Cyrus Hazari v. County of Santa Clara, et al.
This text of Cyrus Hazari v. County of Santa Clara, et al. (Cyrus Hazari v. County of Santa Clara, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 CYRUS HAZARI, Case No. 5:19-cv-04392-BLF Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., DISQUALIFY AND MOTION FOR Defendants. CHANGE OF VENUE 10 11
12 13 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Cyrus Hazari’s combined motion to disqualify the 14 undersigned and motion for change of venue. ECF No. 130 (“Mot.”). The matter is suitable for 15 decision without a oral hearing and does not require a response from Defendants. See Civ. L.R. 7- 16 1(b). The motion is DENIED. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Mr. Hazari instituted this action by filing a complaint against the County of Santa Clara on 19 July 31, 2019, asserting eighteen claims for, inter alia, “EQUAL PROTECTION,” FRAUD,” and 20 “VANDALISM.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 276–93. In the complaint, Mr. Hazari alleged that the County 21 and other Defendants carried out a conspiracy to deny him a residential building permit and, more 22 broadly, to harass him. Id. ¶¶ 67–68. 23 After twice extending Mr. Hazari’s deadline to serve Defendants, see ECF Nos. 8, 12, on 24 February 25, 2020, the Court granted his administrative motion for disability accommodations and 25 stayed proceedings for 90 days. ECF No. 16. The Court granted his second administrative motion 26 for disability accommodations and extended the stay for an additional 90 days on June 10, 2020, 27 see ECF No. 25, as well as his third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth motions, each 1 the Court granted Mr. Hazari’s tenth administrative motion for disability accommodations and 2 extended the stay for a year. ECF No. 75. 3 On March 10, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Hazari’s eleventh administrative motion, 4 explaining that Mr. Hazari’s contention that his disability prevents him from prosecuting his case 5 is contradicted by his rapid, prolix filings in this case. ECF No. 87 at 2; see also ECF No. 93 6 (order denying motion for reconsideration). On April 14, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Hazari’s 7 motion to disqualify the undersigned because the motion was “based on his disagreement with the 8 Court’s order denying his request to stay the case.” ECF No. 98 at 3. The Court dismissed the 9 complaint on July 1, 2025, for failure to state a claim: In recognition of Mr. Hazari’s medical 10 issues, the Court gave him ninety days to amend instead of the standard fourteen days. ECF 11 No. 122 at 8. 12 Instead of filing an amended complaint, Mr. Hazari filed a motion for a preliminary 13 injunction. ECF No. 127. Defendants subsequently filed an administrative motion to dismiss the 14 case for failure to prosecute, see ECF No. 128, which the Court denied in recognition of 15 Mr. Hazari’s pro se status. ECF No. 129. The Court extended the deadline to file an amended 16 complaint to November 4, 2025. Id. at 2. Mr. Hazari filed the present motion instead of an 17 amended complaint. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Section 455(a) states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States 20 shall disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be 21 questioned.” Section 455(b) states that the judge “shall also disqualify [her]self . . . [w]here [she] 22 has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary 23 facts concerning the proceeding.” The same substantive standard applies to each subsection. See 24 United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged 25 “that section 455(a) claims are fact driven, and as a result, the analysis of a particular 26 section 455(a) claim must be guided, not by comparison to similar situations addressed by prior 27 jurisprudence, but rather by an independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances of 1 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[A] 2 judge has ‘as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as [she] does to 3 recuse when the law and facts require.’” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 4 (10th Cir. 1995)). “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking 5 disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler 6 Fin. Co., No. 07-cv-00915-JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N. D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2007). 7 A district court may, in the interest of justice, transfer any civil action “to any other district 8 or division where it might have been brought” for the convenience of the parties and of the 9 witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To determine if a transfer of venue is appropriate under 10 § 1404(a), courts apply a two-part test. First, courts consider whether the case could have been 11 brought in the proposed transferee district. Second, if the case could have been brought in the 12 transferee district, courts determine if the case should be moved to that forum for convenience of 13 parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th 14 Cir. 1985); Ponomarenko v. Shapiro, 287 F. Supp. 3d 816, 833 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Mr. Hazari argues that disqualification is appropriate because the undersigned has 17 “tortured the plaintiff, continued to coerce and intimidate his unaccommodated and unequalized 18 [sic] participation despite considerable authorities and analysis which he provided to the record, 19 appealing to her reason and condemning by inevitability of findings of law [sic], her unlawful and 20 unethical conduct by repeated educational coverage of applicable law and precedents.” Mot. at 2. 21 In the Court’s order denying Mr. Hazari’s first motion to disqualify, the Court explained to 22 Mr. Hazari that disagreement with the Court’s ruling on a motion is not a ground for 23 disqualification. ECF No. 98 at 3 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); United 24 States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)). Mr. Hazari further argues that the Court’s 25 orders granting his original complaint and denying his motion for a preliminary injunction were 26 issued with “intent to cause the plaintiff serious pain and suffering.” Mot. at 3, 7. This argument 27 amounts to no more than disagreement with the Court’s orders and again does not support 1 biased or prejudiced, or that her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, disqualification is 2 || not appropriate. 3 Mr. Hazari also argues that these proceeding should be transferred to the U.S. District 4 || Court for the Northern District of New York, Mot. at 16, to promote “judicial efficiency by 5 avoiding bias-related continuances and motion practice,” id. at 10. Mr. Hazari has not established 6 || that this action could be brought in the Northern District of New York, or any other judicial 7 district for that matter. Transfer of venue is thus inappropriate. 8 For the reasons described above, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion is 9 DENIED. In the interest of allowing this case to go forward on the merits, the Court will again 10 || grant a limited period of time to file an amended complaint. Mr. Hazari SHALL file an amended 11 complaint no later than fourteen days after the date of this order. Mr.
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