In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FIVE
C.Y.L., ) No. ED112481 ) Respondent, ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Monroe County vs. ) Cause No. 24MN-CV00003 ) Z.L., ) Honorable Thomas Redington ) Appellant. ) Filed: April 22, 2025
Before Thomas C. Clark II, P.J., Michael E. Gardner, J., John F. Newsham, Sp. J.
Introduction
Appellant Z.L. (Appellant) appeals the Monroe County circuit court’s judgment entering
a one-year, full order of protection against him on behalf of Respondent C.Y.L. (Respondent).
He raises one point on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it entered the full order of
protection because Respondent did not present sufficient evidence showing that Appellant’s
actions constituted domestic violence under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act (the Act).1
Respondent testified about two incidents involving Appellant that occurred within a narrow time
period at her residence, one where Appellant appeared and she ordered him to leave and another
1 Sections 455.010–455.095. All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016).
1 where Appellant returned to her residence, yelling and disparaging her during a verbal
altercation.
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and vacate the one-year, full order of protection,
after finding (1) Respondent did not demonstrate that she suffered substantial emotional distress
and failed to satisfy the subjective component of harassment’s statutory definition pursuant to
Section 455.010(1)(e) and (2) Respondent did not satisfy the objective component of Section
455.010(1)(e) either because Appellant’s actions would not have caused a reasonable person to
suffer from substantial emotional distress. C.B. v. Buchheit, 254 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2008).
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 4, 2024, Respondent filed a Petition for Order of Protection-Adult claiming
Appellant harassed her. On February 7, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing which
both parties attended pro se. The following evidence was presented at the hearing:
Appellant is Respondent’s father-in-law. On January 3, 2024, Respondent’s husband
(Husband) entered into a physical altercation with his brother, Respondent’s brother-in-law
(Brother-in-Law), at the residence belonging to Husband and Respondent. Appellant was not
present during this initial encounter. At some point during their encounter, Brother-in-Law called
Appellant for assistance. Later, Appellant arrived at the residence and engaged in an altercation
with Husband. Respondent witnessed this exchange and demanded Appellant leave the property
which he did. Later, Husband left the house and traveled to the police station to report the
altercation. Meanwhile, Appellant and Brother-in-Law returned to Respondent’s residence and
attempted to take one of her vehicles but Respondent successfully secured the car keys and
2 prevented them from doing so. In response, Appellant yelled and cursed at her, calling her a
“white trash bitch,” “piece of shit mother” and “piece of shit wife.”
Subsequently, Respondent traveled to the police station where she and Husband
explained the altercation to law enforcement. She stated that Appellant and Brother-in-Law did
not physically harm her but they were physical with Husband. Her interaction with Appellant
was limited to her initial demand that he leave the property during his altercation with Husband
and the subsequent encounter when he returned to the residence and disparaged Respondent.
During the hearing, Respondent did not testify that she feared any physical harm or that
Appellant’s actions caused her substantial emotional distress. Monroe City police officer P.J.
(Officer P.J.) testified that he arrived at Respondent’s residence following the initial altercation
between Husband and Brother-in-Law and he attempted to keep them separated. He observed
Appellant arrive at the residence and enter into an altercation with Husband who eventually
pushed Appellant out of the house.
Appellant testified that Brother-in-Law called him from Respondent’s residence because
Respondent and Husband threatened to kill him. Appellant decided to travel to the house to
better understand the situation and saw Officer P.J. outside the residence when he arrived. After
Appellant entered the residence and engaged in the altercation with Husband, Respondent started
arguing with him and ordered him to leave. In response, he explained that he came to the house
because Brother-in-Law contacted him for help. Appellant further testified that animosity exists
between Respondent and him. As background, she used to live with Appellant and his wife while
she worked at his restaurant and until he fired her. Finally, Appellant testified that he does not
wish to interact with Respondent because she disparages his restaurant. After the hearing, the
3 trial court entered a one-year, full order of protection in favor of Respondent and against
Appellant. Now, Appellant appeals.
Standard of Review
We will affirm a trial court’s judgment granting a full order of protection unless
substantial evidence does not support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously
declares the law. J.R.C. v. S. L.F., 686 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (citing L.M.M. v.
J.L.G., 619 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). Substantial evidence means “competent
evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably decide the case.” Id. at 677–78 (quoting
H.R. v. Foley, 356 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)). We review “the evidence and
permissible inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.”
Bateman v. Platte Cty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Mo. banc 2012).
Trial courts “must ensure that sufficient credible evidence exists to support all elements
of the statute before entering a full order of protection” due to the potential stigma an individual
may face by being labeled a “stalker” under the Act. J.R.C., 686 S.W.3d at 678 (citing L.M.M.,
619 S.W.3d at 596). To be entitled to relief under the Act, “a petitioner must prove allegations in
a petition for an order of protection by a preponderance of the evidence.” L.A.C. v. R.A.P., 671
S.W.3d 419, 423 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).
Discussion
In his sole point on appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the
full order of protection because Respondent did not submit substantial evidence showing that his
actions constitute domestic violence, stalking or sexual assault under the Act. We agree, reverse
the trial court’s judgment and vacate the order of protection.
4 When filing a petition seeking an order of protection, a party may allege domestic
violence, stalking or sexual assault. Section 455.020. In her petition, Respondent alleged that
Appellant “harassed” her so her claim falls within the “domestic violence” category. 2 Section
455.010 defines “domestic violence” as “abuse or stalking committed by a family or household
member.” Section 455.010(5). A “family or household member” includes “any person related by
blood or marriage,” such as a father-in-law in this instance. Section 455.010(7).
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FIVE
C.Y.L., ) No. ED112481 ) Respondent, ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Monroe County vs. ) Cause No. 24MN-CV00003 ) Z.L., ) Honorable Thomas Redington ) Appellant. ) Filed: April 22, 2025
Before Thomas C. Clark II, P.J., Michael E. Gardner, J., John F. Newsham, Sp. J.
Introduction
Appellant Z.L. (Appellant) appeals the Monroe County circuit court’s judgment entering
a one-year, full order of protection against him on behalf of Respondent C.Y.L. (Respondent).
He raises one point on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it entered the full order of
protection because Respondent did not present sufficient evidence showing that Appellant’s
actions constituted domestic violence under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act (the Act).1
Respondent testified about two incidents involving Appellant that occurred within a narrow time
period at her residence, one where Appellant appeared and she ordered him to leave and another
1 Sections 455.010–455.095. All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016).
1 where Appellant returned to her residence, yelling and disparaging her during a verbal
altercation.
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and vacate the one-year, full order of protection,
after finding (1) Respondent did not demonstrate that she suffered substantial emotional distress
and failed to satisfy the subjective component of harassment’s statutory definition pursuant to
Section 455.010(1)(e) and (2) Respondent did not satisfy the objective component of Section
455.010(1)(e) either because Appellant’s actions would not have caused a reasonable person to
suffer from substantial emotional distress. C.B. v. Buchheit, 254 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2008).
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 4, 2024, Respondent filed a Petition for Order of Protection-Adult claiming
Appellant harassed her. On February 7, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing which
both parties attended pro se. The following evidence was presented at the hearing:
Appellant is Respondent’s father-in-law. On January 3, 2024, Respondent’s husband
(Husband) entered into a physical altercation with his brother, Respondent’s brother-in-law
(Brother-in-Law), at the residence belonging to Husband and Respondent. Appellant was not
present during this initial encounter. At some point during their encounter, Brother-in-Law called
Appellant for assistance. Later, Appellant arrived at the residence and engaged in an altercation
with Husband. Respondent witnessed this exchange and demanded Appellant leave the property
which he did. Later, Husband left the house and traveled to the police station to report the
altercation. Meanwhile, Appellant and Brother-in-Law returned to Respondent’s residence and
attempted to take one of her vehicles but Respondent successfully secured the car keys and
2 prevented them from doing so. In response, Appellant yelled and cursed at her, calling her a
“white trash bitch,” “piece of shit mother” and “piece of shit wife.”
Subsequently, Respondent traveled to the police station where she and Husband
explained the altercation to law enforcement. She stated that Appellant and Brother-in-Law did
not physically harm her but they were physical with Husband. Her interaction with Appellant
was limited to her initial demand that he leave the property during his altercation with Husband
and the subsequent encounter when he returned to the residence and disparaged Respondent.
During the hearing, Respondent did not testify that she feared any physical harm or that
Appellant’s actions caused her substantial emotional distress. Monroe City police officer P.J.
(Officer P.J.) testified that he arrived at Respondent’s residence following the initial altercation
between Husband and Brother-in-Law and he attempted to keep them separated. He observed
Appellant arrive at the residence and enter into an altercation with Husband who eventually
pushed Appellant out of the house.
Appellant testified that Brother-in-Law called him from Respondent’s residence because
Respondent and Husband threatened to kill him. Appellant decided to travel to the house to
better understand the situation and saw Officer P.J. outside the residence when he arrived. After
Appellant entered the residence and engaged in the altercation with Husband, Respondent started
arguing with him and ordered him to leave. In response, he explained that he came to the house
because Brother-in-Law contacted him for help. Appellant further testified that animosity exists
between Respondent and him. As background, she used to live with Appellant and his wife while
she worked at his restaurant and until he fired her. Finally, Appellant testified that he does not
wish to interact with Respondent because she disparages his restaurant. After the hearing, the
3 trial court entered a one-year, full order of protection in favor of Respondent and against
Appellant. Now, Appellant appeals.
Standard of Review
We will affirm a trial court’s judgment granting a full order of protection unless
substantial evidence does not support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously
declares the law. J.R.C. v. S. L.F., 686 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (citing L.M.M. v.
J.L.G., 619 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). Substantial evidence means “competent
evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably decide the case.” Id. at 677–78 (quoting
H.R. v. Foley, 356 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)). We review “the evidence and
permissible inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.”
Bateman v. Platte Cty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Mo. banc 2012).
Trial courts “must ensure that sufficient credible evidence exists to support all elements
of the statute before entering a full order of protection” due to the potential stigma an individual
may face by being labeled a “stalker” under the Act. J.R.C., 686 S.W.3d at 678 (citing L.M.M.,
619 S.W.3d at 596). To be entitled to relief under the Act, “a petitioner must prove allegations in
a petition for an order of protection by a preponderance of the evidence.” L.A.C. v. R.A.P., 671
S.W.3d 419, 423 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).
Discussion
In his sole point on appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the
full order of protection because Respondent did not submit substantial evidence showing that his
actions constitute domestic violence, stalking or sexual assault under the Act. We agree, reverse
the trial court’s judgment and vacate the order of protection.
4 When filing a petition seeking an order of protection, a party may allege domestic
violence, stalking or sexual assault. Section 455.020. In her petition, Respondent alleged that
Appellant “harassed” her so her claim falls within the “domestic violence” category. 2 Section
455.010 defines “domestic violence” as “abuse or stalking committed by a family or household
member.” Section 455.010(5). A “family or household member” includes “any person related by
blood or marriage,” such as a father-in-law in this instance. Section 455.010(7).
Several actions constitute “abuse” under the Act, including “harassment,” which
Respondent asserted in her petition. Section 455.010(1)(e). “Harassment” means “engaging in a
purposeful or knowing course of conduct involving more than one incident that alarms or causes
distress to an adult or child and serves no legitimate purpose.” Harassment contains both a
subjective and an objective component. Section 455.010(1)(e) (“The course of conduct must be
such as would cause a reasonable adult or child to suffer substantial emotional distress and must
actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner or child.”).
First, Respondent did not satisfy the subjective component of harassment’s statutory
definition because she never said that she suffered substantial emotional distress and she did not
present any evidence supporting that fact. Section 455.010(1)(e). Second, and equally fatal to her
case, Respondent did not satisfy the objective component of harassment’s statutory definition
either because Appellant’s actions would not have caused a reasonable person to suffer from
substantial emotional distress. She testified that Appellant yelled and called her several
disparaging names which does not alone create substantial emotional distress. His offensive
language and yelling may have caused emotional hurt but his actions must rise above general
2 In her petition, Respondent claimed Appellant harassed her, so she alleged abuse by harassment which falls under “domestic violence” within the Act’s meaning. More specifically, she did not allege stalking or sexual assault. See Sections 455.010(5) and 455.010(1)(e).
5 negative feelings to constitute substantial emotional distress. See Buchheit, 254 S.W.3d at 212.
(“[T]he offending conduct must produce a considerable or significant amount of emotional
distress in a reasonable person; something markedly greater than the level of uneasiness,
nervousness, unhappiness, or the like which are commonly experienced in day to day living.”).
Appellant’s actions share similarities with those of the appellant in Buchheit. 254 S.W.3d
210 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). In Buchheit, the appellant called the respondent explicit names, made
several negative internet posts about her, threatened to take away her daughter, threatened to file
a lawsuit and refused to leave her property until police responded. Id. at 212. The Eastern
District held that the respondent presented insufficient evidence to receive a full protection order
because the appellant’s actions “did not rise to the level of provoking a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress.” Id. at 213. Like the Buchheit appellant, Appellant called
Respondent explicit names. However, the Buchheit appellant went further by threatening to take
away the respondent’s daughter, disseminating disparaging comments on social media,
forewarning legal action and refusing to leave the respondent’s property. If this collective
conduct would not cause a reasonable person to suffer from substantial emotional distress
according to the Buchheit court, then neither can Appellant merely yelling and using disparaging
language meet this legal standard. Id. at 213. Respondent claims that Appellant threatened her in
the petition but she did not support this claim at any point during her testimony. She admitted
that her contact with Appellant was limited to a verbal altercation. The interaction between them
constitutes an intense but otherwise normal argument between two adults. The Act “was not
intended to be a solution for minor arguments between adults.” Binggeli v. Hammond, 300
S.W.3d 621, 624 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
Conclusion
6 The trial court erred when it entered the full order of protection against Appellant because
Respondent did not present sufficient evidence showing that he engaged in domestic violence
within the meaning of the Act. First, Respondent did not testify that she suffered from substantial
emotional distress, failing to satisfy the subjective component of harassment’s statutory
definition, pursuant to Section 455.010(1)(e). Second, Respondent did not satisfy the statutory
definition’s objective component either because Appellant’s actions would not have caused a
reasonable person to suffer from substantial emotional distress. Buchheit, 254 S.W.3d at 212. We
reverse the court’s judgment and vacate the one-year, full order of protection.
_______________________________ Thomas C. Clark II, P.J.
Michael E. Gardner, J., and John F. Newsham, Sp. J., concur.