D. R. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 27, 2023·No. 03-22-00777-CV·Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00777-CV

D. R., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-20-006808, THE HONORABLE MADELEINE CONNOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following a jury trial, the district court terminated the parental rights of appellant D.R. (Mother) to her daughter, two-year-old J.P.D.H. (Daughter). 1 In a single issue on appeal, Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the district court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in Daughter’s best interest. We will affirm the termination decree.

BACKGROUND

The case began in November 2020, when the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) received a report alleging that Mother had contacted law enforcement in response to Mother’s boyfriend, J.H. (Boyfriend), “terroriz[ing] the family” and

1 For the child’s privacy, we refer to her, her mother, and others by their initials and by their relationships to each other, and we refer to the child’s approximate age at the time of trial. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.

“threaten[ing] to murder the family” at the home of Mother’s mother (Grandmother). 2 While the investigation into that incident was ongoing, the Department received another report that on December 4, 2020, Mother drove to Boyfriend’s home to drop off Daughter for the night when she discovered that Boyfriend “had his girlfriend in [his] vehicle.” Mother became “upset and rammed [Boyfriend’s] car with her vehicle while Daughter was inside her vehicle” and then fled the scene.

Following its investigation into these and other reports of domestic violence between Mother and Boyfriend, the Department sought and obtained temporary managing conservatorship of Daughter and filed its petition seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights. 3 The case proceeded to a jury trial in May 2022. Witnesses who testified included Mother; Laura Pender, the Department conservatorship worker assigned to the case; B.W., Mother’s cousin and Daughter’s foster mother at the time of trial (Foster Mother); Deborah Smith, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer assigned to the case; Meredith Wesley, the CASA supervisor assigned to the case; Krystal Humphrey, a licensed professional counselor who provided counseling services to Mother during the case; and two police officers, one who responded to an assault by Mother against Boyfriend in January 2020, and the other who responded to an assault by Boyfriend against Mother in February 2020.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed Daughter to remain in conditions and

2 These allegations are contained within the Department’s removal affidavit, a copy of which was not admitted into evidence but has been included in the clerk’s record. We refer to it only to the extent necessary to understand the background of this case.

3 When the case began, Boyfriend was the alleged father of Daughter, and the Department also sought to terminate his parental rights to Daughter. However, DNA testing later established that Boyfriend was not the father.

surroundings which endangered her physical and emotional well-being; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Daughter with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered her physical and emotional well-being; and (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of Daughter. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The jury also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Daughter’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). The district court rendered judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict and later signed its decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship implicate rights of constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 2018). Parental rights have been characterized as “essential,” “a basic civil right of man,” and “far more precious than property rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). They are “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” protected by the United States Constitution. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); E.E. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 598 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). “When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). “Consequently, termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. “Because termination of parental rights ‘is complete, final,

irrevocable and divests for all time’ the natural and legal rights between parent and child,” a trial court “cannot involuntarily sever that relationship absent evidence sufficient to ‘produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20). “This heightened proof standard carries the weight and gravity due process requires to protect the fundamental rights at stake.” Id.

“A correspondingly searching standard of appellate review is an essential procedural adjunct.” Id. “The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” Id. “Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631. “Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” Id. “In a factual-sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.” Id. “Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.

However, “an appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only fact-

findings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). “While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute.” Id. “Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional

underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” Id.

DISCUSSION

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