Cynthia Colyer Allen v. County of Henrico Public Schools

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedOctober 8, 2019
Docket0275192
StatusUnpublished

This text of Cynthia Colyer Allen v. County of Henrico Public Schools (Cynthia Colyer Allen v. County of Henrico Public Schools) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cynthia Colyer Allen v. County of Henrico Public Schools, (Va. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Petty and Huff Argued at Richmond, Virginia UNPUBLISHED

CYNTHIA COLYER ALLEN MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0275-19-2 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY OCTOBER 8, 2019 COUNTY OF HENRICO PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES GROUP SELF-INSURANCE

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Norman A. Thomas (Jeffrey R. Allen; Norman A. Thomas, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

Brian J. McNamara (Ford Richardson, PC, on brief), for appellees.

Cynthia Colyer Allen (claimant) argues on appeal that the functional capacity evaluation

and permanent partial disability rating used by Dr. Desai to form the basis of his opinion should be

ignored because it does not take into account her shoulder injury. Accordingly, she argues that the

Commission erred in accepting the doctor’s rating in its entry of the award for permanent partial

disability benefits for claimant. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm the decision of

the Commission.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and this

memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite only those facts and incidents of

the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this appeal.

“Under our standard of review, when we consider an appeal from the Commission’s decision, we

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the

commission.” K & K Repairs & Const., Inc. v. Endicott, 47 Va. App. 1, 6 (2005).

Claimant experienced a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course

and scope of her employment in 2016. The claim was accepted, and an award was entered,

providing temporary total disability benefits and lifetime medical benefits for a left wrist

fracture. Claimant returned to work with the employer at a wage equal to or greater than the

pre-injury average weekly wage, and claimant’s temporary total disability benefits were then

terminated by agreement of the parties.

Claimant filed claims for benefits in May 2017 and September 2017, seeking to add

claimant’s left radius, left wrist, and left shoulder as compensable body parts. The parties agreed

to add the left radius, left wrist, and left shoulder as accepted body parts. Specifically, the parties

agreed that claimant sustained a “left frozen shoulder” as a compensable consequence of her

2016 work accident. Employer agreed to pay the claimed medical expenses associated with the

left frozen shoulder and reimburse claimant and her medical insurer for the same. This

agreement resolved the issues raised in the claims for benefits filed in May and September. A

stipulated order memorializing this agreement was entered by the Commission in October 2017.

Claimant underwent a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) and permanent partial

disability (PPD) rating in October 2017. The report of that FCE and PPD rating was endorsed by

the treating physician, Dr. Desai. The PPD rating provided for a 2% permanent impairment of

claimant’s left upper extremity—that is, her arm.

Employer sought to enter a revised award agreement for PPD based on the PPD rating,

but claimant refused to sign it. Therefore, employer requested a hearing pursuant to Code

§§ 65.2-702 (failure to reach agreement) and 65.2-708 (change in condition), in order to resolve

the issue of claimant’s entitlement to PPD benefits. At the hearing, employer entered claimant’s

-2- medical designation report as well as the FCE into evidence. Claimant testified and entered into

evidence a document from the “OrthoInfo” website, which generally discussed distal radial

fractures. No additional evidence was presented by claimant regarding any permanent

impairment to her shoulder.

Following the hearing, the deputy commissioner entered an award for PPD based on the

2% rating to claimant’s left upper extremity. The full Commission affirmed the deputy

commissioner’s ruling. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Claimant argues that employer failed to meet the burden of proof that claimant had a 2%

permanent partial impairment rating to her left upper extremity. Claimant argues that the FCE and

PPD rating used by Dr. Desai to form the basis of his opinion should be ignored because it does not

take into account her shoulder injury. Accordingly, she argues that the Commission erred in

accepting the doctor’s rating in its entry of the award for PPD benefits for claimant. We disagree.

A. Burden of Proof

Before discussing the decision of the Commission, we must address the appropriate burden

of proof in a workers’ compensation claim. It is fundamental that when seeking benefits under the

Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant always bears the burden of proof.

The burden of proving a case beyond speculation and conjecture is on claimant. This means that claimants must establish the employment relationship, the work-connection of their injuries, the causal relationship between a work connected injury and their disabilities, the extent of their disabilities, and all the other facets of their claims by a preponderance of the evidence[.]

12 Arthur Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 130.06(3)(a) (2019). See

Virginia Dep’t of Transp. v. Mosebrook, 13 Va. App. 536, 537 (1992) (“The burden [of proof] is

upon a claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable

injury” which requires proof of an accident and an injury caused by that accident. (emphasis -3- added)); Williams v. Auto Brokers, 6 Va. App. 570, 571-72 (1988) (“One seeking compensation

retains the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable

injury.”).

Before the Commission and on appeal to this Court, both parties took the position that, as

the party requesting a hearing, employer bore the burden of proof. However, the assignment of the

burden of proof is a purely legal question. Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, 282 Va. 98, 111

(2011). Furthermore, while a party can concede the facts, we are not bound by a concession of law.

“Our fidelity to the uniform application of law precludes us from accepting concessions of law

made on appeal.” Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172 (2005) (en banc). Thus, despite

employer’s acceptance of the burden of proof, we will evaluate the decision of the Commission

recognizing that claimant bore the burden of proving her entitlement to PPD compensation.

B. Compensable Injury

The Commission did not err in accepting the doctor’s rating in its entry of the award for

PPD benefits for claimant. Claimant did not offer medical evidence that she was entitled to more

than a 2% impairment rating for her injured arm and accordingly failed to meet the burden of proof

to establish compensable injury and PPD beyond what was outlined in the FCE.

“[I]n order to obtain benefits under Code § 65.2-503 for the loss of use of a particular

body member, claimant must establish that [s]he has achieved maximum medical improvement

and that [her] functional loss of capacity be quantified or rated.” Cafaro Const. Co. v. Strother,

15 Va. App. 656, 661 (1993). “By statute, the commission’s award is conclusive and binding on

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Related

Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, LLC
712 S.E.2d 468 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2011)
Logan v. Commonwealth
622 S.E.2d 771 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2005)
K & K Repairs & Construction, Inc. v. Endicott
622 S.E.2d 227 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2005)
Williams v. Auto Brokers
370 S.E.2d 321 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Cafaro Construction Co. v. Strother
426 S.E.2d 489 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Virginia Department of Transportation v. Mosebrook
413 S.E.2d 350 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1992)
MANASSAS ICE AND FUEL CO. v. Farrar
409 S.E.2d 824 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1991)

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