Cynthia Almond v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 7, 2026
DocketAT-1221-25-1858-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Cynthia Almond v. Department of Defense (Cynthia Almond v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cynthia Almond v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CYNTHIA ALMOND, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-1221-25-1858-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: May 7, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Benjamin Reid , Macon, Georgia, for the appellant.

Owen J. Hoover , New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal without prejudice to refiling. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We FORWARD this matter to the Atlanta Regional Office for docketing and adjudication as a refiled appeal. On March 7, 2025, the appellant filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which OSC closed without seeking corrective action. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, 11. The appellant timely filed the instant IRA appeal alleging retaliation for whistleblowing. Id. at 2. Because the appellant alleged that an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint she filed with the agency’s EEO office was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take personnel actions against her, the administrative judge notified the parties of her intent to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to refiling, pending the Board’s reconsideration decision or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Reese v. Department of the Navy, 2025 MSPB 1. IAF, Tab 8, Tab 9 at 4. After the appellant responded, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for 6 months without prejudice to refiling. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 3. She stated that the Board would automatically refile the appeal on or around January 29, 2026. ID at 2. The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the administrative judge abused her discretion in dismissing the appeal because it delayed the adjudication of her appeal. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, 7. She 3

also argues the merits of her appeal. Id. at 5-6. The agency has responded, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. An administrative judge has wide discretion to dismiss an appeal without prejudice in the interests of fairness, due process, and administrative efficiency, and she may order such a dismissal at the request of one or both parties, or to avoid a lengthy or indefinite continuance. Thomas v. Department of the Treasury, 115 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 7 (2010). Here, the appellant alleged that she disclosed to the agency’s EEO office that agency management violated Federal merit principles and agency promotion regulations and engaged in substantial waste, gross mismanagement, and an abuse of authority, and that these disclosures constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). IAF, Tab 9 at 5-6. She further alleged that she suffered retaliatory personnel actions as a result of that activity. Id. at 6. In Reese, 2025 MSPB 1, ¶¶ 44-52, the Board held that disclosures concerning alleged violations of Title VII may constitute protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) if made to a covered entity. In Holman v. Department of the Army, 2025 MSPB 2, ¶¶ 12-13, the Board expanded that holding and held that communications with an agency’s EEO office, whether formal or informal, constitute protected activity within the definition 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that Reese and Holman apply to the appellant’s claim. ID at 2. As the administrative judge correctly explained, at the time she issued the initial decision, there was a reconsideration request pending before the Board and a request for judicial review pending before the D.C. Circuit in Reese, and the outcome of those cases could have impacted the adjudication of the appellant’s claim. ID at 2. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to refiling on that basis. 2 The

2 After the initial decision was issued in this appeal, the employee in Reese withdrew her petition for judicial review before the D.C. Circuit, the Member issued a lack of quorum order, and the original Reese decision became the Board’s final decision, which the Government did not appeal further to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 4

appellant’s remaining arguments as to the merits of her appeal are irrelevant to the issue of whether the administrative judge erred in dismissing the appeal without prejudice to refiling. See Gingery v. Department of the Treasury, 111 M.S.P.R. 134, ¶ 11 (2009). Because the 6-month dismissal period has now elapsed and the appeal has not been refiled, we FORWARD the appeal to the Atlanta Regional Office for docketing and adjudication as a refiled appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction.

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Cynthia Almond v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cynthia-almond-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2026.