RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3321-24
C.V.O., III,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D.A.O., ESTATE OF C.V.O., JR., and ESTATE OF G.A.O.,
Defendants-Respondents. __________________________
Argued December 16, 2025 – Decided January 5, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-3924-21.
Michael R. Napolitano argued the cause for appellant C.V.O., III (Fuggi Law Firm, PC, attorneys; Robert R. Fuggi, Jr., of counsel; Michael R. Napolitano, on the brief).
1 We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38- 3(c)(9); N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f)(1). Patrick B. Minter argued the cause for respondent Estate of C.V.O., Jr. (Donnelly Minter & Kelly, LLC, attorneys; Patrick B. Minter, of counsel and on the brief; Thomas J. Coffey, on the brief).
Brian W. Shaffer argued the cause for respondent Estate of G.A.O. (Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, attorneys; Brian W. Shaffer, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On leave granted, plaintiff John Doe appeals from the Law Division's
March 18, 2025 order granting defendants, his deceased parents' estates, the
Estate of C.V.O., Jr. and the Estate of G.A.O. (collectively, the Estates), motions
to dismiss Doe's complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule
4:6-2(e), and May 7, 2025 order denying reconsideration.2 The motion court
granted the Estates' motion to dismiss Doe's claims, finding Doe had previously
entered a global settlement agreement (GSA), which released claims against the
Estates. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, we
affirm.
2 We note Doe does not challenge the portion of the motion court's March 18 order granting D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss Doe's complaint with prejudice. A-3321-24 2 I.
We limit our recitation of the facts to the issue raised in this appeal, as we
presume the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history detailed in
our prior opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the first motion court's
order dismissing Doe's complaint for failure to state a claim. See Doe v. Est. of
C.V.O., 477 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 257 N.J. 232, 257
N.J. 242, and 257 N.J. 259 (2024).
In November 2021, Doe filed a complaint against the Estates alleging:
violations of the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1;
negligence; gross negligence; and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He
primarily alleged his parents failed to prevent the sexual abuse his minor sister,
D.A.O., committed against him. In January 2022, the Estates moved to dismiss
the complaint in lieu of filing an answer, which the first motion court granted in
March 2022. The Estate of C.V.O., Jr.'s motion did not raise the GSA's release
as grounds for dismissal.
Doe alleged D.A.O. sexually abused him multiple times when he was nine
or ten years old, and the abuse began in either 1964 or 1965. His mother,
G.A.O., and father, C.V.O., Jr., would leave him alone with D.A.O., which he
alleged enabled her to sexually abuse him. While D.A.O. was allegedly sexually
A-3321-24 3 abusing Doe, he "reported to his mother that [D.A.O.] was engaging in conduct
that he did not like and described specifically the actions." Est. of C.V.O., 477
N.J. Super. at 50. Doe also "wrote a letter to his father describing" D.A.O.'s
alleged sexual abuse. Ibid. Doe maintained his parents "knew or should have
known that [D.A.O.] was sexually abusing" him. Ibid. He alleged that while
his parents had "actual knowledge" of the sexual abuse, neither prevented it.
Ibid. In approximately 2010, Doe "discussed with his parents 'the effect of
[D.A.O.'s] abuse,'" and in 2017, Doe notified his prior counsel of the sexual
abuse in an unrelated lawsuit. Ibid. Doe additionally informed his prior counsel
at a consultation about D.A.O.'s alleged sexual abuse and expressed it was "a
major issue affecting his mental health and instilling in him fear of his sister."
While C.V.O., Jr. was alive, Doe had filed a lawsuit "related to the affairs
of [C.V.O., Jr.,] which . . . was dismissed." After C.V.O., Jr.'s death in May
2014, Doe had filed multiple actions in the Chancery Division against the Estate
of C.V.O., Jr. and D.A.O. Doe "filed a caveat in the Union County Surrogate's
Court seeking to block the probate of" C.V.O., Jr.'s will. "[T]he Executor of the
Estate of" C.V.O., Jr. requested Doe's "voluntary withdrawal of the caveat,
which . . . was denied." Thereafter, "the [e]xecutors of the Will filed an [o]rder
to [s]how [c]ause and [v]erified [c]omplaint seeking probate of the Will." Doe
A-3321-24 4 filed an answer, defenses, and counterclaims. The Chancery Division dismissed
the probate action, but Doe proceeded on certain counterclaims, filing a new
complaint against D.A.O.
To facilitate a global resolution of Doe's claims, in 2017, G.A.O. agreed
to conditionally gift $1,300,000 each to Doe and D.A.O. if Doe agreed to settle
his claims. Doe, his children, his spouse, D.A.O., and her children entered the
GSA, which Doe signed on September 5, 2017. The GSA noted Doe's lawsuits,
including his earlier lawsuit while C.V.O., Jr. was alive.
The first page of the GSA references that C.V.O., Jr. "executed a Will
dated June 4, 2013, which in substantial part conveyed his assets to the then
serving trustees of the Amended and Restated [C.V.O., Jr.] Revocable Living
Trust" (C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust). "Albert Dill qualified as Executor of
[C.V.O., Jr.'s] Will (the Executor)," and "Dill and . . . Bank of America, NA, are
the serving co-trustees of the [C.V.O., Jr.] Revocable Trust." With respect to
the C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust, the GSA explains, it is to be "divided into two
equal separate share trusts, one for the benefit of [D.A.O.], and one for the
benefit of [Doe], provided that they both survive" G.A.O.
Under the GSA, Doe released the following claims:
Except for any action or proceeding to enforce any obligation arising out of or in connection with th[e]
A-3321-24 5 Agreement, [Doe] . . . release[s], relinquish[es], surrender[s], disclaim[s] and forever discharge[s]: (i) [G.A.O.], (ii) [D.A.O.], . . . (vi) Albert Dill, as Executor and Co-Trustee of the [C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust], (vii) Bank of America . . . as co-Trustee of the [C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust] . . . each individually and in their fiduciary capacity, from any and all actions, claims, proceedings, counterclaims, third-party claims, rights, interests, at law or in equity, now existing or whenever arising, direct, indirect, derivative, present or contingent, including any and all liabilities, damages, demands, costs, expenses, fees, including attorneys' fees, known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, liquidated or unliquidated, arising under federal, state or local laws, rules, regulations or ordinances, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, that he, his heirs, distributees, virtual representatives, representatives, successors or assigns ever had, now has or may have as of the Effective Date, including without limitation those that arise out of or relate in any way to (i) the Subject Litigation, (ii) the administration of the Estate of [C.V.O., Jr.], (iii) the administration of the Revocable Trust, and continuing trusts created thereunder, . . . (v) th[e] Agreement; (vi) [D.A.O. and her children]; and (vii) [G.A.O.] and the conditional inter vivos gifts contemplated herein.
[(Emphasis added).]
The GSA provides that each party confirmed they had the following: "an
opportunity to discuss th[e] Agreement with legal counsel and/or professional
advisors of their choosing"; "fully underst[ood] the terms of th[e] Agreement";
and executed the "Agreement voluntarily with the intent to be bound by its
terms." Specifically, Doe acknowledged his agreement and "that he ha[d]
A-3321-24 6 consulted with . . . counsel of his own selection, in connection with th[e]
Agreement." The GSA states that nothing contained in the releases "shall serve
to release any and all claims that any of the enumerated parties may have in the
future after the [GSA's] execution."
After the GSA was presented to the Chancery Division, Doe and D.A.O.
placed their agreement to the settlement terms on the record. While under oath,
Doe acknowledged to the court that he had done the following: read the GSA;
understood the GSA; voluntarily entered the GSA; discussed the GSA with his
attorney, who he was satisfied with and who answered all his questions; and
entered the agreement not having been forced or threatened in any way. As
G.A.O. was not a party to the GSA, she did not sign it, but she gifted Doe the
agreed upon $1,300,000. She later passed away in March 2021.
Doe filed the present complaint in November 2021. After our remand to
the trial court for further proceedings, the Estates each filed answers in October
2023. The Estates and Doe petitioned for certification to our Supreme Court,
which was denied in May 2024.
On September 12, 2024, Doe filed an amended complaint, adding D.A.O.
as a direct defendant and vicarious liability claims against the Estates. On
October 2, the Estates moved to dismiss the vicarious liability claims in lieu of
A-3321-24 7 filing an amended answer, which a second motion court denied on November
22. On November 11, 2024, D.A.O. had also moved to dismiss in lieu of filing
an answer, arguing the GSA's release barred Doe's claims against her. In
December, the Estates cross-moved to dismiss, arguing the GSA's release barred
Doe's claims against the Estates.
On March 18, 2025, a third motion court entered an order and
accompanying letter opinion granting D.A.O.'s and the Estates' motions to
dismiss. The court found the GSA was a relevant "public record" because the
GSA was marked as an exhibit before the Chancery Division, and Doe and
D.A.O. each "allocuted their understanding and assent to the GSA on the record
in the [Chancery Division] action." It determined "the GSA and the general
release contained therein bars all of [Doe's] claims against . . . the Estates"
because of the following: Doe "knowingly and voluntarily signed the GSA";
Doe was aware of D.A.O.'s alleged sexual abuse before entering the GSA and
acknowledged earlier discussions about the abuse with his parents; Doe "agreed
to release [the Estates] from 'any and all actions,' which . . . include[d] the tort
action"; "the GSA covers all claims which are predicated on past events—even
if those claims have not yet accrued" because it releases "any . . . claims . . . at
law or in equity, now existing or whenever arising"; the GSA is not an
A-3321-24 8 exculpatory contract, as "it does not release tortious conduct that may occur in
the future"; and there was no exception to precedent that settlement agreements
and general releases should be honored. Regarding the application of the
doctrine of laches, the court determined "[t]he Estates [we]re not prevented by
laches in moving to dismiss based on the GSA," as there was no "unexplainable
and inexcusable delay by the Estates nor . . . [did Doe] establish the requisite
prejudice."
In April 2025, Doe moved for reconsideration on the limited issue of
whether the GSA's release barred Doe's claims against the Estate of C.V.O., Jr.
On May 7, the third motion court denied reconsideration, finding that "[a]t the
time that the release was executed, the only party to be released that was
deceased was C.V.O., Jr.," and the parties to the GSA "named the executor and
[co-]trustees of the estate, rather than include C.V.O., Jr. or his estate by name."
The court reasoned that the GSA's plain text demonstrates the parties released
each of the fiduciaries personally and as representatives of the Estate of C.V.O.,
Jr. and C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust, respectively.
On appeal, Doe argues the third motion court erred in granting the Estate
of C.V.O., Jr.'s motion to dismiss his complaint because of the following: the
co-trustees of the C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust owed him fiduciary duties, which
A-3321-24 9 required them to preserve the family trusts and raise the GSA without delay; the
doctrine of laches bars the Estates' GSA release defenses, as the delayed
assertion of the defenses was "overwhelmingly attributable" to the Estates'
unjustifiable conduct, caused him harm, and was unsupported by law; and
pursuant to the GSA's plain text, Doe did not release C.V.O., Jr. or the Estate of
C.V.O., Jr., and Doe only released the Estate of C.V.O., Jr.'s fiduciaries "by
virtue of [Doe's] status as a contingent beneficiary under the Trust Agreement ."
II.
We review de novo a trial court's order dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). See
Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021). "A pleading
should be dismissed if it states no basis for relief and discovery would not
provide one." Arsenis v. Borough of Bernardsville, 476 N.J. Super. 195, 205
(App. Div. 2023) (quoting Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone,
423 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011)).
Courts may consider documents specifically referenced in the complaint
"without converting the motion into one for summary judgment." Myska v. N.J.
Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 482 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting E. Dickerson
& Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 361 N.J. Super. 362, 365 n.1 (App. Div.
A-3321-24 10 2003), aff'd, 179 N.J. 500 (2004)). "In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts
consider 'allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.'" Ibid.
(quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005)).
"In the absence of a factual dispute, the interpretation and enforcement of
a contract, including a settlement agreement, is subject to de novo review by the
appellate court." Savage v. Township of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 306
(App. Div. 2022), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 257 N.J. 204
(2024). The reviewing court must "determine 'the intention of the parties to the
contract as revealed by the language used [by them.]'" Globe Motor Co. v.
Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 483 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Lederman v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div.
2006)). "A court's role is to consider what is 'written in the context of the
circumstances' at the time of drafting and to apply 'a rational meaning in keeping
with the expressed general purpose.'" Cottrell v. Holtzberg, 468 N.J. Super. 59,
72 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5-6 (2011)). "The
burden of proving that the parties entered into a settlement agreement is upon
the party seeking to enforce the settlement." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. N.J.
Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016).
A-3321-24 11 "An agreement to settle litigation is 'governed by [the general] principles
of contract law.'" Globe Motor Co., 225 N.J. at 482 (alteration in original)
(quoting Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 600-01 (2008)). In
furtherance of the strong policy of enforcing settlements, "we 'strain to give
effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'" Capparelli v. Lopatin,
459 N.J. Super. 584, 603 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Brundage, 195 N.J. at 601).
"[A]ny action which would have the effect of vitiating the provisions of a
particular settlement agreement and the concomitant effect of undermining
public confidence in the settlement process in general, should not be
countenanced." Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 396 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App.
Div. 2007) (quoting Isetts v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 254
(App. Div. 2003)).
In interpreting a plaintiff's settlement agreement's waiver and release that
"any and all claims, rights, actions[,] and causes of action of any kind, both at
law and equity, which he has, had or may have had against" a defendant, we held
the plain meaning of "the release's critical . . . phrase 'any and all' allows for no
exception" with respect to the "types of things" included after the phrase. Isetts,
364 N.J. Super. at 255-56. "[T]he word 'any' clearly may and should be
interpreted as meaning 'all or every.'" Id. at 256 (quoting Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
A-3321-24 12 Interstate Ins. Co., 28 N.J. Super. 81, 91 (App. Div. 1953)). Generally, a
plaintiff surrenders only "any and all" of his existing "claims, rights, actions[,]
and causes of action." Ibid. "Settlements will usually be honored . . . . 'absent
a demonstration of "fraud or other compelling circumstances."'" Brundage, 195
N.J. at 601 (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div.
1983)).
"To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the expression of the terms
of a settlement agreement, a hearing may be necessary to discern the intent of
the parties at the time the agreement was entered and to implement that intent."
Capparelli, 459 N.J. Super. at 604 (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45
(2016)). However, a court reviewing "a disputed motion to enforce a settlement"
is not required to hold a hearing if "the available competent evidence, considered
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, is insufficient to permit the
[court] . . . to resolve the disputed factual issues in favor of the non -moving
party." Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-75 (App. Div. 1997).
III.
A. GSA Release
We first address Doe's contention that the court erred in dismissing his
complaint against the Estate of C.V.O., Jr., because it misinterpreted the GSA's
A-3321-24 13 release provisions. Doe acknowledges in his merits brief that the GSA identifies
Dill as the executor, recognizes Dill and Bank of America as "the [co-]trustees[,]
and discusses the purposes of the Trust Agreement." Although the GSA names
the executor and co-trustees, Doe contends there was no "express release in
favor of C.V.O., Jr." or the "Estate of C.V.O., Jr." Stated another way, he argues
the GSA's release of the Estate of C.V.O., Jr.'s executor and the C.V.O., Jr.
Revocable Trust's co-trustees cannot be interpreted as a release of C.V.O., Jr. or
the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. because the GSA's release does not separately name the
latter two. After our de novo review of the record, we are unpersuaded.
The third motion court found the GSA's release barred "all of [Doe's]
claims against" the Estate of C.V.O. Jr. As the court correctly noted, the GSA's
plain language releases Dill as executor of the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. and co-
trustee of the C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust. Further, the GSA plainly releases
Bank of America as the co-trustee of the C.V.O., Jr. Revocable Trust. Under
the GSA, Doe specifically released Dill and Bank of America "in their fiduciary
capacity" as administrators of the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. and the C.V.O., Jr.
Revocable Trust.
It is irrefutable that the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. and C.V.O., Jr. Revocable
Trust are legally created entities that effectuate C.V.O., Jr.'s estate in his stead.
A-3321-24 14 It is well-established that an estate, through its executors or administrators,
stands in the place of a decedent as to any timely filed claims. See N.J.S.A.
3B:10-25 ("[A] personal representative of a decedent . . . has the same standing
to . . . be sued in the courts of this State and the courts of any other jurisdiction
as his decedent had immediately prior to death."); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:15-4
(stating a plaintiff may pursue a claim against a decedent's estate as a
"person . . . shall have and may maintain the same action against the executors
or administrators of such testator . . . as he or they might have had or maintained
against the testator"). Further, it is well-recognized that executors in
administrating an estate are empowered "[t]o execute and deliver agreements,
assignments, bills of sale, contracts, deeds, notes, receipts, and any other
instrument necessary or appropriate for the administration of the estate or trust."
N.J.S.A. 3B:14-23(q). Thus, Dill and Bank of America stood in the Estate of
C.V.O., Jr.'s place.
Doe clearly recognized when entering the GSA that any cognizable claims
against C.V.O., Jr. had to be raised against the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. and directed
to its fiduciaries. This is evidenced by the GSA's acknowledgement that "Dill
qualified as [e]xecutor of C.V.O., Jr.'s" estate. As the court correctly stated,
"The inclusion of their official, fiduciary duties within the scope of the release
A-3321-24 15 cannot be interpreted to mean anything other tha[n] [Doe] was releasing claims
against the beneficiary: the [E]state" of C.V.O., Jr.
Doe concedes the parties entered the GSA "to resolve disputes over" the
Estate of C.V.O.'s "asset distribution and estate planning . . . in connection with
earlier Chancery Division [law]suits." He specifically admits the parties entered
the GSA after he filed the probate litigation related to his father's estate, and the
GSA was intended "to resolve disputes over the Will and Trust Agreement of
C.V.O., Jr." As particularly memorialized in the GSA, Doe entered the GSA to
settle his claims at the time against D.A.O. and issues surrounding "the estate
plan of C.V.O., Jr," as administered by the executor. Therefore, pursuant to the
GSA's plain language, Doe released his known claims against the Estate of
C.V.O., Jr.'s fiduciaries—the executor and co-trustees—which effectively
released Doe's claims against the Estate of C.V.O., Jr.
We also reject Doe's argument that dismissal of his claims pursuant to the
GSA is unwarranted because his sexual abuse claims were unknown or
unaccrued at the time he signed the GSA. He posits that the GSA does not
"apply to unaccrued child sexual abuse claims as a matter of public policy." In
other words, Doe asserts his current claims against C.V.O., Jr., or the Estate of
A-3321-24 16 C.V.O., Jr., survive because they were potentially not cognizable at the time he
entered the GSA.
At the time Doe entered the GSA, we had long recognized that "[b]ecause
of the unique nature of sexual abuse, which may only be discovered by an adult
victim after years of repression, . . . a civil suit for sexual abuse shall accrue at
the time of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the
act of sexual abuse." Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 112 (2006)
(alteration in original) (quoting S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 257, at 4
(Feb. 24, 1992), as reprinted in N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(b)); see also D.M. v. River
Dell Reg'l High Sch., 373 N.J. Super. 639, 646 (App. Div. 2004) (stating
"plaintiffs may have a conscious memory of the sexual abuse, but may not have
reasonably discovered that the serious psychological and mental illness injury
they suffer from was caused by that sexual abuse") (quoting J.L. v. J.F., 317 N.J.
Super. 418, 434 (App. Div. 1999)). Therefore, under the discovery rule, Doe
could have filed his claims related to D.A.O.'s sexual abuse once he realized his
injuries. While a material issue of fact regarding Doe's discovery of the harm
may have existed when he entered the GSA, he is still charged with knowledge
of his potential claim because the GSA releases any tort action "known or
unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, . . . that he, . . . ever had, now has or may
A-3321-24 17 have as of the Effective Date" of the GSA "without limitation . . . that arise[s]
out of or relate[s] in any way to . . . the administration of the Estate of [C.V.O.,
Jr.]." Doe did not preserve any claim. Thus, under the GSA, Doe
unconditionally released claims arising from events that occurred before the
parties entered the GSA.
We agree with Doe's assertion that New Jersey's public policy strongly
favors affording sexual abuse victims the opportunity to bring claims . The
Legislature has clearly stated its "desire to expand the rights of victims of sexual
assaults and other sexual misconduct." E.C. by D.C. v. Inglima-Donaldson, 470
N.J. Super. 41, 47 (App. Div. 2021). That does not, however, thwart the
enforcement of the GSA, under which Doe released any then-existing claims,
whether known or unknown, in exchange for G.A.O.'s $1,300,000 payment. We
note that Doe did not request to void the GSA settlement as against public policy
but only to limit the application of its release, which he knowingly entered.
For these reasons, we discern no reason to disturb the court's dismissal of
Doe's claims against the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. pursuant to the GSA's release.
B. Laches
Doe next contends the court abused its discretion in failing to apply the
doctrine of laches to bar the Estates' motions to dismiss based on the Estates'
A-3321-24 18 untimely asserted GSA release and waiver defenses. He argues the third motion
court unjustifiably granted the Estates' dismissal given their unexplained
prolonged delay in raising the GSA defenses. Doe asserts reversal is mandated
because of the following: the Estates embarked on years of appellate review
instead of raising the defenses; Dill and Bank of America owed him independent
fiduciary duties as a beneficiary and were bound to limit expenses such as
"attorneys' fees and litigation expenses"; and he suffered harm. A review of the
record demonstrates Doe's arguments are without merit.
"Laches is an equitable doctrine . . . . 'invoked to deny a party enforcement
of a known right when the party engages in an inexcusable and unexplained
delay in exercising that right to the prejudice of the other party.'" Fox v.
Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417-18 (2012) (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169,
180-81 (2003)). It is a remedy that our Supreme Court has "frequently described
as 'an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of the statute of
limitations.'" Id. at 418 (quoting Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 169 N.J. 135, 157 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient
opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the prejudiced party acted
in good faith believing that the right had been abandoned." Ibid. (quoting Knorr,
A-3321-24 19 178 N.J. at 181). "The core" of "applying laches is whether a party has been
harmed by the delay." Chance v. McCann, 405 N.J. Super. 547, 567 (App. Div.
2009) (quoting Knorr, 178 N.J. at 181). Our Supreme Court has held "laches is
not governed by fixed time limits." Fox, 210 N.J. at 418.
In considering Doe's argument regarding the Estates' delay in raising the
GSA release defenses, we initially recognize the matter's procedural history. In
March 2022, after the first motion court granted the Estates' motions to dismiss
Doe's November 2021 complaint, Doe appealed, and the first motion court's
jurisdiction was removed. R. 2:9-1. After we issued our opinion in October
2023, the Estates promptly filed answers, including "the Doctrine of Waiver"
defense. Relevantly, the Estates timely sought certification on October 30
before our Supreme Court and Doe cross-petitioned for certification. Doe
acknowledges the matter was stayed pending our Supreme Court's review,
preventing the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. "from giving formal notice of the GSA . . .
for a period of months" and "that his decision to file a [c]ross-[p]etition for
[c]ertification created some delay."
This procedural history demonstrates that the matter was under appellate
review for two years—consisting of seventeen months before our court and
A-3321-24 20 seven months before our Supreme Court.3 Doe's argument that the Estates had
nearly two years to assert the GSA release defenses, after filing answers in
October 2023, ignores that the Estates had timely petitioned for certification and
he cross-petitioned. Further, after our Supreme Court denied certification in
May 2024, Doe filed his amended complaint in September, which included
vicarious liability claims against the Estates. In October, the Estates moved to
dismiss the vicarious liability claims in lieu of filing answers, arguing Doe's
prior withdrawal of his CSAA vicarious liability claims barred his newly
asserted common law vicarious liability claims, which the second motion court
denied. In November, D.A.O. moved to dismiss Doe's complaint based on the
GSA, and the Estates relatedly cross-moved in December. The Estate of C.V.O.,
Jr.'s December amended answer, and the Estate of G.A.O.'s January 2025
amended answer to Doe's amended complaint, raised the GSA, release, and
waiver as separate defenses. Thus, a review of the record amply supports the
court's determination that the Estates did not delay asserting the GSA, release,
and waiver as defenses for Doe's claims against the Estates. The Estate of
3 It also bears noting, as mentioned in our earlier opinion, that we addressed issues of first impression surrounding the Child Victims Act's (CVA), L. 2019, c. 120, amendments to the statute of limitations for civil sexual abuse claims and the expanded category of liable defendants. Limited case precedent existed regarding the newly enacted CVA amendments. A-3321-24 21 C.V.O., Jr.'s litigation of its defenses did not delay the matter nor make it
inequitable to permit enforcement of the GSA.
We also reject Doe's argument that the doctrine of laches bars the Estates'
GSA release defenses because they failed to specifically recite their arguments
in the following: the "motion[s] to dismiss" the "original complaint, filed
November 17, 2021"; the "answers filed on October 30, 2023"; and the "second
motion[s] to dismiss . . . , filed October 2, 2024." We again note the Estates'
October 2023 answers included the waiver defense, and their earlier motions
argued unsettled statutory interpretation issues. See R. 4:5-4. We discern no
error in the third motion court's finding that the Estates' failure to "amend their
responsive pleadings or file new motions while dipositive motions were pending
d[id] not present . . . inexcusable delay contemplated by the laches doctrine."
The third motion court correctly considered the relevant facts, balancing the
equities and denying the doctrine of laches' application.
C. Fiduciary Duty
Finally, Doe argues the third motion court wrongly dismissed his claims
against the Estate of C.V.O., Jr. without examining whether the delay was
"unexplainable and inexcusable" because the co-trustees of the C.V.O., Jr.
Revocable Trust owed him a "fiduciary duty." Specifically, Doe contends the
A-3321-24 22 fiduciaries owed him a duty as a beneficiary to not delay in filing defenses and
protract the litigation.
Executors and trustees have fiduciary relationships with beneficiaries and
a duty to preserve estate assets. See Est. of Dizon v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 481
N.J. Super. 451, 462 (App. Div. 2025) (stating an "[e]state's representative must
'take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, protection and
preservation of[] the estate in his [or her] possession'" (alteration in original)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 3B:10-29)); see also N.J.S.A. 3B:10-23 (providing that a
representative "shall use the authority conferred upon him [or her] by law, the
terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is a party for
the best interests of successors to the estate.") We further recognize that "[t]he
duty of an administratrix is to do what is necessary to the administration of the
estate with the degree of care, prudence, circumspection and foresight that an
ordinary prudent person would employ in matters of his own." In re Est. of
Risica, 179 N.J. Super. 452, 455 (App. Div. 1981).
Recognizing these fiduciary duties, we discern Doe fails to demonstrate a
prima facie showing that the executor and co-trustees breached any fiduciary
duty to him as a beneficiary that serves to bar the Estate of C.V.O., Jr.'s GSA
release defenses under the doctrine of laches. To the contrary, Dill and Bank of
A-3321-24 23 America were obligated to preserve the estate for all beneficiaries and to act in
"good faith" and use "reasonable discretion . . . [t]o employ and compensate
attorneys for services rendered to the estate or trust or to a fiduciary in the
performance of the fiduciary's duties." N.J.S.A. 3B:14-23(l). While Doe argues
they did not preserve assets and limit "needless litigation expenditures," the
record demonstrates otherwise as evidenced by the defenses argued. For these
reasons, we discern the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply
the equitable doctrine of laches to bar the Estates' GSA defenses.
To the extent that we have not addressed Doe's remaining contentions, it
is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3321-24 24