Cynthia Bryan, Aubry Bryan, Jr., Aunya Bryan, and Glenda Bryan v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation as the Guarantor of the Insolvent Insurance Company, Southern Fidelity Insurance Company

• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Decided: March 6, 2026
• Docket: 2025-C-00443
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #009

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 6th day of March, 2026 are as follows:

BY Cole, J.:

2025-C-00443 CYNTHIA BRYAN, AUBRY BRYAN, JR., AUNYA BRYAN, AND GLENDA BRYAN VS. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION AS THE GUARANTOR OF THE INSOLVENT INSURANCE COMPANY, SOUTHERN FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY (Parish of Orleans Civil)

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-C-00443

CYNTHIA BRYAN, AUBRY BRYAN, JR., AUNYA BRYAN, AND GLENDA BRYAN

VS.

LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION AS THE GUARANTOR OF THE INSOLVENT INSURANCE COMPANY, SOUTHERN FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans Civil

COLE, J.*

This is a first-party1 property insurance dispute arising from Hurricane Ida

that requires this Court to determine the prescriptive period applicable to claims

against the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (“LIGA”). The legislature

provides LIGA a defense where prescription has run against the underlying carrier,

and prescription continues to run in favor of LIGA after the underlying carrier’s

insolvency. LIGA also benefits from a special statutory deadline within which a

claimant must make a claim against it. See La. R.S. 22:2058(A)(1)(c)(i). However,

an unconditional payment interrupts prescription on a first-party insurance claim.

Here, plaintiffs’ amended petition was filed within two years of Southern Fidelity

Insurance Company’s unconditional tender on the claim. Because suit was timely

under the provisions of the insurance policy (requiring all claims to be filed within

two years of the date of loss) and Louisiana law governing the interruption of

* Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in the First District. 1 “In the world of insurance, a first-party claim is a claim filed by an insured against his own insurer for damage to property or person; whereas a third-party claim is made by a claimant against the insured for damages allegedly caused by the insured.” Gary Langlois, Jr., Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company: Practical Effects Resulting from an Expansion of Insurers' Broad Good– Faith Duty, 61 Loy. L. Rev. 799, 805 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 prescription, we affirm the court of appeal’s denial of LIGA’s peremptory exception

of prescription, albeit on different grounds.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hurricane Ida made landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2021, causing damage

to property insured by Capitol Preferred Insurance Company, which had merged

with Southern Fidelity Insurance Company (“SFIC”). The named insured under the

policy at issue was Emma Bryan. Plaintiffs Cynthia Bryan, Aubry Bryan, Jr., Aunya

Bryan, and Glenda Bryan (“plaintiffs”) claim entitlement to proceeds under the

policy. The policy provides that “[n]o action can be brought against [SFIC] unless .

. . the action is started within two years after the date of loss.”2

On June 15, 2022, a Florida court placed SFIC in receivership, and SFIC

became an insolvent insurer under La. R.S. 22:2055(7).3 Before its insolvency, SFIC

made one unconditional tender on the claim: a payment of $23,097.55 on March 1,

2022. The record contains no evidence that LIGA adjusted or otherwise contacted

anyone regarding the claim following SFIC’s insolvency.

On August 28, 2023, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Damages and Breach of

Contract, incorrectly naming Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation

(“LCPIC”) as defendant. On October 24, 2023, plaintiffs filed an amended petition

substituting LIGA for LCPIC. LIGA responded by filing a peremptory exception of

prescription, arguing that (i) prescription commenced to run against LIGA on the

date of loss (August 29, 2021), (ii) the policy’s two-year deadline applied to LIGA,

and (iii) because there was no relationship between LCPIC and LIGA, plaintiffs’

2 Capitol Preferred Insurance Company, Inc., Policy No. CLH 9747379 05 17, HOMEOWNERS 2 – BROAD FORM, Section I Conditions, Section G. Civil District Court Record P. 71. 3 Under La. R.S. 22:2055(7), “‘Insolvent insurer’ means an insurer who . . . (a) Is licensed and authorized to transact insurance in this state, either at the time the policy was issued or when the insured event occurred[, and] (b) Against whom an order of liquidation with a finding of insolvency has been entered by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the insurer’s state of domicile or of this state, and which order of liquidation has not been stayed or been the subject of a perfected suspensive appeal or other comparable order.” 2 October 24, 2023 amended petition, filed more than two years after the date of loss,

did not “relate back” to the original filing, making plaintiffs’ claim prescribed.4

The trial court denied LIGA’s exception, and LIGA sought a supervisory writ

with the Fourth Circuit. In a 4-to-1 decision, a five-judge panel granted LIGA’s writ

application but denied relief, holding that the two-year deadline for suit against

LIGA commenced on the date of SFIC’s insolvency—June 15, 2022—rather than

on the date of loss. Bryan v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 24-0694 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), 414 So.3d 768. The majority found that a claim against LIGA

does not “vest” until the insurer is declared insolvent, and prescription could not

commence to run until the date of insolvency. Id. One judge dissented and would

find that prescription should run from the date of loss irrespective of insolvency. We

granted certiorari to resolve these important issues. Bryan v. Louisiana Citizens

Prop. Ins. Corp., 25-0443 (La. 6/25/25), 412 So.3d 215.

ANALYSIS

LIGA plays a vital role in Louisiana’s insurance system, serving as a safety

net for policyholders when insurers become insolvent.5 The financial stability of

LIGA is essential to maintaining public confidence in Louisiana’s insurance market

and ensuring that policyholders are protected even in the face of insurer insolvency.

Understanding the importance of LIGA’s mission and the challenges it faces in

managing claims from insolvent insurers, we turn to the question presented here, i.e.,

4 As LIGA concedes, if the proper plaintiffs had timely sued the insolvent carrier, LIGA could be subsequently added, and the amendment would relate back and interrupt prescription against LIGA as of the date of its original filing. 5 See generally Stephanie B. Laborde et al., The DEF’s of LIGA: An Update to the ABC’s of LIGA, 77 La. L. Rev. 997, 998 (2017). Ms. Laborde served as General Counsel for LIGA for more than 20 years.

3 the timeliness of plaintiffs’ petition and what prescriptive period applies, a legal

question we review de novo in this case.6

All personal actions, including an action on a contract, are subject to a

liberative prescription of ten years, unless otherwise provided by law. La. C.C. art.

3499. Notwithstanding the general rule, La. R.S. 22:868(B) permits parties to an

insurance policy to contractually limit a policyholder’s right of action to no less than

two years from the date of loss. In Taranto v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp.,

10-0105, p. 15-16 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 732, this Court found this limitation

to be prescriptive in nature and therefore subject to rules of prescription, specifically

to suspension and interruption. In his concurrence, now Chief Justice Weimer

explained that even where an insurer avails itself of a statute permitting time

limitations in an insurance contract, the matter is not one of pure contractual

freedom, because the statute still governs the range within which the parties are

authorized to agree. Id., 10-0105, 62 So.3d at 746 (Weimer, J., concurring). Because

this is a species of prescription, he explained that the general codal and statutory

rules of prescription apply. Id.

The LIGA Law (La. R.S. 22:2051 et seq.) itself does not contain its own

prescriptive period. Instead, it contains a claims bar deadline, which provides that a

claim must be filed with LIGA by “the earlier of five years after the date of the order

of liquidation of the insolvent insurer or the final date set by the domiciliary court

for the filing of claims against the liquidator or receiver of an insolvent insurer.” La.

R.S. 22:2058(A)(1)(c)(i).7 The LIGA Law contains no special prescriptive period,

6 Since there is no dispute regarding material facts, and the issue is purely legal, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, L.L.C., 21-0061, p. 4-5 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 368, 373. 7 While this statute only requires notice to LIGA of the claim, any interruption of prescription via suit also serves to satisfy the claims bar deadline. We also note that any application of the claims bar deadline requires actual notice be transmitted to the insured of the deadline set by the insolvency court. La. R.S. 22:2058(A)(5). For LIGA to apply this claims bar deadline prior to the otherwise applicable prescriptive deadline, we find that notice to the insured must inform the insured that the claims bar deadline is also the deadline to file a claim with LIGA. 4 therefore the general rule of ten years from the date of loss applies. La. C.C. art.

3499.8 Here, neither of those periods would prohibit these plaintiffs’ claims. The

insolvency court did not set a final deadline to file claims against SFIC in

liquidation,9 and plaintiffs’ suit against LIGA was filed well within ten years of the

date of loss.

Nevertheless, and as explained above, the underlying SFIC policy contains a

two-year limitation on actions consistent with La. R.S. 22:868(B). The policy

provides that “[n] o action can be brought against [SFIC] unless . . . the action is

started within two years after the date of loss.” See footnote 3. The LIGA Law

expressly grants LIGA the benefits of the underlying policy provisions. Under La.

R.S. 22:2055(6)(a), “‘[c]overed claim’ means . . . an unpaid claim . . . that arises out

of and is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an

insurance policy[.]” And, notably, La. R.S. 22:2058(A)(2) provides that “[t]o the

extent of its obligations on the covered claims, [LIGA shall] have all rights, duties,

and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent[.]”

One such “right” is the benefit of the SFIC policy’s two-year limitation period.

Therefore, without any suspension or interruption of prescription, a suit against

LIGA in this case would have had to be filed within two years of Hurricane Ida’s

landfall, and this suit would be deemed untimely.

However, because the foregoing time periods are a species of prescription, as

now Chief Justice Weimer observed in Taranto, supra, in order to determine the

timeliness of plaintiffs’ petition, we must also examine whether the period was

interrupted or suspended. “Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the

8 Accord Stephanie B. Laborde et al., The DEF’s of LIGA: An Update to the ABC’s of LIGA, 77 La. L. Rev. 997, 1014 (2017) (“The same laws of prescription apply to LIGA as apply to any other party in Louisiana.”). 9 The Florida court’s priority payment deadline does not operate as a claims filing deadline because it does not prohibit filing subsequent claims with the receiver. 5 right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe.” La. C.C. art.

3464. “If prescription is interrupted, the time that has run is not counted. Prescription

commences to run anew from the last day of interruption.” La. C.C. art. 3466. An

unconditional payment on an obligation, as opposed to a settlement payment, has

long been recognized as an acknowledgment.

This Court has held that in the context of a third-party property damage

claimant, “an unconditional payment of a property damage claim constitutes an

acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription.” Mallett v. McNeal, 05-2289,

p. 1-2 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1254, 1256. This holding was extended to claims

made pursuant to uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance policies. Demma v.

Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exchange, 08-2810, p. 15 (La. 6/26/09), 15 So.3d 95, 105.

Many federal courts have already extended these holdings to also find an

unconditional payment interrupts prescription in a first-party insurance claim.10

We agree that an unconditional payment on a first-party insurance claim

constitutes an acknowledgment under La. C.C. art. 3464 sufficient to interrupt

prescription.11 Here, SFIC made an unconditional payment on March 1, 2022, in the

amount of $23,097.55, thereby interrupting the two-year period set forth in the

policy. Therefore, plaintiffs’ amended petition, filed on October 24, 2023, is

timely.12

10 See, e.g., Bateman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., CV 24-00866-BAJ-EWD, 2025 WL 2723544 (M.D. La. Sept. 24, 2025); Willis v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 2:22-CV-05556, 2025 WL 2463770, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2025); Gray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CV 23-1053, 2025 WL 1213860, at *3 (W.D. La. Apr. 25, 2025). 11 We recognize the policy arguments favoring greater incentivization of unconditional payments, but those concerns are properly addressed to the legislature. This Court has consistently held the prescriptive period in insurance contracts is treated in the same manner as other prescriptive periods under our law, and there is no textual basis for us to reject applying these principles in this context. We also acknowledge that Taranto contains dicta referencing Lila, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 08-0681 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/10/08), 994 So.2d 139, which reached a contrary result. For the reasons explained above, we decline to adopt that approach. 12 Interruption or suspension occurs with respect to LIGA if it would occur with respect to the insolvent insurer. Accord, Laborde, 77 La. L. Rev. at 1014. Therefore, we agree with LIGA’s position in this case and expressly reject any contrary position it previously took in arguing that an insured’s timely filed suit against an insolvent insurer does not interrupt prescription as to 6 Our holding is limited to unconditional payments—specifically, payments

made without qualification, condition, or reservation of rights. See Clark v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 00–3010, p. 18 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, 791. Not all

payments constitute acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription. For

example, a payment made in settlement of a claim (La. C.C. art. 3071) would not

interrupt prescription, nor would a partial payment under protest (La. C.C. art. 1861).

Additionally, interruption of prescription is personal in nature, extending only to

those who have a right of action under the policy. The record, here, contains no

indication that the March 1, 2022 payment was conditioned in any way.

Finally, LIGA raised the ancillary issue of whether plaintiffs, as children of

the named insured, have a right of action against LIGA under the SFIC policy. That

issue was raised for the first time by LIGA before this Court, and there is no

evidentiary record concerning whether these plaintiffs were the legal successors of

the named insured, whether a succession was opened, or any other myriad variables.

There may also be questions concerning applicable insurance policy defenses from

which LIGA may benefit. Those questions are best addressed in the first instance by

the trial court with the benefit of fully developed briefing and evidence, and LIGA

is free to raise them below.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeal’s denial of LIGA’s

exception of prescription. We remand this matter to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

LIGA. See, e.g., Green v. Maison Insurance Company, 24-0297 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/4/24), 398 So.3d 231.