D. Lisner & Co. v. United States

40 Cust. Ct. 104
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedFebruary 13, 1958
DocketC. D. 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 40 Cust. Ct. 104 (D. Lisner & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
D. Lisner & Co. v. United States, 40 Cust. Ct. 104 (cusc 1958).

Opinion

OliveR, Chief Judge:

These protests relate to strands of solid imitation pearl beads from Spain, which were assessed with duty at the rate of one-half of 1 cent per inch under the provision in paragraph 1503 of the Tariff Act of 1930 for imitation solid pearl beads, [105]*105valued at more than one-fourth of 1 cent and not more than 1 cent per inch. Plaintiff claims that the articles in question are properly classifiable under the provision in paragraph 1527 (a) (2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 for “Jewelry, commonly or commercially' so known, finished or unfinished (including parts thereof): * * carrying dutiable rates equivalent to 110 per centum ad valorem. Specifically, plaintiff contends, as stated by counsel in his opening statement at the time of trial, that—

* * * in their condition as imported the merchandise was no longer beads, but were unfinished necklaces dedicated to that use, and actually, practically and commercially fit for no other use.

To support its contention, plaintiff, a dealer in all types of jewelry, such as necklaces, earrings, bracelets, and pins, introduced the testimony of its vice president in charge of sales. The witness stated that he has been associated with his employer for approximately 33 years, that during the period of his employment he was in charge of the pearl department of his employer’s organization, and that he also bought jewelry in the foreign market and in the domestic market. He testified that he purchased the merchandise in question which “consisted of graduated imitation pearl necklaces in various lengths and different sizes, as to centimeter for length and millimeter for graduation.” At the time of importation, there were from 12 to 36 strands loosely wrapped or tied with a piece of string. The merchandise was ordered and received in specific lengths, running “from about 38 centimeter, 40, 42, 43, 45, possibly 46 to 50 centimeter,” all of which are standard lengths for necklaces. Tire use of different lengths facilitated completion of the merchandise into necklaces of double, triple, or quadruple strands. These pearl beads from Spain, as imported, were strung on substantial strings (plaintiff’s illustrative exhibit 1), which were much longer in length than the beads that were strung thereon. Extra long thread or string was used to permit the addition of a clasp, without restringing the beads. These pearl beads, as strung, were graduated from the smallest on top to the largest size in the center (plaintiff’s illustrative exhibit 2). The imported condition of the strands of these Spanish pearl beads, strung on substantial strings and graduated with proper matching, brought the merchandise to a condition where the only manipulation necessary to complete the necklaces was the addition of a clasp (plaintiff’s illustrative exhibit 3), which work was done after importation in the following manner (ft. 19):

* * * A needle was put on one end of it, and that is drawn through a jump ring, knotted back either one or two beads, and then pulled through another three beads, another knot put -on, and clipped off. That was done whether there is one or two strands, or any strand which made the necklace.

[106]*106Ordering the merchandise in the specific lengths that were received and having the beads strung in graduating sizes with the use of strings sufficiently strong to eliminate restringing, all of which was done prior’ to importation, brought the imported merchandise to the condition of unfinished necklaces that required nothing to be done, except the addition of a clasp, to produce finished necklaces. On cross-examination, the witness testified that these strands of Spanish beads, of which approximately 900,000 were imported, were never restrung, unless they broke, and that the amount broken “would be too small for me to even think about it” (R. 35). Explaining his use of the term “loosely strung” in connection with the merchandise under consideration, the witness testified as follows (R. 34):

R. Q. You were questioned about the phraseology “loosely, strung”, and I believe you stated that as imported the beads in question were loosely strung. What did you mean by that? — A. There was no clasp attached to it, or any connection of any kind. They were merely the pearls on the strings. To me it is a loosely strung necklace unless the clasp is attached.
R. Q. Did you mean to infer that the strings on which they were strung was a mere temporary thing and would be replaced?- — A. No.

Defendant introduced the testimony of three witnesses. Following is an outline of their testimony.

Defendant’s first witness, Joseph D’Elia, stated that he has been an importer of pearls and beads since 1911. He testified that pearl beads, as they appear on the string representative of the imported strand (plaintiff’s exhibit 1), are loosely strung and that his company has restrung merchandise which comes in with those loose ends after importation. Cross-examination developed that it has been the consistent practice of the witness, throughout his experience with imported pearls and beads, to restring all imported strands. He admitted that this general practice of his company may have been due to the inferior quality or type of string that was used. Under questioning by the court, the witness stated that the bulk of merchandise imported in the condition of the strands of pearl beads under consideration are used as necklaces and that the strands of beads in question, in the same graduation as they appeared at the time of importation (plaintiff’s exhibit 2), are unfinished articles, “unfinished beads, beads loosely strung.” He testified, further, that restringing the imported strands of pearl beads in the same graduation as they appeared at the time of importation (plaintiff’s exhibit 2) and then adding a clasp would produce a finished article known as a necklace.

Defendant’s second witness, Anthony Di Maria, has been an importer of beads for 30 years. He stated that pearl beads imported on a string with loose ends (exhibit 1, supra) are “loose end beads” [107]*107and. that, by merely adding a clasp and finishing it off, the article would be a complete necklace. Redirect- examination brought out the witness’ knowledge of a trade practice, in which strings of graduated beads of the length of the imported merchandise (exhibit 1, supra) were reduced to a mass of loose beads from which “earrings, pins, brooches, different items” were made. Under questioning by the court, the witness admitted that the use of a string, such as plaintiff’s exhibit 1, except for a necklace, would be an incidental or an occasional use. His testimony on the point is as follows (R. 70):

Jtjdgb Mollison: If you were going to make necklaces or brooches or other articles, you wouldn’t buy beads such as or similar to Illustrative Exhibit 1, would you? You would get some other type of beads to use in those articles?
The Witness: You usually would, yes.
Judge Wilson: It would be a rare use when you used a string similar to Illustrative Exhibit 1, except for a necklace, isn’t it?
The Witness: Well, it has been done.
Judge Wilson: It would be rare?
The Witness: Yes, Your Honor.

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Bluebook (online)
40 Cust. Ct. 104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/d-lisner-co-v-united-states-cusc-1958.