Cynthia Claire Chesler

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedOctober 25, 2019
Docket18-43795
StatusUnknown

This text of Cynthia Claire Chesler (Cynthia Claire Chesler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cynthia Claire Chesler, (Minn. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

In re: Cynthia Claire Chesler, Case No. 18-43795 Debtor. Chapter 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

At Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 25, 2019. On August 7, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the chapter 7 trustee’s Motion for Turnover, together with the debtor’s response thereto. Mary Sieling appeared on behalf of the trustee, Nauni Jo Manty, and Thomas Olive appeared on behalf of the debtor. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court invited the parties to file contemporaneous supplemental memoranda. Both parties timely filed their memoranda on August 21, 2019. The Court thereafter took this matter under advisement, and it is now ready for resolution. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (I) and the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(B) and (I). This memorandum decision is based on all the information available to the Court and constitutes the Courts findings of fact and conclusions of law under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052, made applicable to this contested matter by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014(c). For the reasons stated herein, the chapter 7 trustee’s motion for turnover is GRANTED, and the debtor shall turn over $1,290.12, which is 93.15% of the debtor’s 2018 Minnesota Homestead Credit Refund. BACKGROUND The facts in this case are undisputed. The debtor owns and occupies a homestead in Saint Louis Park, Minnesota, with her non-filing spouse. The debtor owned and occupied this property throughout 2018 and continues to own and occupy the property. On December 7, 2018,

the debtor filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Shortly before filing, on November 26, 2018, the debtor paid her then-due property taxes to Hennepin County. In the Spring of 2019, the debtor filed a Homestead Credit Refund Return on Form M1PR, claiming a joint Homestead Credit Refund for herself and her husband in the amount of $2,770.00. The debtor expects to receive this Homestead Credit Refund in the fall of 2019. Half of the Homestead Credit Refund, or $1,385.00, is allocated to the debtor. The trustee argues that 93.15 percent of the debtor’s half of the Homestead Credit Refund – or $1,290.12 – is property of the bankruptcy estate. This number is based on a percentage of the 2018 calendar year on the date the debtor filed; in other words, December 7, 2018 was 93.15 percent of the way through 2018. As a result, the trustee asked the debtor to sign a stipulation

stating that 93.15 percent of the debtor’s portion of the Homestead Credit Refund is property of the estate. The debtor disagrees with the trustee’s assessment and argues that, although the debtor does not claim the Homestead Credit Refund as exempt property, the refund is not part of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the debtor refused to sign the trustee’s stipulation. In response, the trustee filed this Motion for Turnover. The issue here, then, is whether the Homestead Credit Refund is part of the bankruptcy estate. LAW When a bankruptcy case is filed, a bankruptcy estate is formed. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:

(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of this case.

11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Additionally, all property of the estate must be delivered to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). Courts – including the United States Supreme Court – have consistently found that § 541 should be interpreted broadly. In Segal v. Rochelle, the Supreme Court held, “[T]he term ‘property’ has been construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because its enjoyment must be postponed.” Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 511 (1966). The question of whether property should be included in the bankruptcy estate is a question of law, and property interests are both created and defined by state law. In re Parsons, 280 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 2002); In re Smith, 402 B.R. 887 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2009). Courts have long found that an income tax refund can be property of a bankruptcy estate. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). See also In re Barowsky, 946 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Every court that has considered this issue has held that the portion of an income tax refund that is based upon the pre-petition portion of a taxable year constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate.”). Courts have also consistently found that contingent interests in future payments are property of the estate. In re Law, 336 B.R. 780 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). Examples of these contingent interests include commissions and – of particular relevance here – tax credit refunds, such as the child tax credit. Parsons, 280 F.3d at 1185; Smith, 402 B.R. at 887; Law, 336 B.R. at 780. The debtor in Parsons argued that real estate commissions she received after her bankruptcy filing for 15 pre-petition contracts did not belong to the bankruptcy estate, in part because “the post-petition services she rendered were indispensable to the closing of the subject real estate contracts.” Parsons, 280 F.3d at 1187. Each of the 15 contracts at issue was signed

before the bankruptcy filing, but all but two closed after the filing. Id. The Eighth Circuit applied Missouri law, which defined when a broker earns her commissions, and emphasized that although the debtor had completed some post-petition services relevant to the closings, none of the contract terms “were altered by post-petition events so as to alter her protectable interest in receiving the commissions.” The court affirmed the B.A.P.’s conclusion that the commission payments were property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 1188. See also Smith, 402 B.R. at 887. In Law, the 8th Circuit B.A.P. considered the child tax credit, noting that its purpose was “to give parents of dependent children a financial break,” and that it was given to parents with an income below a certain threshold, based on a graduated scale for income amounts above that threshold – up to a maximum amount. Law, 336 B.R. at 780. The B.A.P. found that, for

bankruptcy purposes, earned income tax credits and child tax credits were both contingent interests on a debtor’s petition date – despite receiving different treatment under the tax code. Id. Therefore, the B.A.P. found that the tax credits become property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. Additionally, Law cited Williamson v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.

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Related

Segal v. Rochelle
382 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Kokoszka v. Belford
417 U.S. 642 (Supreme Court, 1974)
In Re Meyers
616 F.3d 626 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Williamson v. Jones
224 F.3d 1193 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
In Re DeVoe
5 B.R. 618 (S.D. Ohio, 1980)
Smith v. Hanrahan (In Re Smith)
402 B.R. 887 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
In Re Orndoff
100 B.R. 516 (E.D. California, 1989)
Law v. Stover (In Re Law)
336 B.R. 780 (Eighth Circuit, 2006)

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Cynthia Claire Chesler, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cynthia-claire-chesler-mnb-2019.