decision in Adjartey, and where Dacey has not met his burden to
void the voluntary stipulation for lack of capacity to contract,
we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the
judgment.
3. Request for attorney's fees and costs. Finally,
Burgess, characterizing this appeal as frivolous, requests that
this court award appellate attorney's fees and costs, pursuant
to Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019). We
decline to do so.
Pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 25, an appellate court may
"award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee"
in civil cases where the appeal is "frivolous." "An appeal is
frivolous, so as to risk [the] potential imposition of a
sanction, where there can be no reasonable expectation of a
reversal under well-settled law." Abuzahra v. Cambridge, 486
Mass. 818, 829 (2021), quoting Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp.,
463 Mass. 394, 400 (2012). "[D]etermining 'whether an appeal is 16
frivolous is left to the sound discretion of the appellate
court.'" Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Hernandez, 480 Mass.
462, 478 (2018), quoting Marabello, supra.
Here, although we affirm the judgment awarding possession
of the leased premises to Burgess absent a summary process
action under G. L. c. 239, in accordance with the explicit
language of G. L. c. 184, § 18, Dacey's appeal was not
frivolous, because it involved a question of law that this court
previously had not addressed directly. See Abuzahra, 486 Mass.
at 829 (no frivolous appeal where city's appeal "involved a
novel question of law that this court previously did not have
occasion to address"). No appellate case in the Commonwealth
had yet determined whether a voluntary stipulation with
dismissal satisfies the requirement of any "other proceeding[]
authorized by law" under § 18. Where the law is not "well
settled" (citation omitted), Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455
(1993), mere "[u]npersuasive arguments do not necessarily render
an appeal frivolous," Oxford Global Resources, LLC, 480 Mass. at
478, quoting Marabello, 463 Mass. at 400. Furthermore, where
the COVID-19 pandemic and Dacey's allegations of a mental
disability became complicating circumstances in the parties'
voluntary stipulation with dismissal, we cannot say that Dacey
possessed "no reasonable expectation of a reversal," and as
such, we decline to levy on him the sanction of appellate 17
attorney's fees and costs. Abuzahra, supra, quoting Marabello,
supra. Therefore, we hold that this appeal was not frivolous
and conclude that Burgess is not entitled to appellate
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 25.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment in favor of Burgess, and we also affirm the order
So ordered.