Cynequia Latria Glover v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 20, 2020
• Docket: 19A-CR-2572
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 20 2020, 10:32 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE P. Jeffrey Schlesinger Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Office of the Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Appellate Division Tina L. Mann Crown Point, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cynequia Latria Glover, April 20, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2572 v. Appeal from the Lake Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. Clarence D. Murray, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45G02-1610-MR-3

Kirsch, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 1 of 8 [1] Following her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter,1 Cynequia Latria Glover

(“Glover”) was sentenced to twenty years in the Indiana Department of

Correction with two years suspended to probation. Contending that the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to recognize mitigating circumstances and

that her sentence is inappropriate, she now appeals.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] In the early morning hours of October 8, 2016, Glover and Dan Hardy

(“Hardy”) returned to the residence they shared in Gary, Indiana. They began

to argue, and the altercation became physical. During the argument, Glover

stabbed Hardy in the abdomen with a knife. Hardy died shortly thereafter.

[4] On October 9, 2016, the State charged Glover with murder. On June 3, 2019,

the State amended the charging information to add one count of voluntary

manslaughter, a Level 2 felony. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 119. At that

time, the State and Glover entered into a “stipulated plea and agreement.” Id.

at 120-22. Pursuant to that plea agreement, Glover pleaded guilty to Level 2

felony voluntary manslaughter, and the State dismissed the murder charge. Id.

at 120-22, 139-40. On October 2, 2019, the trial court, finding that the

aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, sentenced

1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 2 of 8 Glover to twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction with two years

suspended to probation. Id. at 164-65. Glover now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [5] Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bethea v. State,

983 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2013) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,

490 (Ind. 2007), reh’g granted on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). An

abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of

the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. A court will abuse its

discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement, relying on aggravating or

mitigating factors that are not supported by the record, failing to find factors

advanced by the parties and clearly supported by the record, or relying on

factors that are invalid as a matter of law. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.

The trial court has no obligation to “properly weigh” these factors, and the

weight given to such factors is no longer subject to appellate review Id. at 491.

[6] Glover argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her

because it ignored several significant mitigating circumstances. Here, the trial

court found that the nature and circumstances of the crime was a significant

aggravating factor and noted that: (1) the crime was committed in the parties’

residence with Glover’s children and Hardy’s seventeen-year-old brother

present; (2) the incident was fueled by drugs and alcohol; and (3) Glover is

“volatile” and has “destructive anger management” issues. Appellant’s Conf.

App. Vol. II at 164. The trial court found the following mitigating

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 3 of 8 circumstances: (1) Glover had no history of criminal activity and had led a law-

abiding life for a substantial period before commission of the crime; (2)

imprisonment of Glover will result in undue hardship to her dependents; (3)

Glover pleaded guilty, thus saving the court and the taxpayers the time and

expense of a trial; and (4) completed a number of self-betterment courses while

incarcerated. Id. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances

outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Glover.

[7] The trial court did not fail to take into consideration evidence that Glover was

not likely to reoffend because, although she had no criminal history, this

mitigating circumstance was not supported by the record. The trial court

reviewed the presentence report that placed Glover in the moderate risk

category to re-offend. Id. at 152. However, evidence was presented at the

sentencing hearing that Glover had been violent in the past when she was

involved in an incident with the father of her three children, where she allegedly

stabbed him, but he refused treatment because he did not want the mother of

his children to go to jail. Tr. Vol. 3 at 9, 12-13, 14, 15. The police had been

called to their house before when they had “gotten into situations” “probably a

little bit more” than two times. Id. at 15. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion because there was no evidence that clearly supported that Glover

would not continue with this pattern of violent behavior.

[8] The trial court did not fail to recognize grounds tending to excuse or justify the

crime as a mitigating factor. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated

“under any reasonable evaluation of this case, there is no justifiable reason for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 4 of 8 what you did. None that I can see.” Id. at 31. The trial court further stated, “I

have no reason to believe that your life or your physical safety was in issue at

the time you committed this act.” Id. Therefore, the trial court looked at the

facts presented and came to the conclusion that this mitigating factor was not

significant. Further, Glover pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. By

doing so, she admitted that (1) she had not acted in self-defense and (2) had

knowingly or intentionally killed Hardy while acting under sudden heat. See

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a).

[9] There is also no evidence that the trial court failed to recognize that Glover

would respond positively to short term incarceration. The presentence

investigation indicated that a letter was sent to Lake County Community

Corrections requesting the defendant be evaluated, but there was no response.

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 153. No evidence was presented to support this

challenged mitigator other than Glover’s counsel’s statement, “She will respond

positively to shorter term incarceration” and a letter defense counsel sent to

community corrections confirming a conversation she had regarding Glover’s

potential acceptance into community corrections. Tr. Vol. 3 at 26-27; Appellant’s

Conf. App. Vol. II at 126. Although Glover had no criminal history, there was

evidence presented that this was not the first time that she had been involved in

violent domestic disputes, and her volatile behavior had occurred in the past.

The trial court did not have substantial evidence that Glover would respond to

short term incarceration.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 5 of 8 [10] Glover also contends that the trial court did not consider her remorse as a

mitigating factor. The trial court heard Glover’s statement at the sentencing

hearing, in which she expressed her remorse. Tr. Vol. 3 at 29-30. We give

substantial deference to the trial court’s evaluation for remorse because the trial

court may observe the defendant and is therefore in the best position to

determine whether the remorse is genuine. Webb v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1082,

1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. The court is neither obligated to accept the

defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor nor required to

give the same weight to a proposed mitigating factor as does the defendant.

Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Here, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Glover’s remorse to

be a significant mitigating circumstance. We, therefore, conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Glover.

[11] Glover also argues that her sentence is inappropriate. Pursuant to Indiana

Appellate Rule 7(B), this court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the [c]ourt finds that the

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the principal role of

appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, “not to achieve a

perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225

(Ind. 2008). We independently examine the nature of Glover’s offense and his

character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference to the trial

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 6 of 8 court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In

conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s sentence

is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test

is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a sentence is inappropriate

ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the

crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to

light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Glover bears the burden

of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. Id.

[12] Glover’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and

her character. As to the nature of the offense, Glover admitted that she and

Hardy had a volatile relationship, particularly when they used drugs and

alcohol, and that, on the night in question, she had grabbed a knife and stabbed

Hardy in the abdomen during an argument. Glover committed this crime when

three of her children and Hardy’s brother, who was also under the age of

eighteen, were present in the residence.

[13] As to Glover’s character, the trial court described her as volatile due to

destructive anger management issues. This crime happened when children

were in the home, which shows that Glover had complete disregard for what

the children could possibly observe and the long-lasting effects on them if they

witnessed this violence. There is evidence that Glover had been involved in an

altercation in the past that caused injury but was never arrested, and police had

been called to the residence on previous occasions to deal with domestic

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 7 of 8 disturbances. Glover also admitted to a police officer the night of the incident

that she “needs counseling for her anger issues but has never sought

counseling.” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 76. Glover was aware of her

propensity to become violent and angry, but she only sought out help and

treatment after she was incarcerated. Ex. Vol. 4 at 7. We conclude that

Glover’s twenty-year-sentence with two years suspended to probation is not

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character.

[14] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 8 of 8