D. C. D. A/K/A C. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided January 28, 2025·No. 03-24-00738-CV·Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00738-CV

D. C. D. a/k/a C. D., Appellant v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-23-002405, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

D.C.D. a/k/a C.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s final decree of termination following a bench trial. 1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating her parental rights existed and that termination was in her child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (N), (O), (2).

On appeal, Mother’s court-appointed attorney has filed a brief concluding that her appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (explaining that counsel’s obligation to client in parental-rights-termination case may be satisfied by filing Anders brief). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

1 We refer to appellant by her initials or as Mother. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d);

Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. The final decree of termination also terminated the parental rights of her child’s father, but he has not appealed.

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744. Mother’s attorney has certified to this Court that he provided a copy of the Anders brief to Mother and informed her of her right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Mother has not filed a pro se brief.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, including the Anders brief submitted on Mother’s behalf, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. Our review included the trial court’s endangerment finding, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), and we have found no issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to this finding, see In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019). We agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s final decree of termination. 2

Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump Affirmed Filed: January 28, 2025

2 We deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). If Mother, after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27–28.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

D. C. D. A/K/A C. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

D. C. D. A/K/A C. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (D. C. D. A/K/A C. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Penson v. Ohio
488 U.S. 75 (Supreme Court, 1988)
in the Interest of P.M., a Child
520 S.W.3d 24 (Texas Supreme Court, 2016)
in Re Interest of N.G., a Child
577 S.W.3d 230 (Texas Supreme Court, 2019)