Dable Grain Shovel Co. v. Flint

Supreme Court

Dable Grain Shovel Co. v. Flint

137 U.S. 41, 11 S. Ct. 8, 34 L. Ed. 618, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2060

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedNovember 3, 1890

Docket1213

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 137 U.S. 41 (Dable Grain Shovel Co. v. Flint) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dable Grain Shovel Co. v. Flint, 137 U.S. 41, 11 S. Ct. 8, 34 L. Ed. 618, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2060 (1890).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Justice Gray,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The fourth plea is based upon section 7 of the act of March 3, 1839, c. 88, (in force when the patents were granted,) providing that “every person or corporation, who has or shall have purchased or constructed any newly invented machine,

manufacture or composition of matter, prior to the application by the inventor and discoverer for a patent, shall be held to possess the right to. use, and vend to others to be used, the specific machine, . manufacture or composition of matter so made or purchased, without liability therefor to the inventor or any other person interested in such invention.” 5 Stat. 354. In the later statutes, this provision has been reenacted with the qualification that the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter must have been purchased from the inventor, or constructed with his knowledge and consent. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 37, 16 Stat. 203; Rev. Stat. § 4899.

It is agreed that the machines in question were constructed and put in use in the defendants’ grain elevators by the inventor himself, and with his knowledge and consent, while he was *43 in their employment as superintendent of machinery, and before his application for either patent. According to the express terms of the statute, therefore, the defendants had the right to continue to use these specific machines without paying any compensation to him or his assigns, whether asked for or not.

To the argument of the plaintiff’s counsel, that the statute is unconstitutional as depriving the inventor of his property without compensation, there is a twofold answer: The patentee has no exclusive iright of property in his invention, except under and by virtue of the statutes securing it to him, and according to the regulations and restrictions of. those statutes.' Gayler v. Wilder, 10. How. 477, 493; Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195; Marsh v. Nichols, 128 U. S. 605, 612. And these machines have been set free from his monoooly by his own act, consent and permission. Wade v. Metcalf, 129 U. S. 202.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Mr. Justice Gray,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The fourth plea is based upon section 7 of the act of March 3, 1839, c. 88, (in force when the patents were granted,) providing that “every person or corporation, who has or shall have purchased or constructed any newly invented machine,

manufacture or composition of matter, prior to the application by the inventor and discoverer for a patent, shall be held to possess the right to. use, and vend to others to be used, the specific machine, . manufacture or composition of matter so made or purchased, without liability therefor to the inventor or any other person interested in such invention.” 5 Stat. 354. In the later statutes, this provision has been reenacted with the qualification that the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter must have been purchased from the inventor, or constructed with his knowledge and consent. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 37, 16 Stat. 203; Rev. Stat. § 4899.

It is agreed that the machines in question were constructed and put in use in the defendants’ grain elevators by the inventor himself, and with his knowledge and consent, while he was *43 in their employment as superintendent of machinery, and before his application for either patent. According to the express terms of the statute, therefore, the defendants had the right to continue to use these specific machines without paying any compensation to him or his assigns, whether asked for or not.

To the argument of the plaintiff’s counsel, that the statute is unconstitutional as depriving the inventor of his property without compensation, there is a twofold answer: The patentee has no exclusive iright of property in his invention, except under and by virtue of the statutes securing it to him, and according to the regulations and restrictions of. those statutes.' Gayler v. Wilder, 10. How. 477, 493; Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195; Marsh v. Nichols, 128 U. S. 605, 612. And these machines have been set free from his monoooly by his own act, consent and permission. Wade v. Metcalf, 129 U. S. 202.

Judgment affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

137 U.S. 41, 11 S. Ct. 8, 34 L. Ed. 618, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2060, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dable-grain-shovel-co-v-flint-scotus-1890.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack