D. J. McQuestion and Sons v. The United States

439 F.2d 181, 194 Ct. Cl. 522, 1971 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 115
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 19, 1971
Docket335-67
StatusPublished

This text of 439 F.2d 181 (D. J. McQuestion and Sons v. The United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
D. J. McQuestion and Sons v. The United States, 439 F.2d 181, 194 Ct. Cl. 522, 1971 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 115 (cc 1971).

Opinion

ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM:

This case was referred to Trial Commissioner Mastín G. White with directions to prepare and file his opinion on the issues of plaintiff’s motion and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment under the order of reference and Rule 166(c). The commissioner has done so in an opinion and report filed on February 12, 1970, wherein such facts as are necessary to the opinion are set forth. Plaintiff filed a request for review by the court of the commissioner’s report; defendant urged that it be upheld and the petition dismissed. The case has been submitted to the court on oral argument of counsel and the briefs of the parties.

Since the court agrees with the opinion and recommended conclusion of the trial commissioner, with very slight modifications, it hereby adopts the same, as modified, as the basis for its judgment in this case as hereinafter set forth. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, defendant’s cross-motion is allowed, and plaintiff’s petition is dismissed.

OPINION OF COMMISSIONER

WHITE, Commissioner:

The plaintiff in this case asks the court to review, under the provisions of the Wunderlich Act (41 U.S.C. §§ 821, 322 (1964)), a decision by the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals dated March 27, 1967 (ENG BCA 2714), to the effect that the plaintiff had not established its entitlement to an equitable adjustment under the “changed conditions” provision of Contract No. DA-34-066-CIVENG — 62-2441.

It is my opinion that the administrative decision should be upheld.

Contract No. DA-34-066-CIVENG-62-2441 (“the contract”) was entered into under the date of May 15, 1962, between the plaintiff and the defendant (represented by a contracting officer of the United States Army Engineer District, Tulsa, Corps of Engineers). Under the contract, the plaintiff was to construct the earthen first-stage embankment and to perform the spillway excavation at the Millwood Dam, Little River, Arkansas. The total contract price was estimated to be $2,058,780.

The earthen first-stage embankment was to be approximately 8,500 feet long and was to consist of approximately 290,-000 cubic yards of impervious material at the core of the embankment, of approximately 335,000 cubic yards of select random material, and of approximately 2,160,000 cubic yards of random material. 1 The contract specifications prescribed fairly strict requirements with respect to the material that might be used for the impervious core of the embankment; and the specifications prescribed a somewhat less strict standard with respect to the material that might be used for the select random fill. The material to be used for random fill did not have to meet any particular requirement, except that it had to be essentially inorganic in nature and capable of being compacted in thin lifts. Any material suitable for the impervious core was also suitable for use as select random fill or as random fill; and any material suitable for select random fill was also suitable for use as random fill.

The contract specifications and drawings indicated that borrow area B, which *183 ran parallel to the axis of the embankment, would be the source of the materials to be used for the impervious core of the embankment, for the select random fill, and for the random fill.

Paragraph 4 of the general provisions of the contract stated as follows:

4. CHANGED CONDITIONS
The Contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are disturbed, notify the Contracting Officer in writing of: (a) subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated in this contract, or (b) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in this contract. The Contracting Officer shall promptly investigate the conditions, and if he finds that such conditions do so materially differ and cause an increase or decrease in the Contractor’s cost of, or the time required for, performance of this contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract modified in writing accordingly. Any claim of the Contractor for adjustment hereunder shall not be allowed unless he has given notice as above required ; or unless the Contracting Officer grants a further period of time before the date of final payment under the contract. If the parties fail to agree upon the adjustment to be made, the dispute shall be determined as provided in Clause 6 of these General Provisions.

The contract contained, as paragraph 6 of the general provisions, the standard “disputes” provision that is customarily found in Government construction contracts.

Notice to proceed with the work under the contract was issued to the plaintiff under the date of May 23, 1962. All of the work was completed by February 20, 1964.

By means of a letter dated September 8, 1964 (which was more than 6 months after the completion of the work under the contract), the plaintiff submitted to the contracting officer a claim for additional compensation in the aggregate amount of $305,933.15. The claim consisted of six separate items. Only item 1 is involved in the present litigation. Item 1 was in the amount of $187,656.20 and was asserted under the “changed conditions” provision of the contract.

In a decision dated May 6, 1965, the contracting officer denied the plaintiff’s “changed condition” claim, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to give the contracting officer a timely notice with respect to the encountering of the alleged “changed condition,” as required by paragraph 4 of the general provisions of the contract, and that the failure to give a timely notice had materially prejudiced the rights of the defendant.

The plaintiff appealed to the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals (“the Board”) from the contracting officer’s decision of May 6, 1965. After holding a hearing in September 1966, the Board rendered a decision on March 27, 1967 (ENG BCA 2714). In its decision, the Board discussed the evidence that had been adduced at the hearing, and then reached the following conclusion:

We conclude from the evidence presented by the appellant [plaintiff] that it has failed in its burden of establishing that the materials which it encountered differed materially from what is shown on the contract drawings and log borings or that the soil conditions encountered were not what an experienced contractor should have anticipated from a reasonable analysis of the core boring data and specifications. * * *

In view of the adverse decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s “changed condition” claim, the Board stated that it was unnecessary to pass on the question of whether the plaintiff had given a timely notice to the contracting officer.

*184

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Related

§ 821
41 U.S.C. § 821

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Bluebook (online)
439 F.2d 181, 194 Ct. Cl. 522, 1971 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/d-j-mcquestion-and-sons-v-the-united-states-cc-1971.