PER CURIAM.
¶1 The - Appellant-landowner, DKMT (Landowner), seeks review of the district court's August 7, 2008, certified order sustaining D-Mil Production, Inc.'s (D-Mil) Motion for Summary Judgment as to all issues concerning D-Mil's status as a "pipeline company" for purposes of eminent domain. The primary issue on appeal is whether D-Mil established that it meets the constitutional and statutory definition of a "pipeline company." Based on our review of the summary judgment record and applicable law, we reverse the district court's order.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
12 D-Mil is a Texas corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Texas. Its Articles of Incorporation, as filed in the State of Texas, permit D-Mil "to transact any or all lawful business for which Corporations may be incorporated under this act."
13 D-Mil became domesticated in the State of Oklahoma on December 8, 1985. Its Amended Articles of Domestication advised that the "business which the Corporation proposes to do in the State of Oklahoma is the business the Corporation is authorized to do in the jurisdiction of its incorporation." The Articles of Domestication also stated that D-Mil's purpose of transacting business in Oklahoma was for "mineral leasing." However, when required to designate in its Articles of Domestication "the total length of line everywhere, and the length of line to be located in Oklahoma during the current fiscal year," D-Mil answered "N/A."
T4 On May 28, 20083, D-Mil initiated this condemnation proceeding in MeCilain County. It sought to appropriate easements from Landowner for the purpose of construction, operation, and maintenance of a natural gas pipeline for the transmission of natural gas. D-Mil's petition attached a plat of Landowner's land, including the land description designating the centerline of the easement, and the natural gas pipeline to be located thereon. D-Mil contended the easements and rights of way were necessary for its natural gas pipeline, as "authorized by its Articles of Incorporation and the laws of the State of Oklahoma." D-Mil asserted that the casements and rights of way described will remain the property of Landowner, subject to D-Mil's use as described in its petition. The petition also alleges that D-Mil's good faith efforts to secure easements and rights of way from Landowner were unsuccessful.
T5 On June 17, 2008, Landowner filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Its answer challenged D-Mil's status as a "pipeline company," the necessity of the right of way, and D-Mil's statutory authority to exercise eminent domain. Landowner alleges that D-Mil's Articles of Domestication, filed of record in the Office of the Secretary of State of the State of Oklahoma, stated in the application
that the provisions concerning pipeline companies are not applicable to D-Mil's corporate structure. Landowner contended further that D-Mil failed to comply with the title 52 requirements, and D-Mil's continued operations constitute an unlawful act pursuant to section 25
; and is punishable under section 81
of the Oklahoma Statutes. Lastly, Landowner's counterclaim asserted D-Mil committed trespass on its property when D-Mil entered Landowner's property to procure the plat.
16 D-Mil subsequently moved to strike and dismiss Landowner's Answer and Counterclaim, and motioned for summary judgment on all issues raised in Landowner's Answer. Specifically, D-Mil alleged that a court's jurisdiction in condemnation proceedings is limited to three substantive pleadings-a petition, an objection to the commissioners' report, and a demand for jury trial. Answers and counterclaims, however, are not among them. It further defended that the survey of Landowner's property was lawful, and asserted that all foreign corporations domesticated in Oklahoma may exercise eminent domain. In support, D-Mil proffered its State of Oklahoma Certificates of Good Standing and Authority issued by the Office of the Secretary of the State of Oklahoma; and the Acceptance attaching the Plat filed in the Corporation Commission.
7 Landowner, on the other hand, denied D-Mil's capacity to exercise eminent domain and contended not all foreign corporations are vested with this right upon domestication. Landowner urged the district court to take notice that D-Mil failed to establish it is a domesticated pipeline company authorized to maintain an action for eminent domain in Texas-a condition precedent to becoming a "pipeline company" in Oklahoma under title 18, section 1180B(@)e (2001)
, of the Oklahoma Statutes. Landowner asserted D-Mil
had not satisfied the statutory scheme. In support, Landowner tendered D-Mil's Articles of Domestication and Correction issued by the State of Texas; Amended Certificate of Qualification filed with the Oklahoma See-retary of State; proof of D-Mil's Franchise Tax Return filed with the Oklahoma Tax Commission; and several Assignments and Bills of Sale of oil and gas leases for properties located in McClain County, Oklahoma. Landowner further alleged D-Mil's admissions contained in the Oklahoma Secretary of State filings, described its business purpose in Oklahoma as "mineral leasing," but neither the Texas nor the Oklahoma filings submitted designate D-Mil's alleged business activities as transporting or transmitting natural gas by pipelines.
T8 By order dated June 28, 20083, three commissioners were appointed to inspect and determine just compensation for the proposed easements and rights of way described in D-Mil's petition. Landowner immediately sought to vacate the appointment over D-Mil's objection. On July 10, 2008, the Commissioners filed their report and assessed damages at $5,280.
19 The district court issued a cumulative order on August 7, 2008, to resolve all pending motions and claims. It began by overruling Landowner's Motion to Vacate Appointment of Commissioners; and sustained, in part,- D-Mil's Motion for Summary Judgment. - Specifically, the court determined that no material issues of fact or law existed, and found as a matter of law, that D-Mil was a Texas corporation, properly domesticated in Oklahoma. The court concluded that D-Mil transported natural gas to market as part of its lawful business activities. Based on that determination, the district court found that D-Mil was "entitled to file an action for eminent domain under 52 0.8. (2001) § 1, et seq. and $ 26, et seq.; 18 0.8. (2001) § 1, et seq.; 60 0.8. (2001) §§ 58 and 55." Additionally, Landowner was directed to file any other objections, to the Report of the Commissioners, within the statutorily time prescribed.
110 The district court also found that the August 7, 2003, order was final and subject to immediate appeal under title 12, sections 953
and 994(A),
of the Oklahoma Statutes. Landowner appealed.
{11 This Court directed Landowner to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an appealable order.
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PER CURIAM.
¶1 The - Appellant-landowner, DKMT (Landowner), seeks review of the district court's August 7, 2008, certified order sustaining D-Mil Production, Inc.'s (D-Mil) Motion for Summary Judgment as to all issues concerning D-Mil's status as a "pipeline company" for purposes of eminent domain. The primary issue on appeal is whether D-Mil established that it meets the constitutional and statutory definition of a "pipeline company." Based on our review of the summary judgment record and applicable law, we reverse the district court's order.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
12 D-Mil is a Texas corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Texas. Its Articles of Incorporation, as filed in the State of Texas, permit D-Mil "to transact any or all lawful business for which Corporations may be incorporated under this act."
13 D-Mil became domesticated in the State of Oklahoma on December 8, 1985. Its Amended Articles of Domestication advised that the "business which the Corporation proposes to do in the State of Oklahoma is the business the Corporation is authorized to do in the jurisdiction of its incorporation." The Articles of Domestication also stated that D-Mil's purpose of transacting business in Oklahoma was for "mineral leasing." However, when required to designate in its Articles of Domestication "the total length of line everywhere, and the length of line to be located in Oklahoma during the current fiscal year," D-Mil answered "N/A."
T4 On May 28, 20083, D-Mil initiated this condemnation proceeding in MeCilain County. It sought to appropriate easements from Landowner for the purpose of construction, operation, and maintenance of a natural gas pipeline for the transmission of natural gas. D-Mil's petition attached a plat of Landowner's land, including the land description designating the centerline of the easement, and the natural gas pipeline to be located thereon. D-Mil contended the easements and rights of way were necessary for its natural gas pipeline, as "authorized by its Articles of Incorporation and the laws of the State of Oklahoma." D-Mil asserted that the casements and rights of way described will remain the property of Landowner, subject to D-Mil's use as described in its petition. The petition also alleges that D-Mil's good faith efforts to secure easements and rights of way from Landowner were unsuccessful.
T5 On June 17, 2008, Landowner filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Its answer challenged D-Mil's status as a "pipeline company," the necessity of the right of way, and D-Mil's statutory authority to exercise eminent domain. Landowner alleges that D-Mil's Articles of Domestication, filed of record in the Office of the Secretary of State of the State of Oklahoma, stated in the application
that the provisions concerning pipeline companies are not applicable to D-Mil's corporate structure. Landowner contended further that D-Mil failed to comply with the title 52 requirements, and D-Mil's continued operations constitute an unlawful act pursuant to section 25
; and is punishable under section 81
of the Oklahoma Statutes. Lastly, Landowner's counterclaim asserted D-Mil committed trespass on its property when D-Mil entered Landowner's property to procure the plat.
16 D-Mil subsequently moved to strike and dismiss Landowner's Answer and Counterclaim, and motioned for summary judgment on all issues raised in Landowner's Answer. Specifically, D-Mil alleged that a court's jurisdiction in condemnation proceedings is limited to three substantive pleadings-a petition, an objection to the commissioners' report, and a demand for jury trial. Answers and counterclaims, however, are not among them. It further defended that the survey of Landowner's property was lawful, and asserted that all foreign corporations domesticated in Oklahoma may exercise eminent domain. In support, D-Mil proffered its State of Oklahoma Certificates of Good Standing and Authority issued by the Office of the Secretary of the State of Oklahoma; and the Acceptance attaching the Plat filed in the Corporation Commission.
7 Landowner, on the other hand, denied D-Mil's capacity to exercise eminent domain and contended not all foreign corporations are vested with this right upon domestication. Landowner urged the district court to take notice that D-Mil failed to establish it is a domesticated pipeline company authorized to maintain an action for eminent domain in Texas-a condition precedent to becoming a "pipeline company" in Oklahoma under title 18, section 1180B(@)e (2001)
, of the Oklahoma Statutes. Landowner asserted D-Mil
had not satisfied the statutory scheme. In support, Landowner tendered D-Mil's Articles of Domestication and Correction issued by the State of Texas; Amended Certificate of Qualification filed with the Oklahoma See-retary of State; proof of D-Mil's Franchise Tax Return filed with the Oklahoma Tax Commission; and several Assignments and Bills of Sale of oil and gas leases for properties located in McClain County, Oklahoma. Landowner further alleged D-Mil's admissions contained in the Oklahoma Secretary of State filings, described its business purpose in Oklahoma as "mineral leasing," but neither the Texas nor the Oklahoma filings submitted designate D-Mil's alleged business activities as transporting or transmitting natural gas by pipelines.
T8 By order dated June 28, 20083, three commissioners were appointed to inspect and determine just compensation for the proposed easements and rights of way described in D-Mil's petition. Landowner immediately sought to vacate the appointment over D-Mil's objection. On July 10, 2008, the Commissioners filed their report and assessed damages at $5,280.
19 The district court issued a cumulative order on August 7, 2008, to resolve all pending motions and claims. It began by overruling Landowner's Motion to Vacate Appointment of Commissioners; and sustained, in part,- D-Mil's Motion for Summary Judgment. - Specifically, the court determined that no material issues of fact or law existed, and found as a matter of law, that D-Mil was a Texas corporation, properly domesticated in Oklahoma. The court concluded that D-Mil transported natural gas to market as part of its lawful business activities. Based on that determination, the district court found that D-Mil was "entitled to file an action for eminent domain under 52 0.8. (2001) § 1, et seq. and $ 26, et seq.; 18 0.8. (2001) § 1, et seq.; 60 0.8. (2001) §§ 58 and 55." Additionally, Landowner was directed to file any other objections, to the Report of the Commissioners, within the statutorily time prescribed.
110 The district court also found that the August 7, 2003, order was final and subject to immediate appeal under title 12, sections 953
and 994(A),
of the Oklahoma Statutes. Landowner appealed.
{11 This Court directed Landowner to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an appealable order. Upon consideration of Landowner's response, this Court permits the action to proceed as review of a certified interlocutory order because the order affects a substantial part of the merits of the controversy.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
112 This appeal challenges the trial court's legal conclusion drawn from the undisputed facts presented in the summary judgment record. Where, "as in this matter, the dispute concerns the legal effect of the relevant facts, the question [before this Court] is whether the party seeking enforcement is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rules for Dist. Cts., Okla. Stat. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., Rule 18(e) (Supp. 2008)." In re De-Anmmexation of Certain Real Property from City of Seminole, 2009 OK 18, T 7, 204 P.3d 87, 89. And because "summary judgment disposes solely of issues of law, we review it de novo" without any deference to the trial court's legal ruling. Young v. Macy, 2001 OK 4, T9, 21 P.8d 44, 47; Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 1998 OK 85, 114, 859 P.2d 1081, 1084.
ANALYSIS
118 - Condemnation, - otherwise known as eminent domain, is a special proceeding that empowers an entity to take private property for the public use. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Mehta, 2008 OK CIV APP 25, 117, 180 P.3d 1214, 1218. Its powers and procedures are derived from statutory authority. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., 1997 OK 78, 116, 941 P.2d 995, 999. But superimposed on these statutory enactments are the general constitutional constraints of article 2 sections 23 and 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution that limit the basis of a taking to "public use" upon payment of "just compensation." Additionally, eminent domain proceedings may only be initiated in strict compliance with the specific constitutional mandates and legislative enactments that confer eminent domain powers to the condemning entity, Carter v. Okla. City, 1993 OK 134, 862 P.2d 77; Okla. Stat. tit. 52, $ 3, so as to prevent an unlawful intrusion of a landowner's rights. As such, constitutional and statutory provisions governing eminent domain are construed in the light most favorable to the landowner. State ex rel. Dep't. of Transp. v. Cole, 2009 OK 40, 1 9, 286 P.3d 49, 51.
T14 The procedural vehicle that would enable a foreign corporation to exercise eminent domain rights, in this case, is delineated in title 52, which confers the benefits of "this article upon compliance with the
laws and Constitution of this state, including the provisions of Section 81, of Article 9, of the Constitution, but until such compliance they shall have no rights in, on or under the highways." Okla. Stat. tit. 52 § 58 (2001). These limitations are anchored in the Oklahoma Constitution, article 9, section 831, which provides:.
No railroad, oil pipe line, telephone, telegraph, express, or car corporation organized under the laws of any other state, or of the United States, and doing business or proposing to do business in the State of Oklahoma, shall be allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain, unless it shall become a body corporate pursuant to the laws of this state; or unless such corporation shall comply with such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by the Corporation Commission, and file with the commission its written acceptance of such requirements and procure from the commission a certificate entitling it to exercise such right.
Those limitations include the requirement that a foreign corporation execute a statement setting forth "the business it proposes to do in this state and a statement that it is authorized to do that business in the jurisdiction of its incorporation." Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1130 B(Z)e (2001) (emphasis added); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 11831 (2001). The legal effect of the express declaration is the empowerment of a corporation to acquire lands consistent with its business purpose. See Tx. Co. v. Coryell, 1947 OK 58, 87, 180 P.2d 631, 688. Where as here, a foreign corporation invokes the power of eminent domain to acquire easements and rights of way in Oklahoma, that corporation must demonstrate the existence of some right, power, or privilege in its state of incorporation. See Myatt v. Ponca City Land & Imp. Co., 1908 OK 15, 78 P. 185, (syl. no. 1 by the court).
115 The record is clear that D-Mil is a Texas corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Texas, and properly domesticated in the State of Oklahoma. However, the crux of Landowner's appeal is that the power of eminent domain, as it relates to pipeline entities, is acquired only after satisfying the applicable statutory requirements found in title 52, §§ 1-707 (2001).
1 16 To the contrary, D-Mil cites Williams v. Cont'l Constr., Corp., 1984 OK 887, 34 P.2d 254 and title 52, sections 2
, 3
, 7
, and 26
, of the Oklahoma Statutes, contending that,
under Williams, because it has complied with Oklahoma's general corporation laws and accepted the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's rules, regulations and applicable statutes, D-Mil is entitled to exercise eminent domain across Landowner's land to market gas from a well it operates. And, no statute requires D-Mil to be specifically designated as or become a "pipeline company." We disagree.
17 D-Mil correctly notes that a pipeline company is not expressly required to be named as such. See eg. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, 11 85, 712 P.2d 40, 46; French v. Ayres, 1949 OK 88, 207 P.2d 308 (recognizing a pipeline company as a "public service corporation" even though it was not expressly named as such). Under title 52, a company's business name is not required to be consistent with its business purpose. See Okla. Stat. tit. 52, §§ 1-707 (2001). Instead, this Court will serutinize a business's function to determine whether that entity possess the rights and privileges conferred by article 9, section 31 of the Oklahoma Constitution and title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes. See Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R. Co., 1985 OK 108, 712 P.2d 40, French, 1949 OK 88, 207 P.2d 808. But, mere compliance with Oklahoma's general corporate laws and recognition as a body corporate, does not in itself, automatically empower D-Mil with the right of eminent domain.
118 D-Mil's supposition of the Williams court's statement, although dicta taken out of context, seemingly implies that the court opined the Legislature unequivocally delegated condemnation authority to all domesticated foreign entities 1984 OK 387, 34 P.2d 254. But that interpretation is supported neither by precedent nor logic. Williams, did not involve a domesticated foreign corporation engaging in business activities of an unknown or unsubstantiated origin exercising the power of eminent domain in Oklahoma. Rather, the case was one of first impression and addressed the cireumstances in which the power of eminent domain is extended to a foreign pipeline corporation. Id., I 4, 34 P.2d at 255.
119 The Williams' court explained that under the Oklahoma Constitution, article 9, section 31, foreign "railroads, oil pipelines, telephones, telegraphs, express or car corporations incorporated in a foreign state" may exercise the right of eminent domain upon becoming a statutorily recognized .body corporate in this state. Id., 17, 34 P.2d at 255. However, the Legislature had not enacted a specific provision enabling foreign pipelines to reincorporate in Oklahoma. Id., T8, 34 P.2d at 255. What existed, was ample statutory authority governing the licensing of foreign corporations to conduct business in this state, and statutory authority empowering Oklahoma - pipelines - with - condemnation rights. Id. In construing article 9, section 31 of the Oklahoma Constitution and Oklahoma's - existing - corporate - laws, - the Williams' court yielded to Oklahoma's longstanding policy of recognizing foreign corporations, already engaged in section 81 activities, as corporate bodies empowered with the right of eminent domain upon domestication. Id., 115, 34 P.2d at 257. (emphasis added). It réasdned,
[ilt is true that the Legislature, by its enactment fixing the domicile of persons, firms, and corporations transacting business within the state, as found in sections 119 to 124, 00.98.1931, and in its enactment of laws pertaining to the licensing of foreign corporations to do business within the «state, do not within themselves grant to such corporations the right of eminent domain as provided by section 124, 0.98.19831, which has been called to our attention ... but all such enactments indicate a policy of permitting foreign corporations to enjoy the same privileges enjoyed by like domestic corporations without discrimination.
Id., T8, 34 P.2d at 255. "Such provision of the Constitution unquestionably contemplates that a foreign corporation ... as is described [in article 9, section 31 of the Oklahoma Constitution] may, by complying with the requirements of the statutory and constitutional law of the state, acquire the right of eminent domain." Id., 17, 34 P.2d at 255. Because the Willionns' litigants conceded the foreign corporation's status as a pipeline company in its home state, the only issue before the court was whether that corporation, having domesticated in Oklahoma, acquired the right to exercise eminent domain. Id., T7, 34 P.2d at 255. The answered in the affirmative.
" 20 D-Mil's evidentiary materials presented in its motion for summary judgment do not support, in any manner whatsoever, its entitlement to exercise eminent domain beyond its unsubstantiated assertion that it is a statutorily recognized "pipeline company" because it is a Texas corporation domesticated in Oklahoma. D-Mil's motion provides no explanation of any of its business activities in Texas beyond mineral leasing. Whether D-Mil transports or transmits natural gas by means of a pipeline, at best, is purely conjecture. D-Mil, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
121 During the course of a summary judgment action, a trial judge must decide all legal issues pending and shall render judgment in favor of the party entitled to judgment as a matter of law, regardless of whether that party is the movant. See eg., Travelers Ins. Co. v. LV. French Truck Serv., Inc., 1988 OK 76, 118, TIO P.2d 551, 557; Rules for Dist. Cts., Okla. Stat. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., Rule 13(e) (Supp. 2008) ("If it appears to the court that ... one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall render judgment for said party"). The trial judge was presented with the legal controversy; it was briefed by the parties; and the court was under a duty to address the legal issues. D-Mil specifically denied the existence of any material fact and sought judgment as a matter of law. This Court holds that while no issues of material facts exist, it is Landowner, not D-Mil, who is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
22 The factual evidence presented does not indicate that D-Mil engages, either in Texas or elsewhere, in transporting or transmitting natural gas by means of pipeline for hire or otherwise. Section 2 requires all foreign corporations to comply with the Oklahoma general corporate laws. Okla. Stat. tit. 52. Among the corporate laws is the requirement that D-Mil state its true business activities in Texas. See Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1130 (2001). No showing has been made sufficient to sustain D-Mil's burden of establishing a prima facie case that it is a "pipeline company" vested with the constitutional and statutory right of eminent domain. What the summary judgment record does support is judgment in favor of Landowner, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for the district court to conclude otherwise.
CONCLUSION
123 In considering all the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties, we find that D-Mil is properly domesticated in Oklahoma as a "mineral leasing company." - As a matter of law, however, D-Mil has not met the statutory definition of a "pipeline company" under Oklahoma law. Specifically, D-Mil failed to demonstrate that it transports or transmits natural gas by means of pipeline as part of its lawful business activities in the State of Texas. There was no factual evidence to support the trial court's legal conclusion that D-Mil is a pipe-Tine company. Therefore, the district court's August 7, 2008 order, is reversed and the trial court is directed, on remand, to enter summary judgment in favor of Landowner.
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER GRANTED; DISTRICT COURTS CERTT-FIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CONCUR: TAYLOR, C.J.; COLBERT, V.C.J.; KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, GURICH, JJ.
NOT VOTING: WINCHESTER, J.