IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
CYFRED, LTD., CIVIL CASE NO. CV0396-23
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID W AATIIDAD; KINASIRO K. ALBERT; RENSPER ALPET; IASINDA R. ALPET; SINIO ANIS; FLORENZO H. ATAN; THANKYOU ERAM; ROSENTA IFRAIM; SMITHER D. EZRA; SILIHNER G. FRED; DECISION AND ORDER MARGARET L. FANOWAY; MARTINA FINE DENYING MOTION TO STAY JOSEPH, Individually as the Special AND MOTION TO DISMISS Administrator of the Estate of RAINIS RAN GI, deceased; PAUL KARGON; MARTINA RUEMAU; DARIA KOSAM; JOHN LIGMAW; MARIA T. LIGMAW; MARSALA D. MARTIN; SONTAG H. MARTIN; T'NEL MORI; LYNN OTWil aka "LYNN OTIWII"; TAKASHI C. UNTUN; MARTIN RAYMOND; INOCENTA RAYMOND; ALEX H. RUBEN; FELISA B. RUBEN; KEROPIM SHAREP; TOMININA TAKEIOSHY; JENNIFER D. TAPACIO; GERRY L. TAPACIO; DIVINA VAIAU; STANLEY YANFAG; ROSEMARY YANFAG, WAYSONW.S. WONG and DOES ONE (1) through TEN (10) inclusive,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on January 23, 2025 for a Motion hearing on Plaintiffs
Motion for an Order Staying Case ("Motion"). Present was counsel for Plaintiff Cyfred, Ltd.
("Plaintiff'' or "Cyfred"), Attorney Curtis Van de Veld. Counsel for all living named Defendants DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
in this matter (the "Various Defendants"), Attorney Wayson Wong, was not present at the hearing.
Upon review of the arguments and applicable Guam law, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Before addressing the merits of Defendants' request for a stay, the Court first summarizes
the background of the related proceedings in Waathdad et al. v. Cyfred, Ltd., Superior Court of
Guam Civil Case No. CV0735-18 ("CV0735-18"), as the outcome of the pending motions in that
case directly impacts whether a stay is appropriate in this matter.
A. Background in CV0735-18
The matter in CV0735-18 involves years of litigation between Plaintiff and various
homeowners, some of whom are the Various Defendants in the present matter. Plaintiff, the
developer of the Gill-Baza Subdivision, failed to install sewer lines to lots in the subdivision that
were sold to Defendants. Waathdad v. Cyfred, Ltd. , 2024Guam612. This resulted in litigation
that was· eventually resolved through a settlement agreement. Id. Under that settlement, the
Defendants in CV0735-18 received promissory notes for additional lots, which required them to
make annual payments to Plaintiff. Id. Initially, the Defendants complied with these payment
obligations, but later ceased doing so, claiming a right to offset those payments based on fees they
believed were owed to them by Plaintiff in separate litigation. Id.
Following the non-payment, Plaintiff initiated several non-judicial foreclosures on certain
homeowners' properties, as permitted under the terms of the settlement. Id. In response, the
Defendants filed a lawsuit in CV0735-18 seeking an injunction to halt further foreclosures. Id. The
trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiff, entering judgment against the homeowners and awarding
Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs. Id. at ,r 3. The amount of fees was initially deferred due to the
2 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
homeowners' appeal, but after the Guam Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and related orders
in Waathdad v. Cyfred, Ltd., 2021 Guam 24, the trial court resumed its consideration of fees. Id.
Although the homeowners successfully argued that the trial court could not award appellate
attorney's fees, the trial court still ordered them to pay $72,282.00 in trial-level attorney's fees and
costs to Plaintiff. Id.
Shortly after this ruling, Defendants sought ex parte relief from the trial court, requesting
a stay of execution on the attorney's fees judgment. Id at ,I 4. They asked for the stay to remain
in place for one year or until a final judgment was entered in a separate civil case, Superior Court
of Guam Civil Case No. CV0425-l 8 ("CV0425-l 8"). Id. That case, notably, was not filed by the
homeowners but by their attorney, Wayson Wong, who sought payment from Plaintiff on a
promissory note given by Cyfred to him. Id. at ~ 19. The trial court denied the stay request,
concluding that none of the provisions under Guam Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 62 applied to
the motion and that there was no basis for granting a stay. Id. at 1 5.
Defendants then appealed the denial of the stay and filed an emergency motion with the
Guam Supreme Comt to halt execution of the attorney's fees judgment, which was also denied.
Id. at 1 6. In tum, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting reimbursement of appellate attorney's fees
incurred in opposing the emergency motion. Id. at 1 7. Defendants then filed a Notice of
Intervening Facts alleging fraud upon the court based on the allegation that Plaintiff concealed its
insolvency from the trial court. Id. at 1 9. Defendants filed a Motion Relief for Fraud Upon the
Court ("Motion for Relief') in CV0735-18 seeking to set aside the judgment based on the alleged
nondisclosure of insolvency. Appendix I at 2. Plaintiff objected to the notice, stating the
3 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
"allegations of fraud on the court are meritless.'' Cyfred, Ltd., 2021 Guam 24 ,r 9. As to date, a
decision has not yet been issued on Defendants' Motion for Relief.
On December 15, 2024, the Guam Supreme Court issued its Opinion holding that the trial
court does not have authority to extend staying execution of a judgment based on a separate lawsuit
involving different parties. Id. generally. Because the plaintiffs in CV0425-18 and CV0735-l 8
were not the same, the trial court lacked authority to grant the stay the homeowners requested. Id.
at ,r 22. The Guam Supreme Court stated that "Cyfred's insolvency would be relevant only if the
judgment debtor had another action pending on a disputed claim against the judgment creditor,"
in other words, Cyfred's insolvency would be relevant only if the parties were the same. Id. at ,r
21. Accordingly, the Guam Supreme Court did not consider the matter of Cyfred's insolvency. Id.
The Guam Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the stay and remanded the matter to the trial court
to determine the appropriate amount of appellate attorney's fees and court costs to be awarded to
Plaintiff. Id. at ,r 26.
B. Relevant Filings in Present Matter
On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Complaint, alleging malicious prosecution in another ' case-CV0735- 18. On July 26, 2023, the Various Defendants filed their Answer to Complaint
Demand for Jury Trial of Six.
On July 23, 2024, the Various Defendants filed a Notice of Intervening Facts That Should
Cause Proceedings in This Case To Be Stayed Temporarily ("Notice"). In response, the Plaintiff
filed an Objection to the Defendant's Notice. At the July 25, 2024 hearing, the Court informed the
Various Defendants that the Notice did not comply with the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Guam. The Court instructed the Various Defendants to
4 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cy/red, Ltd, v. David Waathdad, et al.
file a motion in compliance with the motion practice rules. See Order After Hearing (Aug. 7, 2024).
On September 12, 2024, Defendants filed a CVR 7.1 Form 5 Ex Parte Application
("Application") requesting an "[o ]rder staying this case until IO days after the Court in CV0735-
l 8 decides the appearing defendants' pending fraud on the Court motion for that case." Appl. at 1.
Alternatively, Defendants requested "dismissing this case without prejudice." Id. Attached, was
Various Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities for their Ex Parte Application for
Relief (Stay) and Declaration of Wayson W.S. Wong ("Memorandum"). The same day, the
Various Defendants filed Appendix I, Appendix II, and Appendix Ill to their Memorandum. 1
On October 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Stay or Dismiss
This Case Pending the Outcome of Defendants' Motion Re: Fraud On the Court in CV0735- l 8
("Opposi tion").
On October 24, 2024, the Various Defendants filed Various Defendants' Reply
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for a Stay; Certificate of Service ("Reply").
The Court held a hearing on the Various Defendants' Motion on April 10, 2025. Attorney
Wong was not present at the hearing. After hearing from Attorney Van de Veld on the Motion, the
Court took the matter under advisement. See Under Advisement Notice (Jan. 29, 2025). In
response, on January 29, 2025, Attorney Wong filed Various Defendants' Response to This
Court's Under Advisement Notice in which he "apologizes to the Court for failure to appear at the
hearing."
1 The Court denied the request to hear the matter ex parte and required the Various Defendants to serve the Application on the Plaintiff. The Court also denied the Various Defendants' request to hear the matter on an expedited basis and required the Various Defendants to submit a CVR 7.1 Form 1. 5 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
On April 16, 2025, the Court held a status hearing to address matters separate from the
Motion. 2 Attorney Wong represented to the Court that he filed a second motion for fraud in
CV0735-18 that, if granted, would also be determinative in the Plaintiffs present malicious
prosecution claims. Min. Entry at 9:24 AM (Apr. 16, 2025).
Following the status hearing, the Various Defendants filed a Notice oflncorrect Statements
by Attorney Curtis Van de Veld at the Status Conference Held Today ("April 16, 2025 Notice").
DISCUSSION
The Various Defendants argue that this matter should be stayed because they filed a Motion
for Relief for Fraud Upon This Court ("Motion for Relief') in CV0735-l 8 that if granted, would
set aside the judgment in that matter and dispose of a key element of Plaintiffs malicious
prosecution claim-that the proceeding was terminated in the Various Defendant's favor. 3
Memorandum at 1. Alternatively, the Various Defendants request that the Court dismiss the case
without prejudice because Plaintiff "cannot show it is entitled to proceed with its malicious
prosecution claims because it cannot show it can prove the required element that the underlying
case was terminated in its favor." Id. at 3.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that the Motion for Relief is a "groundless effort" that
2 On March 13, 2025, Plaintiff issued a summons to name and serve defendants previously identified as
DOE defendants. In response, on April 4, 2025, Attorney Wong filed Defendant Wayson W.S. Wong's Answer to Complaint; Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. Attached as Exhibit A was Various Defendants' second motion for relief for fraud in CV0735-l 8. See Def. Wayson W.S. Wong's Ans. Compl., Ex. A (Apr. 4, 2025). On April 7, 2025, Attorney Wong filed First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint; Redemand for Jury Trial of Six which also included Various Defendants' second motion for relief for fraud in CV0735- I 8 as Exhibit A. 3 "A plaintiff must plead and prove three elements to establish the tort of malicious prosecution: a lawsuit
(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice." Nunez v. Pennisi, 241 Cal. App. 4th 861, 872-73 (2015). 6 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
seeks to "delay and frustrate the progress of this case." Opp'n at 2.
A. A Stay Is Not Appropriate Here
As the Guam Supreme Court has recognized, "the power to stay proceedings is incidental
to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself for counsel, and for litigants." Perez v. Monkeypod Enters.,
2022 Guam 12 ,r 27 (quoting Landis v. N Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,256 (1936)). As an extension of
this principle, other courts have recognized their "inherent power to stay proceedings pending a
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in another case." Lair v. Murray, 871 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1068
(D. Mont. 2012). Other courts have likewise recognized the power to stay proceedings in one case
pending the decision in a "bellwether" case, as waiting on the latter decision "can serve to winnow
and sharpen" the instant case. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. AmerisourceBergen
Corp., 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 400, 411 (Ct. App. 2022). The Court therefore finds it has the power to
stay these proceedings; the only question is whether a stay is appropriate under the circumstances.
In determining the appropriateness of a stay, the burden of proof belongs to the party
requesting the stay; here, to the Various Defendants. See United States v. Guam, 2013 WL 5809289
* 7 (D. Guam Oct. 29, 2013); see also Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 ("the suppliant for a stay must make
out a clear case of hardship or inequity to go forward[.]"). Generally, it is appropriate to grant a
stay "when doing so would serve some legitimate interest of the parties or the court." Fujikawa v.
Gushiken, 823 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987). But since the interests of the parties and/or the
court are not always in harmony, a balancing of interests is often required. As the Ninth Circuit
has explained:
Where it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal ·
7 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
to grant a stay must be weighed. Among these competing interests are the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.
CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55); see
also Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477,480 (9th Cir. 2001)("[w]e evaluate stay requests under the
same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive
relief.").
Therefore, in evaluating the Various Defendants' Motion, the Court considers (1) a threat
of irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on merits; (3) whether the injunction will
substantially injure other parties in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. See
Benavente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 20,, 15. "The first two factors of the traditional standard are
the most critical." Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,434 (2009).
1. Threat of Irreparable Harm
The Various Defendants argue that staying the proceedings would "avoid immediate and
irreparable harm" because "[they] would avoid the substantial undue burden and expense of
responding to discovery requests that are not valid or premature or responding to the motion to
amend which also would be premature and/or incomplete .... " Appl. at 1.
The "key word in this consideration is irreparable." PlayUp, Inc. v. Mintas, 635 F. Supp.
3d 1087, 1103 (D. Nev. 2022). "Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and
energy necessarily expended . .. are not enough." Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1008 (9 th
Cir. 2020)(quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)). "Ample case law finds that the
burden of meeting one's discovery obligations does not generally constitute irreparable injury."
8 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
PlayUp, Inc. 635 F. Supp. 3d at 1103; see also Agerkop v. Sisyphian LLC, No. CV 19-10414-
CBM, 2021 WL 4348734, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2021 ).
The Court finds that Defendants have not shown a credible threat of irreparable harm. Their
claimed injury of being required to respond to discovery is not a legal injury but a standard part of
litigation. Courts have consistently held that "[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and
unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury." F. TC. v. Standard Oil Co. ofCalifornia,
449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)(quoting Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. I,
24 (1974)). Defendants provide no evidence that such burdens are exceptional. Thus, the Various
Defendants' assertion of harm stemming from discovery obligations amounts to a standard
litigation burden, not an irreparable injury.
Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in the Various Defendants' favor.
2. Likelihood of Success on Merits
a. Various Defendants' First Motion for Fraud
The Various Defendants assert that they "have a good chance" of having their pending
Motion for Relief granted in CV0735-18. Memorandum at 1. The Various Defendants "referenced
and invited this Court to review their pending motion, its supporting m(;morandum, Cyfred's
opposition to it and their reply memorandum" filed as Appendices I-III. Id at 2.
The Various Defendants claim that Plaintiff concealed a significant liability-a
confidential arrangement to pay attorney's fees. Reply at 3. If disclosed, the Various Defendants
argue this would have precluded summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor. Id. The Various
Defendants contend that this alleged nondisclosure constitutes a fraud on the court sufficient to set
aside the judgment, thus undermining an essential element of Plaintiffs malicious prosecution
9 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
claim. Id
Plaintiff counters that the Various Defendants' motion for fraud on the court is entirely
speculative and "baseless." Reply at 3. Plaintiff points out that the Various Defendants allegations
of fraud rely on facts that were already known or readily available to the Various Defendants'
counsel during the underlying CV0735-18 proceedings. Id
In his Reply memorandum in CV0735-18, Wong asserts that he was aware of the fee
arrangement, but that he had "forgot about it by 2019" and did not know whether it had been
"satisfied, expired or resolved in some other way" during the summary judgment proceedings.
Appendix III at 10. He emphasizes that the fraud only became clear to him in 2024, when
declarations by Cyfred and its counsel revealed that Cyfred had entered into the payment
arrangements that are the basis of the fraud. Id. at 2-3.
In seeking to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, it is the moving party's burden
to clearly demonstrate that a stay is warranted, including by establishing a likelihood of success
on the merits. Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34 ("The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing
that the circumstances justify an exercise of [judicial] discretion.").
Setting aside a judgment is a difficult and exceptional remedy, subject to strict legal
standards. Courts are generally hesitant to disturb final judgments, recognizing the need for finality
in litigation. Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006)("Fraud on
the court should be read narrowly, in the interest of preserving the finality of judgments.)
As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "Rule 60(b)( 6) has been used sparingly as an equitable
remedy to prevent manifest injustice. The rule is to be utilized only [in] extraordinary
circumstances .... " United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co ., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
1993). The legal grounds for setting aside a judgment are typically limited to very specific and
serious issues, such as fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60.
Fraud on the court is "tightly construed" because the consequences are severe. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). 4 "When alleging a claim of fraud on the court, the plaintiff must show by clear and
convincing evidence that there was fraud on the court, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of
the finality of the judgment." Weese v. Schukman, 98 F .3d 542, 552 ( I 0th Cir. 1996). "[O]nly the
most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of
evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated will constitute a fraud on the court. Less
egregious misconduct, such as nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly pertinent to the matter
before it, will not ordinarily rise to the level of fraud on the court." Id.; see also Moore's Federal
Practice ,i 60.33, at 60-360 (noting that fraud on the court should "embrace only that species of
fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated
by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its
impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication").
Moreover, because the burden of proof is by "clear and convincing evidence," the party
seeking to set aside the judgment must provide strong, unequivocal evidence that the fraud "must
involve egregious conduct, such as an unconscionable plan or scheme designed to improperly
influence the court in its decision." Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1104.
Based on this standard, the Various Defendants' argument appears tenuous. Merely
4 Rule 60(b)of the GRCP is modeled after its federal counterpart. Guam R. Civ. P. 60, SOURCE. Thus, federal interpretations of the analogous federal procedural rule are persuasive for guidance. M Electric C01p. v. Phil-Gets (Guam) Int'! Trading Corp., 2016 Guam 35 ,r 25, n. l ("[F]ederal decisions construing rules from which our own are derived are persuasive authority."). 11 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
showing that information was not disclosed is generally insufficient to establish fraud on the court,
especially if Plaintiff was correct that the information was known or available to the opposing
party. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that fraud upon the court must involve an
"unconscionable plan or scheme to improperly influence the court's decision." See id. The failure
to disclose certain facts, without evidence of a deliberate attempt to deceive or manipulate the
judicial process, does not meet this high threshold. See Schukman, 98 F.3d at 552 (finding that
nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly pertinent to the matter before it does not rise to the
level of fraud on the court). The Various Defendants emphasized that "the fraud on the Court was
attorney Van de veld's [sic] failure to inform the Court of that liability during the 2019 summary
judgment proceedings." Memorandum at 3. Such nondisclosure, even if proven, does not present
the sort of extraordinary misconduct required to set aside a judgment.
Given that a motion to set aside a final judgment for fraud upon the court is an extraordinary
remedy that is rarely granted, and the nature of the Various Defendants' claim, the Court finds the
likelihood of success on the merits is unlikely. Because the Various Defendants' argument rests
solely on allegations of nondisclosure, rather than intentional corruption of the court's decision-
making process, the Court need not address the merits of the alleged nondisclosure of insolvency
further. As such, this factor weighs in favor of denying a stay.
b. Various Defendants' Second Motion for Fraud
At the April 16, 2025 status hearing, the Various Defendants noted to the Court that a
second motion for fraud upon the court was filed in CV0735-18. Min. Entry at 9:24 AM (Apr. 16,
2025). Yet the Various Defendants did not explain the substantive arguments in the pending
motion, nor did the Various Defendants request an opportunity to file additional briefing to the
12 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
Court. 5 The Court does not take judicial notice of arguments in pleadings. See GRE Rule 201 (f).
"In taking judicial notice, a court may only take judicial notice of the truth of facts in certain
documents, including past court orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments."
In Re NA., 2001 Guam 7, ,r 58, (citation omitted). "As for all other submissions in the file, the
court should only take judicial notice of the fact of their existence, and not the truth of the facts
within". Id.
Here, the Various Defendants have not satisfied the burden of establishing a likelihood of
success. Rather than presenting any substantive argument, the Various Defendants merely attached
briefing from an entirely different case as an exhibit to their pleadings, to an Answer and First
Amended Counterclaim, and offered the conclusory assertion that this matter had "an even greater
chance" of success. This conclusory statement, without any reasoned explanation or citation to
authority, fails to meet the required standard.
Courts are not obligated to scour the record, read and interpret motions filed before another
judge in a different matter, in an attempt to locate arguments or evidence on behalf of a party. See
United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead, the movant must point to
specific evidence and explain why that evidence demonstrates a likelihood of success on the
merits. Simply referencing other filings without meaningful analysis is insufficient.
Therefore, Defendants have not met their burden in demonstrating this factor.
3. Substantial Injury to Other Party and Public Interest
Because Defendants fail to establish either sufficient likelihood of success or sufficient
5 The Court noted at the hearing and in its previous decision, that it can take judicial notice of what was
filed, but cannot take judicial notice of the substance within the documents, except as allowed by rule or case law. Min. Entry at 9:26 AM (Apr. 16, 2025); see also Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reassign this Case to Judge Elyze M. Iriarte (June 24, 2024). 13 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cy/red, Ltd., v. David Waathdad, et al.
probability of irreparable harm, it is unnecessary to address the remaining factors. See Mount
Graham Coal. v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 558 (9th Cir. 1996)(Because there was no likelihood of
success on the merits and irreparable harm, "we need not address the balance of equities or
comparison of hardships involved in the granting or denial of the stay"); see also PlayUp, Inc.,
635 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 ("Because Counter-Defendants fail to establish either sufficient likelihood
of success or sufficient probability of irreparable harm, it is unnecessary to address the remaining
factors ."). However, the Court will briefly address the other factors.
At the motion hearing, when asked about whether Plaintiff would suffer substantial injury
should a stay be granted, Attorney Van de Veld stated, "I may not survive this case. I have duties
and obligations to Cyfred and they have obligations to me." Min. Entry at 10:39 AM (Jan. 23,
2025).
Attorney Van de Veld is not a party in the matter, and financial injury to him personally is
not a fact that the Court considers. Rather, the Court considers whether his client, Plaintiff Cyfred,
would suffer substantial injury.
Here, it is unlikely that Plaintiff would suffer substantial injury either if this matter was
stayed. Plaintiffs only injury would be the time delay in litigating the matters, which is not a
substantial injury-it is the consequence of any stay granted and is the very nature of a stay. See
Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2020)(substantial injury found where movant city
described significant harm to governmental entities, such as loss of state and local taxes paid by
immigrants and detrimental effects on job sectors that disproportionately employed immigrants);
OrthoAccel Techs., Inc. v. Propel Orthodontics, LLC, No. 4:16-CV-00350-ALM, 2017 WL
3671862, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 20 l 7)(substantial injury found because a stay would perpetuate
14 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cy/red, Ltd. , v. David Waathdad, et al.
either false advertising or anticompetitive behavior); Moreau v. White, No. 4:24-CV-857, 2025
WL 299250, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2025)(substantial injury found where a stay would delay a
mother's reunification with her children and disrupt the children's education and stability).
As to the public's interest, Plaintiff argues that the stay should be denied as a matter of
policy because Defendants seek to use the motions to "prevent or delay any kind of redress for
their malicious actions." Reply at 2.
Considerations ofjudicial economy are important. Both parties, as well as the court system,
would benefit from a speedy resolution. However, if the Court denies the stay and allows this case
to proceed at the same time as the pending motions in that matter, the Court and the parties may
waste time and resources litigating an issue that could become moot if either of the pending
motions in CV0735-l 8 is granted. The inefficient use of resources may be avoided by briefly
staying these proceedings. See Cholipski v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 16 N.E.3d 345, 352 (IIl. Ct.
App. 2014). Thus, while the public interest factor only weakly favors a stay considering that the
Court did not find likelihood of success on the merits, it nonetheless weighs slightly in the Various
Defendants' favor.
However, since the first two factors are not met, the Court finds that the Motion should be
denied.
B. Motion to Dismiss Is Denied
The Various Defendants' Motion is deficient because it fails to cite any applicable Guam
law or procedural rule in support of dismissal. Instead, the Various Defendants merely assert,
without any legal authority, that Plaintiff "cannot show it can prove the required element that the
underlying case was terminated in its favor." Memorandum at 3.
15 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS CV0396-23; Cyfred, Ltd, v. David Waathdad, et al.
Conclusory arguments unsupported by citation to relevant authority are insufficient
grounds.for dismissal. See Danko v. Cline, No . .2 CA-CV 2024-0244, 2025 WL 18649, at *2 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2025)("Argm;nents that are not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the
record, or authority" are deemed waived."); See In re Argon Credit; LLC, 596 B.R. 882,889 (N.D.
Ill. 2019)("It offers no authority in support of its argument. The court therefore does not consider
the argument.").
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Vario~s Defendants have not met their burden to
demonstrate that dismissal is warranted at this stage.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Various Defendants' Motion is DENIED.
so ORDERED: --H-A,+-Y-ff-o-2--.tl10-2s-